

CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS' RELIGIOUS IDENTITY  
AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT ACROSS EUROPE

Tamara van der Does

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Doctoral Committee

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Patricia McManus, PhD

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Clem Brooks, PhD

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Jennifer C. Lee, PhD

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Dina Okamoto, PhD

May 24th, 2018

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Tamara van der Does

CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS' RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND POLITICAL  
ENGAGEMENT ACROSS EUROPE

In contrast with the secularization trend among Christians in Europe, the constant flow of immigrants since WWII has led to a rise in religious diversity and religiosity. How do minority religious groups integrate into the European political landscape? This dissertation investigates the salience of religion for children of immigrants from all faith traditions during their process of incorporation into European societies. I propose that religion is a source of politicized collective identities. Moreover, I argue that the Muslim identity is distinctive in that it functions as a racialized pan-ethnic identity: an imposed categorization that unifies individuals from different backgrounds to encourage political mobilization. I first apply longitudinal methods to analyze the co-evolution of religiosity and national identities among adolescents as they progress through secondary school in four Western European countries. I find that Christian children of immigrants and natives become more secular over time; however, religious identities and religious practices continue to be more important for children of immigrants as compared to natives. Moreover, Muslim children of immigrants increase their participation in religious services all the while developing a stronger attachment to their European national identities. Turning from adolescents to adults, I then use multilevel data from twenty European countries to examine how religiosity among children of immigrants is shaped by regional and national contexts. Except for Muslims, the religiosity of children of immigrants is lower in regions with lower native religiosity. However, both Muslim and Orthodox children of immigrants are more religious in countries with stronger multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies. Finally, I examine the relationship between religion and political engagement among adult children of immigrants across Europe. I find that children

of immigrants' involvement with religious communities and sense of group consciousness are both associated with more political acts. The relationship between religious attendance and political participation is stronger among Muslims and among children of immigrants living in countries with broader multiculturalism policies. Taken together, these findings suggest the resurgence of religion as a meaningful and resourceful identity for children of immigrants, the continuing importance of multiculturalism policies, and the emergence of new political communities.

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Patricia McManus, PhD

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Clem Brooks, PhD

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Jennifer C. Lee, PhD

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Dina Okamoto, PhD

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction: Children of Immigrants' Religious Identity and Political Engagement Across Europe

Although Christianity is the dominant religious tradition in Europe, the share of Europeans who do not identify with any religion has increased steadily in recent decades (Norris and Inglehart 2011). This secularization trend is predicted to continue in the future: in 2010, 18.8% of the European population was unaffiliated, and this proportion is expected to grow to 20% by 2020 and 23.3% by 2050. As a comparison, in 2010 17.1% of North Americans were unaffiliated, 3.2% of Sub-Saharan Africans were unaffiliated, and 0.6% of individuals living in North Africa or the Middle East were unaffiliated. The trend towards secularization among native-born Europeans coincides with successive waves of immigration from non-European countries since World War II. Migrants bring their own religious traditions: Christians from Sub-Saharan Africa, Orthodox Christians from ex-USSR countries, and Muslims from North Africa and the Middle East (Castles et al. 2014). Until today, migration from war-torn regions continues to bring new populations and religions to Europe. Though first-generation migrants go through many challenges as they incorporate into European countries, the changing social fabric has an even greater impact on their children. Children of immigrants<sup>1</sup> grow up between two worlds and try to uphold their families' values and traditions while at the same time incorporating culturally, economically, socially, and politically.

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<sup>1</sup>Throughout the dissertation, I define children of immigrants as individuals with at least one parent born outside of the country of residence (host country), and who were either born there or immigrated as small children. This is equivalent to the 1.5, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 2.5 generation as commonly used in the immigration literature.

How does the confluence of religious diversity and secularization shape the political incorporation of children of immigrants? In this dissertation, I explore the relationship between religion and political incorporation among children of immigrants in adolescence and adulthood. Bloemraad (2006) argues that participation in politics is not only a critical measure of immigrants’ political incorporation, but also a sign of cultural, social, and economic assimilation. Through political engagement, children of immigrants demonstrate their integration in the host country and in the national political discourse. Moreover, by participating in politics, children of immigrants can actively change the political landscape and policies affecting them (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Putnam 2001; Warner 1993). In the United States (US), solidarity and collective political mobilization are fueled by resources and allegiances found within religious organizations (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1993). In the European secular context, civic organizations and strong ethnic identities are found to increase the political engagement of European children of immigrants (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Fischer-Neumann 2014; Klandermans 2008; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014), but little is known about the relationship between religion, national identities, and political engagement.

I mobilize theoretical perspectives on social boundaries and pan-ethnic identities to understand the religious identity of Muslim children of immigrants. Due to the rapid growth of the European Muslim population and the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment among European natives<sup>2</sup>, children of immigrants who identify as Muslim experience a negative social context. However, they also have opportunities for new connections extending beyond national origins based on their shared identity and experience as Muslim Europeans. Immigrant assimilation theorists argue that in Europe, there is a “bright” social boundary — a strong differentiation in people’s minds — between “us” Europeans

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<sup>2</sup>Throughout this dissertation, I define “European natives” as individuals with parents and grandparents born in Europe who speak the official European language at home, only identify with a European ethnic identity, and only practice a traditionally European religion.

and “them” Muslims (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999). This bright social boundary can slow down the economic incorporation of religious children of immigrants and can create salient or even “reactive” religious identities: attitudes of confrontation with mainstream<sup>3</sup> culture and institutions (Foner 2015; Massey and Sánchez 2010; Rumbaut 1994). However, children of immigrants who share a religious tradition but have diverse national and cultural origins can also re-appropriate external categorizations to create new pan-ethnic identities as a tool for political mobilization (Espiritu et al. 2000; Kibria 1998; Okamoto 2006). The Muslim category in Europe is therefore more than just a religious identity. European Muslim can be understood as a racialized pan-ethnic category — a re-interpretation of an external racial categorization due to common experiences, and a tool for mobilization. Muslim organizations have the potential to function as pan-ethnic organizations. European qualitative research indicates that national Muslim organizations often take a pan-Muslim stance (Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005). Muslims in Europe are a diverse group, with multiple national origins, languages, and religious traditions, but a central claim of this dissertation is that for Muslim children of immigrants, Muslim identity and Islamic religious organizations foster the development of a pan-ethnic religious identity, reaching across national origins and encouraging political mobilization around shared interests.

This dissertation uses a comparative approach to study the political incorporation of religious children of immigrants in Europe. It focuses on the context of reception, both in terms of state policy and public opinion regarding immigration and immigrants. Immigration theorists argue that state policies can shape immigrant outcomes, and that states actively create and sustain categorizations, attitudes, and possibilities for representation (Lentin 2007; Massey 1999). Western liberal states have created their national identities and politics based on a white Christian history; therefore, their

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<sup>3</sup>By “mainstream,” I refer to the set of cultures and institutions that are understood by native Europeans to be part of their country. The mainstream, however, is constantly changing as children of immigrants are incorporating (Alba and Nee 2003)



institutions and policies are not completely secular or “blind” to religious differences (Adamson 2011; Kastoryano 2002; Taylor et al. 1994; Vasta 2007). In European and North American countries, states shape the incorporation of children of immigrants through policies that acknowledge, enable, and sometimes politicize minority organizations and identities (Kastoryano 2002; Mooney 2009; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). For example, the state’s relationship with religion determines how religious communities can help immigrants and their children understand the country’s political system (Mooney 2009). Moreover, children of immigrants living in states that focus their political discourse on limiting or accommodating the practice of Islam are more likely to mobilize around that religious identity (Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005). Research in Europe is focused on changes over time in multiculturalism policies and their effect on the economic and cultural incorporation of children of immigrants (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Koopmans 2013b; Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Modood 2013; Vasta 2007), but it has mostly ignored how states influence children of immigrants’ religiosity and political participation.

## **Core Questions**

The goal of this dissertation is to determine how religion shapes the political incorporation of children of immigrants across political and social contexts in Europe. To that end, I draw on the theoretical model exemplified in Figure 1.1. Each empirical chapter addresses a distinct set of questions. I first investigate the joint development of religious identities, religious behaviors, and national identities among children of immigrants of multiple religions. Second, I analyze how the social and political context shapes adult children of immigrants’ religiosity. Finally, I examine the role of religious organizations in encouraging political participation in adulthood.




Figure 1.1: Theoretical model for the dissertation.

*How do religious identities, religious behaviors, and national identities develop during adolescence among children of immigrants, and how do these trajectories vary by religious affiliation?*

Using theories of political socialization, identity development, religion, and immigrant incorporation, I argue that children of immigrants develop politicized religious identities in

adolescence. Politicized collective identities emerge out of a group struggle under a hostile political context leading to a commitment to collective engagement and reinforced by public behavior. In the first empirical chapter, I examine if some children of immigrants develop stronger religious identities and increase their religious practice for three years in adolescence. I look at changes over time in the importance of religion, frequency of prayer, and participation in religious events for Christian and Muslim children of immigrants and compare their trajectories with Christian native Europeans. I test the hypothesis that Muslim children of immigrants develop a specific type of politicized collective identity — a pan-ethnic identity — in the context of bright religious boundaries. I investigate if experiences of segregation and discrimination at school explain the higher salience of religious identity and more frequent religious practice of Muslims compared to other groups. Furthermore, I consider if this strong identity and religiosity is pan-ethnic or is instead reactive. I check if Muslim children of immigrants in adolescence also experience decreasing ties to their national origins and increasing ties to the host country, as a sign of engagement with the mainstream.

*How do state policies, native religiosity, and anti-immigrant sentiment shape the religiosity of children of immigrants?*

I argue that the religiosity of children of immigrants reflects both their social environment and national policies. I use theories of social boundaries and immigrant assimilation to explain children of immigrants' religious incorporation and their response to anti-immigrant attitudes. I use previous work on national-level policies to describe how states can contribute to children of immigrants' religiosity and to a politicization of religion. Multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies influence religiosity by accommodating multiple cultural expressions but also by sustaining debates around the adjustment of certain religious groups. Therefore, in the second empirical chapter, I investigate subjective religiosity and religious behavior among adult children of immigrants

in twenty European countries. Applying assimilation theories, I explore if children of immigrants' religiosity is affected by the religious levels of natives living in the same region. I investigate if Muslim children of immigrants are less religiously incorporated compared to other religious groups due to bright religious boundaries. Moreover, I analyze if Muslim children of immigrants in regions with strong anti-immigrant attitudes attempt to minimize their otherness or if they instead embrace their religion as a "reaction" against the mainstream. Finally, I compare twenty European countries in terms of their multiculturalism policies and anti-discrimination provisions. I test if multiculturalism policies and anti-discrimination policies increase religiosity among children of immigrants.

*How does engagement with religious institutions contribute to political engagement?*

Combining theories of political participation, ethnic social capital, and religious institutions, I investigate if co-religious communities encourage political participation of adults through organizational resources and a sense of religious group consciousness. As classically defined, political participation spans multiple acts, from displaying a campaign sticker to participating in a protest. For children of immigrants who already identify with a religion, group consciousness — a facet of politicized collective identities — is measured using a sense of perceived group discrimination on the basis of religion. In the third empirical chapter, I investigate if attendance at religious events encourages political participation of adult children of immigrants, both Christian and Muslim, and if the effect of religious attendance is moderated by a sense of group consciousness. I then test the hypothesis of a European Muslim pan-ethnic identity. I analyze if Muslim children of immigrants' engagement with pan-ethnic religious organizations (mosques) leads to greater mobilization compared to children of immigrants from other religions. Finally, I extend my analysis of the political context and test if multiculturalism policies and political rights for foreigners strengthen the relationship between children of immigrants' religious attendance and political engagement, and whether they directly increase the political participation of

children of immigrants.

This project connects theories of identity development, religion, political engagement, social boundaries, pan-ethnic identities, state policies, and immigrant incorporation in new ways that advance each field individually. This dissertation is the first to incorporate religion into the study of political socialization and identity exploration in adolescence. I advance the field of sociology of religion by investigating the role religion can play in building group consciousness and identities with consequences beyond religiosity. This project is the first to apply theories of racialized pan-ethnic identities to religion in Europe using the social boundary framework. Finally, this dissertation advances studies of immigration and incorporation by bridging two previously separate research domains: the effects of state policies on immigrant incorporation on one hand, and children of immigrants' religiosity on the other. More broadly, this project addresses the larger sociological question of how societies continue to function during times of animosity between groups, as well as how marginalized minority groups can be a part of the mainstream democratic process and advance their rights.

### **Politicized Religious Identities and Pan-ethnicity**

During times of political socialization and identity exploration in adolescence, children of immigrants learn about the political context and how they are systematically excluded by the majority because of ethnic or religious differences. Children of immigrants' politicized religious identities are further shaped by their interactions with European natives and institutions, and may become "reactive" or pan-ethnic when faced with a negative social context.

## **Collective religious identity and religiosity**

Religious identity and religiosity are separate yet mutually reinforcing. Empirical work focusing on children of immigrants in Europe tends to measure religiosity as an overarching concept including personal religious identity, beliefs, and practice (e.g. Güngör et al. 2011; Maliepaard and Phalet 2012). However, this is a Christian-centrist view of religion, which does not account for experiences outside of Europe and the US. In line with some religion theorists, I consider religious identity and religiosity as two different concepts that reaffirm each other (Chaves 2010; Voas and Fleischmann 2012; Warner 1994). Religiosity refers to the strength of one's religious beliefs and frequency of religious practices (Voas and Fleischmann 2012), while religious identity refers to religious affiliation and its perceived importance (Tajfel and Turner 1986). There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between personal religious identities, religious behavior, and collective identities. Frequent religious behavior indicate a personal religious identity but also reaffirms and strengthens collective religious identities, especially when individuals develop a sense of group consciousness built out of shared experiences and commitment to collective action (Ashmore et al. 2004; Cerulo 1997; Peek 2005; Platt 2014). As described by Peek (2005), "religious dress, practices, and organizational affiliations serve as important identity markers that help promote individual self-awareness and preserve group cohesion." In her study of the development of a Muslim identity in the US, Peek (2005) describes how this collective religious identity becomes more salient for immigrants and their children due to the politicization of Islam after 9/11.

## **Politicized religious identities in adolescence**

Adolescence is a crucial time for political socialization. In adolescence, children start to form political habits and attitudes as political events and issues become more relevant to them (Campbell 2008; Flanagan 2010; Sears and Valentino 1997). Thus, adolescents start to form opinions about the political landscape and learn useful skills for political participation. This political socialization can happen through parents, organizations, and

schools (Flanagan 2010). Empirically, being active in clubs and associations has been found to increase adolescent participation in politics (McFarland and Thomas 2006; Quéniart 2008; Quintelier 2015). For children of immigrants, religious organizations may be some of the few places where they can learn about relevant political issues and develop tools for change. Membership in these organizations might be the consequence or the marker of another process in adolescence: the search for a positive sense of self.

Children of immigrants develop politicized religious identities in adolescence as they become aware of political issues affecting their religious group and start to connect with co-religious individuals. In adolescence, children of immigrants are involved in identity exploration (Erikson 1968; Phinney 1993). During that time, they start to realize that they are treated differently by natives and institutions due to their national origins (Phinney 1993). Religion may provide children of immigrants with self-worth, meaning, and a supportive community during stressful times of identity search amid incorporation (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Warner 1993). Politicized collective identities are born out of group struggles under a hostile political context (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Therefore, in adolescence, children of immigrants who experience discrimination and prejudice based on religious differences are more likely to connect with others with the same religious background and develop strong politicized religious identities. Children of immigrants with a salient politicized religious identity often increase their religious practice to publicly display their group membership (Peek 2005; Platt 2014). Furthermore, children of immigrants who feel the most excluded by mainstream society might develop salient religious identities, either as a reaction against that mainstream or instead as a way to engage with the larger political context.

## **Religious boundaries in Europe**

In adolescence and throughout adulthood, children of immigrants come into contact with native Europeans and European institutions outside of their family. These

interactions reinforce categorizations and thereby shape children of immigrants' identities. According to Sanders (2002, p.327), “[...] boundaries are patterns of social interaction that give rise to, and subsequently reinforce, group members’ self-identification and outsiders’ confirmation of group distinction.” According to new assimilation and social boundary theories, day-to-day interactions between individuals reinforce categories centered on national, cultural, or even physical differences (Alba 2005; Wimmer and Soehl 2014; Zolberg 1999). However, social boundaries can also be sustained through cultures and institutions. In the US, bright boundaries around race have impeded the institutional incorporation of children of immigrants who are considered closer to being “Black” by the US American white majority (Alba 2005; Fox and Guglielmo 2012; Kasinitz et al. 2009; Massey and Sánchez 2010; Waters 2009). Other non-Black groups might experience blurred boundaries surrounding religious or other cultural differences, which are permeable and not a barrier to incorporation (Alba and Nee 2003). Under the context of bright racial boundaries and subsequent racial discrimination, children of immigrants’ racial identities become more salient (Massey and Sánchez 2010), and their ethnic identities often become racialized (Okamoto 2014; Ong et al. 1996). In Europe, however, bright boundaries are not constructed on a racial basis but rather on a religious one (Alba 2005; Lamont 2003; Zolberg 1999).

Bright boundaries separating Muslims from non-Muslims promote the development of politicized religious identities. There is still a debate if bright boundaries centered on religion in Europe emphasize the distinction between non-Muslims and Muslims or between Protestant/Catholic Christians and everyone else (Wimmer and Soehl 2014). However, in continuity with Zolberg (1999) and Alba (2005), I argue that the brightest group boundary in Europe is between “us” native Europeans and “them” Muslims. The attitude of European natives towards Muslims is partly a consequence of Muslims’ sizable population — the largest minority group in Western Europe (Castles et al. 2014; Lamont 2003) — and lower socioeconomic status. It is also a consequence of the disadvantaged position that



Muslim immigrants occupy within European cultures that are based on Christian institutions. Native white Europeans are either non-religious, Catholic, or Protestant, and some consider Muslims to have a culture incompatible with Western ideals (Taylor et al. 1994). European institutions created for Christian and secular individuals are less capable of accommodating Muslim beliefs and practices (Adamson 2011; Kastoryano 2002; Taylor et al. 1994; Vasta 2007). Therefore, bright boundaries in Europe have formed around religious differences, separating Muslims from the native majority (Alba 2005; Foner 2015; Wimmer and Soehl 2014; Zolberg 1999). This bright boundary is exemplified by high levels of segregation and discrimination of Muslims (Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014). Other religious groups do not experience such bright social boundaries but rather other, more permeable, categorizations. Orthodox Christian children of immigrants, for example, experience blurred social boundaries around their national origins or other cultural differences. Due to experiences of social exclusion from natives and institutions, Muslim children of immigrants might develop a stronger politicized religious identity, either as a “reaction” towards the mainstream or as a way to connect with others across ethnic origins.

### **Muslim pan-ethnicity**

Segmented assimilation theorists argue that children of immigrants can take multiple paths as they incorporate into the host country: a “straight line” assimilation if they encounter a positive social context of reception, a structural incorporation based on strong ethnic networks and communities, or a “downward” assimilation when faced with discrimination and low ethnic social capital (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997). This last path can lead individuals to develop a “reactive” identity, characterized by attitudes of confrontation, defensiveness, and solidarity against the mainstream (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997).

Muslim children of immigrants are more aware of how they differ from natives due to

constant categorization as “other” by European states, cultures, institutions, and individuals. According to segmented assimilation theory, Muslim children of immigrants might therefore develop a reactive religious identity. Though the precise operationalization of reactive identities varies, in line with other European empirical research, I believe the core aspect to be a rejection of the mainstream, as exemplified by a weak identification with the host country. Previous research sometimes describes the strong Muslim identity and religiosity as reactive. Cross-sectional research indicates that Muslim children of immigrants are more tied to their religion than other religious groups and grow increasingly religious over generations and time spent in the country. Moreover, high Muslim identity salience and religiosity is positively related to perceived discrimination and negatively associated with ties to the host country (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Güngör et al. 2011; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). However, previous research of Muslim children of immigrants’ does not investigate the intertwined temporal development of religious and national identities in adolescence, and ignores alternative hypotheses that may explain the formation of the salient Muslim identity.

I argue that in the context of bright imposed religious boundaries, Muslim children of immigrants do not develop a reactive identity but instead a pan-ethnic identity: a specific type of politicized collective identity that re-interprets imposed categorizations and reaches across national origins. Pan-ethnic identities are both imposed by the receiving society and re-defined by second-generation immigrants who share common histories and institutions (Kibria 1998; Nagel 1994; Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). For example, studies in the US find that children of immigrants are influenced by existing racial and ethnic categories and take on labels such as “Latino” and “Asian” (Cornell 1996; Feliciano 2009; Kibria 2000; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Tuan 1999). Groups that are structurally similar and have shared experiences of discrimination have the potential to develop pan-ethnic ties (Kibria 2000; Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 2014; Portes 1996; Waters 2009). This can happen within pan-ethnic organizations, where children of immigrants can point out

and discuss group discrimination and potential collective action (Kibria 1998; Park 2008). Because of bright religious boundaries, there may be an ongoing process of ethnicization of Muslims in Europe (Kastoryano 2002), similar to the racialization of ethnic identities in the US (Okamoto 2014; Ong et al. 1996). While imposed by the political discourse and the larger social context, this Muslim identity spans national origins (Adamson 2011; Kastoryano 2002) and therefore has the potential for pan-ethnic allegiances, communities, and mobilization. While reactive identities reflect a stance against the host country, pan-ethnic identities reflect more engagement with mainstream politics.

## **European States and Religion**

Religious identities and religious behaviors are not shaped by social boundaries only. In the secular or mono-religious European context, religious rights and diversity are often debated at the political level, and the resulting policies shape children of immigrants' political socialization, religious freedom, and possibilities for political engagement.

## **Europe and the secularization hypothesis**

As they have modernized, European countries have been rapidly secularizing. However, their Christian past still shapes current institutions and policies. In sociology of religion, Western Europe is the exemplification of the secularization hypothesis, which posits that individuals and organizations become less religious during the process of industrialization and modernization (Chaves 1994; Gorski and Atinordu 2008; Tschannen 1991). European countries, which have held Catholicism, Protestantism, or sometimes Orthodox Christianity as state religions since the rise of nation states, have experienced a decline in Christian observance, belief, and practice following the industrial revolution. There are, however, large variations by country (Gorski and Atinordu 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2011). While many countries began secularizing in the late nineteenth century, the exact starting point and speed varied according to each country's particular relationship with the church (Norris

and Inglehart 2011). In 2010, Europe as a continent had the second largest proportion of religiously unaffiliated individuals, after Asia (Hackett et al. 2015). However, while European countries today are more secular than before, their population is still Christian in majority and their every-day policies and structures are shaped by Christianity. Western liberal nation-states have built their identities and politics on the foundation of a white Christian history and must now adapt to the religious diversity brought by immigration, especially from Muslim-majority countries (Adamson 2011; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Foner and Alba 2008; Mooney 2009; Taylor et al. 1994; Vasta 2007).

### **History of migration in Europe**

After a period of outward migration and colonization before the two world wars, European states began attracting migrants from more diverse and more religious countries. States strongly affected by the wars — Germany, France, Belgium, Britain, or the Netherlands — organized guest-worker programs to rebuild infrastructures. These “guest” workers were mostly southern Europeans from Italy, Yugoslavia, or Greece, but some also came from Morocco and Turkey, especially in the case of the Netherlands and Germany (Castles et al. 2014). At the same time, old colonial powers such as Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands also had a large migration flow from their old colonies. These two forms of migration continued well into the 50s and 60s but ended with the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberal policies in the mid-1970s (Castles et al. 2014). Since the 1970s, European nations put restrictions on labor migration and post-colonial entry, though immigration continued through family reunification policies and refugee programs (Castles et al. 2014). In the late 1980s and 1990s, wars in the Balkans and the fall of the Soviet Empire lead to an increase in east-west migration. Overall migration flow patterns have since changed: countries in Southern Europe are now immigration destinations while countries in Central and Eastern Europe are places of transit (Castles et al. 2014). Most recently, the Syrian wave of refugees, one of the largest in history, put pressure on many European states to follow or break their

policies of welcome.

## **Multiculturalism policies**

In response to an increasingly diverse population in the early 1970s, some European states began developing policies that reflected their multicultural reality (Kastoryano 2002). The goal of these so-called “multiculturalism” policies was to recognize and encourage cultural diversity while also helping immigrants and their children integrate structurally (Koopmans 2013b; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). However, since the 1990s, and especially after 9/11 and a series of European terrorist attacks, European states have been moving away from the multiculturalism framework to instead focus on incorporation, security, and national unity (Joppke and Morawska 2003). Nevertheless, many multiculturalism policies are still in place today, and some countries continue to increase their multicultural provisions (Banting and Kymlicka 2013).

Multiculturalism policies enable more religious freedom, politicize religious identities, and shape the relationship between religious organizations and mainstream institutions. First, children of immigrants who live in countries with more multiculturalism policies are able to practice their culture and identify with a non-native European group, all the while incorporating into public life (Koopmans 2013b; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Anti-discrimination policies provide increased protections for religious minority groups. Second, multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies highlight differences and sustain categorizations (Fossati 2011; Taylor et al. 1994). Strong multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies are the consequence of a larger political debate about religions, which would then be reflected in more politicized religious identities. Third, children of immigrants’ political participation is affected by national-level policies. Multiculturalism policies increase the likelihood of identity politics while national political rights for legally residing foreigners create a culture of minority participation and trust in mainstream institutions (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad et al. 2008).

Finally, multiculturalism policies shape the relationship between the state and religious organizations. By recognizing religious groups, the state can enable religious organizations to play a larger role in the incorporation of children of immigrants (Kastoryano 2002; Mooney 2009; Taylor et al. 1994). If not recognized by the state, minority organizations cannot utilize official power structures and resources to help children of immigrants.

## **Religious Organizations and Political Engagement**

In adulthood, children of immigrants who attend religious services have additional resources for political engagement and further develop their politicized religious identities through a sense of group consciousness. Theorists of political participation find that social organizations provide not only individual resources, but also greater social networks and a motivation for group mobilization.

As I expand in the next paragraphs, I apply theories of ethnic and religious organizations developed in the US to religion in Europe. I argue that attending religious events provides resources to children of immigrants useful for political participation. For individuals experiencing social exclusion, religious organizations develop politicized collective identities through a sense of group consciousness and pan-ethnicity.

### **Resources from religious organizations**

Religious organizations equip children of immigrants and native Europeans with resources and skills critical for political participation. It is known that many types of organizations provide material help and classes to increase their members' material and human capital (Pattillo-McCoy 1998; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Moreover, individuals can learn directly from organizational leaders about political issues affecting them (Harris 1994; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). Through participation in organizations and their structures, members also learn about civic processes and thus develop their civic skills (Secret et al. 1990).

Religious organizations often play a greater role among ethnic minorities with fewer

resources. For example, in the US, ethnic religious organizations are more likely than white American churches to increase the political participation of their members (Verba et al. 1995). This may be because children of immigrants are more reliant on religious organizations for material and human capital, or because religious organizations serve to strengthen and expand social networks.

Through religious organizations, members develop their social capital and strengthen their ethnic identities, both of which lead to more political engagement (Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Putnam 2001). Individuals in religious organizations expand their social networks and can meet other members from different backgrounds. These “bridging” social contacts provide information on politics not available through other networks (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Putnam 2001). Religious organizations can link children of immigrants with individuals who are more incorporated into the cultural mainstream and more comfortable with the host country’s institutions (Allen 2010; Hirschman 2004; Levitt 2003; Warner 1997; Withnow and Hackett 2003). In addition, institutions based on one national origin provide strong “bonding” networks that foster ethnic identities by embracing cultural particularities (Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; Lim and Putnam 2010; Putnam 2001). For example, religious organizations offer a space where immigrants and minority groups can participate in traditional activities and celebrate their cultural uniqueness (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Mooney 2009; Warner 1993). Furthermore, religious organizations have been found to provide a haven for individuals experiencing discrimination (Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1993). These shared experiences of discrimination may increase group-level commitment to political action (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Harris 1994).

### **Religious group consciousness**

Political mobilization around a collective identity develops in the context of shared personal experiences of stigma and discrimination (Bernstein 2005; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005). Ethnic and religious

organizations increase group consciousness: group identity and an added sense of power deprivation and commitment to collective action (Harris 1999; Wilcox and Gomez 1990). This notion of group consciousness, as described by political scientists, is a concept similar to politicized collective identities, a term preferred by the social psychology literature (Fleischmann et al. 2011; Simon and Klandermans 2001), but with less attention to the process of identity politicization and with more focus on the commitment to political action. I consider group consciousness to be a facet of politicized group identities. High levels of group consciousness lead individuals to realize that their group may be at a disadvantage but also that they can take action and influence politics (Peterson 1992). In the US, members of African American churches develop a sense of group consciousness through conversations with other churchgoers about issues pertaining to their group, as well as through narratives of empowerment prominent in church services (Harris 1999; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Secret et al. 1990; Wilcox and Gomez 1990). Children of immigrants from all faith traditions have the potential to develop a sense of group conscientiousness if they experience discrimination as a group.

### **Mosques as pan-ethnic organizations**

I argue that due to bright boundaries around religion and to pan-ethnic identities developed in adolescence, mosques can function as pan-ethnic organizations. Similarly to Christian organizations, mosques encourage political mobilization through a sense of group consciousness, but unlike other faith traditions in Europe, mosques also connect individuals across national backgrounds and re-appropriate imposed categorizations. In the US, pan-ethnic organizations are the cornerstone of political mobilization for marginalized minorities (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 2014). These organizations are a key factor in promoting group identities for children of immigrants across national origins and bringing forth the group's concerns to the national level (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). In pan-ethnic organizations, individuals develop



a greater sense of pan-ethnic group consciousness used for political mobilization (Espiritu 1992). Research in the US on Latino- and Asian-Americans shows that anti-immigrant attitudes, violence, exclusion and segregation lead to pan-ethnic mobilization through organizations (Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). Pan-ethnic organizations are also shaped by the political context. Okamoto (2014) explains that more open national policies regarding citizenship, immigration, and civil rights create an opening for pan-ethnic organizations to form and grow. In a context of simultaneous bright social boundaries and multiculturalism policies, mosques may allow Muslim children of immigrants to develop ties across national background, re-interpret the meaning of being a European Muslim, and organize to change policies.

## **Outline of Dissertation**

This dissertation is divided into three empirical chapters, each answering the questions detailed above. For each chapter, I develop the relevant theoretical background and previous empirical research. Before describing the sample and results, I offer a detailed explanation of the data source and the methods used. I finish each chapter with a summary of the results and a discussion. I provide supplementary materials: additional tables for each chapter (Appendix A) and the indicators for my policy scores (Appendix B).

In Chapter 2, I investigate the development of politicized religious identities in adolescence for Christian and Muslim children of immigrants in four Western European countries: Germany, the Netherlands, England, and Sweden. I combine theories of identity exploration, religiosity in adolescence, and immigrant incorporation to provide a framework to understand trends over time and the role of the social context. Most children of immigrants secularize over time but, by the end of high school, they still give more importance to religion and practice religion more often than natives. Due in part to segregation, Muslim children of immigrants give more importance to religion than other groups and participate more in religious communities between ninth and eleventh grade.

During that same period, Muslim children of immigrants become less tied to their national origins and more tied to the host country, precluding the hypothesis of a reactive Muslim identity and instead showing the potential for a Muslim pan-ethnic identity.

Chapter 3 extends the analysis to religiosity in adulthood and to the social and political contexts of twenty European countries. Using theories of assimilation and social boundaries, I explore how natives' own religiosity and anti-immigrant attitudes shape children of immigrants' religiosity. Due to social boundaries infused in culture and institutions, Muslim children of immigrants are less religiously incorporated, but they do not have a reactive religiosity in an anti-immigrant context. I advance the study of state policies and incorporation by showing that Muslim children of immigrants are more religious in countries with both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies, while other minority religious groups are only affected by the strength of anti-discrimination policies.

In Chapter 4, I investigate the consequences of involvement in religious communities for children of immigrants' political incorporation. I use theories of religious organizations, ethnic social capital, and group consciousness to explain the possible mechanisms linking religious organizations with political engagement. Across twenty European countries, I find that children of immigrants who attend religious services frequently are also more politically engaged, especially if experiencing collective social exclusion. Muslim children of immigrants depend on religious organizations for political incorporation more than any other group. Again, this finding points to the potential for mosques to function as pan-ethnic organizations. Finally, I test the relationship between the state, organizations, and individual political incorporation. I find that strong political rights for immigrants and multiculturalism policies encourage children of immigrants' political engagement, and more multiculturalism policies also increase the positive role of religious organizations.

In the concluding chapter, I discuss the unlikely role of religion as a bridge instead of a barrier for the incorporation of children of immigrants in a secular European context. I

examine the difficulties of exploring religious boundaries and the need for more research to investigate if and how Muslim communities can be a foundation for pan-ethnic political engagement and mobilization. I emphasize the importance of multiculturalism policies at a time where many European countries are experiencing a retreat from a multicultural rhetoric. I propose additional lines of inquiry for future research and implications beyond academia.

## Chapter 2

### **The Development of Religious Identities and Religious Behaviors for Children of Immigrants in Adolescence: Towards or Away from the Mainstream**

Between twelve and nineteen years old, adolescents start to form their own identities, influenced more and more by peers, the media, and the greater political context (Crosnoe and Johnson 2011; Dornbusch 1989). For children of immigrants, this developmental process is complicated by their growing awareness that they are treated differently by the majority (Erickson 1992; Erikson 1968; Phinney 1993). Children of immigrants start to realize that political issues on incorporation, discrimination, or equal rights, concern their own experiences (Campbell 2008; Flanagan 2010; Sears and Valentino 1997). At the same time, at home, children of immigrants continue to learn about their families' cultural origins and practices (Feliciano 2009; Phinney 1993). For immigrants and their children, religion is one way to uphold traditions and at the same time connect to a greater supportive community (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Hirschman 2004). Religion thus becomes an important social identity for children of immigrants in a sometimes-hostile environment (Ysseldyk et al. 2010).

In Europe, research on the religious identity and the religious behavior of children of immigrants focuses primarily on Muslims. Previous empirical work shows that the religious identity of Muslims does not decline with generations but is negatively correlated with ties to the host country (Connor 2010; de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Fleischmann et al. 2011; Güngör et al. 2013; Jacob and Kalter 2013; Maliepaard et al. 2012; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Therefore, this strong Muslim identity is often associated with an oppositional stance against the

mainstream, along the lines of a “reactive” identity as defined by the segmented assimilation literature (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994, 2005; Waters 1999). However, most of these studies center on adults. Few studies address the processes of identity formation in adolescence, and no study compares the joint development of religious and national identities among Muslim and non-Muslim children of immigrants. In adolescence, Muslim children of immigrants might start realizing that many European natives see them and their parents’ culture as monolithic and incompatible with Western ideals (Cesari 2003; Foner and Alba 2008; Taylor et al. 1994). As such, children of immigrants experience “bright” boundaries centered on religion, separating “us” native Europeans from “them” Muslims (Alba 2005; Zolberg 1999). Muslim children of immigrants might turn to religion, not to reject the host country’s culture, but instead to connect with similar individuals and engage with mainstream institutions.

This chapter investigates children of immigrants over time, as they develop religious identities and join new communities between fourteen and seventeen years old. I compare the trajectories of religious identity salience and religious behavior of Muslim and Christian children of immigrants to the trajectories of native Christians in Germany, England, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Using longitudinal data between ninth and eleventh grade, I test if differences between Muslims and non-Muslims are due to experiences with bright boundaries. Finally, I investigate if children of immigrants who experience a growth in religious identity salience or in frequency of religious behavior “react” against the mainstream or instead develop more ties to the host country.

### **Politicized Religious Identities and Religious Behaviors in Adolescence**

Religious identities are marked and reinforced by religious behavior. I investigate religious identity salience, or importance given to religion, alongside changes in religious behavior: frequency of prayer and attendance at religious events. Religious identities are expressed by one’s religious affiliation and the perceived importance of that identity (Tajfel

and Turner 1986). For all social identities, following behavioral norms both expresses one's identity and, in turn, increases a sense of group identity membership, a mutual relationship especially applicable to religion (Ashmore et al. 2004; Maliepaard and Phalet 2012; Platt 2014). Praying frequently and attending religious events will reinforce attachment to religion, and a strong importance given to religion will lead individuals to pray and participate more in the religious community (Ashmore et al. 2004; Maliepaard and Phalet 2012; Peek 2005; Platt 2014; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). In adolescence, children of immigrants might explore their identities within religious communities.

In adolescence, children of immigrants explore multiple aspects of identity: gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, etc. Social psychologists have long been interested in adolescence, a crucial period for identity formation (Erikson 1968; Phinney 1993). Ethnic minority students frequently experience dissonance or “a growing awareness that not all cultural values of the dominant group are beneficial to [them]” and start exploring their ethnic culture and identity (Phinney 1993, pg.69). As suggested by previous work (Padilla 1980; Padilla and Perez 2003; Phinney 1993), identity development might become even more challenging for young immigrants who often deal with societal standards that are incongruous with their cultural heritage (Feliciano 2009; Phinney et al. 2001). This process is also likely to happen for religious identities, which are both tied to national origins and often used in Europe as a basis for discrimination (Alba and Silberman 2002; Massey and Sánchez 2010; Zolberg 1999). Segregation and discrimination around religion might encourage adolescent religious children of immigrant to develop a positive sense of self through religion and religious communities (Phinney 1993). However, children of immigrants also respond to how natives and institutions categorize them.

In adolescence, children of immigrants' religious identities might become increasingly salient and politicized through contacts with peers and institutions. Even if they are still influenced by their parents' religion, children start to become more and more influenced by peers and institutions in adolescence. For European natives, this process is expressed

through a decrease in religiosity over time (Martin et al. 2003; Ozorak 2016; Regnerus et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2002). However, the secularization trend in adolescence might not be applicable to all children of immigrants. First, immigrant parents might put more effort into transmitting their religious and national culture to their child in adolescence (Bankston and Zhou 1996; Güngör et al. 2011; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992). Second, an increase in experiences with social exclusion by peers and institutions might lead children of immigrants to realize that they are treated differently because of their religion. Consequently, they might develop politicized religious identities out of shared awareness of grievances (Fleischmann et al. 2011; Simon and Klandermans 2001). Religious communities are especially important in creating a sense of collective consciousness out of politicized identities.

Children of immigrants' religious identities will develop in relationship to national identities. Individuals have multiple identities that can be ranked and activated (Leszczensky 2016; Peek 2005; Stets and Burke 2000; Stryker 1968), and can either be intertwined or develop independently (Phinney et al. 2001). Theories of bi-culturalism explain that individuals can view their identities as either compatible or in conflict (Benet-Martínez et al. 2002). Measuring the strength of an identity, or identity salience, is one way to compare identities and their changes over time. Identity salience refers to the position of an identity in an identity hierarchy (Stryker and Burke 2000) but can also be measured as the importance of the identity for the individual (Fleischmann et al. 2011; Maliepaard and Phalet 2012; Peek 2005; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). While some salient identities might be “reactions” towards the mainstream, politicized religious identities can lead to more ties across national origins and more engagement with the host country's mainstream political institutions. I investigate how religious identity and religious practice develop alongside national identities in adolescence.

In Figure 2.1, I lay out the process of religious identity formation in adolescence, the influence of one's background and social boundaries, and how religion relates to national identities using a Structural Model Equations Modeling approach. I model both overall

religious identity salience and religious practice (baseline) and changes during adolescence (growth). In early adolescence (before ninth grade), children have a religious identity salience and religious behavior mostly shaped by their parents' religiosity and immigration background. Over time, experiences with social boundaries, due to their religious affiliation, may increase both religious identity salience and religious behavior. Finally, depending on the type of religious identity developed, changes in religious identity salience and practice may reflect more or less ties with national origins and the host country.




Figure 2.1: Theoretical model for Chapter 2.

### Baseline Religious Identity and Behavior: Migration and Incorporation

Religion is especially important for immigrants, who connect religious practice with their origins and use it for support and integration (Akresh 2011; Allen 2010; Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Hammond 1988; Min 1992; Mooney 2009; Peek 2005; Warner 1993, 1997).



Through religious practice, immigrants can meet co-nationals and uphold traditions from their home country (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Peek 2005; Warner 1993). Moreover, in times of hardship, stress, and alienation brought by the processes of migration and incorporation, religion can provide a sense of meaning and belonging (Allen 2010; Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Ebaugh 2001; Hirschman 2004; Peek 2005; Smith 1978a; Warner 1993). Religious organizations also sometimes provide material and social resources, linking immigrants to larger national institutions in the host country (Allen 2010; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Mooney 2009).

Religion also helps the children of immigrants in their own processes of identity exploration and incorporation in the host country (Bankston and Zhou 1996; Berry 1997; Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Chong 1998; Ebaugh 2001; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Smith 1978a). In the US and in Europe, religion and religious organizations continue to play a large role in maintaining ethnic identities for second-generation children already acculturated into the host country (Bankston and Zhou 1996; Chong 1998; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Smith 1978b; Warner 1997). Religious communities also sometimes help diverse children of immigrants to construct new positive social identities in the context of discrimination and exclusion (Cadge and Ecklund 2007). Indeed, the subjective meaning of religion is different for second-generation immigrants spending all or most of their lives in the host country. Religious organizations therefore help the second-generation to maintain ties with their origins while also securing a place for themselves in the host country. Due to the search for ties with their family's origins alongside the need for meaning and community in a new context, I argue that children of immigrants will have a stronger religious identity salience and engage in religious behavior more frequently compared to natives.

*(H1) On average, children of immigrants will have a stronger religious identity and engage in religious behavior more frequently than their native peers.*

Religion will not be as important for all immigrants, due to variation in both dogma and the social context of reception (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Ebaugh 2001; Foner and Alba 2008). Religions have different requirements regarding practice — dogma — which apply to immigrants, children of immigrants, and natives alike. Islam has formal requirements on the number of daily prayers (five) and attendance at religious events (once a week for Friday prayer). However, while the five daily prayers are part of the core of Islam, attendance at Friday congregational prayer (Jum'ah) is not in the five pillars of Islam and not required (sometimes not allowed) for Muslim women. Attendance at Mass is part of the seven sacraments of the Catholic church, but daily prayer, while encouraged, is not required. Most Protestant denominations strongly encourage weekly attendance at church and prayers before all meals of the day, however, these are not considered to be compulsory. Among children of immigrants, I expect Muslims to have the highest frequency of prayer. However, I expect children of immigrants to have similar levels of subjective religiosity and attendance at religious events. Moreover, the social context of incorporation — at the individual and institutional level — might lead to different levels of religious identity and religious behavior for Christian and Muslim children of immigrants.

### **Religion Under Bright Social Boundaries**

During the process of incorporation, children of immigrants often lose their cultural particularities. According to classic and new assimilation theories, children of immigrants and native Europeans become more similar to each other over years and generations (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964). While European natives might adopt some customs from immigrant cultures, children of immigrants will experience the most changes over time (Alba and Nee 2003). Therefore, because of secularization trends in Europe and the role of religion as a cultural identity instead of something exemplified in daily practice, most children of immigrants are expected to lose their strong ties to religion as they spend more time in the host country. There is evidence in Europe and in the US that in an accepting social

context, children of immigrants' religiosity become more similar to natives over time (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Cesari 2003; Gans 1979; Güngör et al. 2011; Hammond 1988; Hirschman 2004). However, in the context of bright boundaries, children of immigrants might develop stronger religious identities and consequently be more religious.

New assimilation and social boundary theories suggest that Muslim children of immigrants might develop a salient politicized religious identity because of interactions with institutions and natives categorizing them as “other” (Alba 2005; Massey and Sánchez 2010). Alba (2005) and Zolberg (1999) argue that in Europe bright social boundaries are centered around religion instead of race or ethnicity. Boundaries shape and are shaped by individuals' beliefs and day to day interactions (Alba 2005). Bright boundaries increase perceived differences between groups and therefore shape both natives' actions towards children of immigrants and children of immigrants' group identities (Brown 2000; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Peek 2005; Yancey et al. 1976). Therefore, the presence of a bright boundary around any given minority status characteristic — e.g., race, citizenship, religion — will increase the salience of that characteristic (Foner and Alba 2008; Sainsbury 2012). Massey and Sánchez (2010) explain that bright boundaries can shape identity development and potential group cohesion through shared experiences of discrimination, thus creating politicized collective identities. I argue that because of a bright religious boundary in Europe, Muslims will experience a growth in importance given to religion and religious practice over time. On the other hand, other religious groups who do not experience this bright boundary will become more similar to natives over time.

*(H2) On average, Muslim children of immigrants will have a stronger religious identity and engage in religious behavior more frequently than Christian children of immigrants.*

*(H3) Christian and Muslim children of immigrants will have different trajectories over time:*

*(H3a) Christians will become more similar to natives over time.*

*(H3b) Muslims' religious identity and religious behavior will increase over time, resulting in an increased differentiation from both natives and Christian children of immigrants.*

The experience of bright boundaries happens not only through direct interactions with the majority, but also through experiences with institutions and the larger cultural context. First, segregated schools and friendship networks are an expression of social boundaries between two groups (Wimmer 2013). Second, actions from natives at school, by law enforcement, or in public transportation will also affect how children of immigrants view themselves (Soininen 1999; Vasta 2007). Bright boundaries can be reflected in personal experiences of perceived discrimination. Third, social boundaries will be expressed through culture. Therefore, children of immigrants from non-western origins will be more likely to be seen as foreigners and these three experiences of bright boundaries will lead cultural particularities to be maintained over generations. However, social boundaries are also experienced through interaction with institutions that cannot be measured using quantitative data analysis, therefore some differences in religious identity salience and frequency of religious behavior between groups will remain unexplained even accounting for segregation, discrimination, and cultural differences. With more time spent in the host country interacting with natives and institutions, children of immigrants will have a higher religious identity salience and practice religion more often.

*(H4) The difference between Muslim and Christian children of immigrants in baseline levels and growth of religious identity salience and religious behavior will be partially explained by personal experiences of segregation, discrimination, and cultural differences.*

### **Pan-ethnic vs. Reactive Religious Identities**

Children of immigrants who do not experience bright boundaries will assimilate over time and therefore drop ties to their country of origin and increase the strength of their

host country national identity. However, Muslims' increase in religious identity salience and religious behavior over time could be either a way to engage with the mainstream or a "reaction" against the mainstream.

In the context of bright religious boundaries, Muslims' politicized religious identity may be pan-ethnic: a re-interpretation of imposed categorizations across ethnic lines. While first-generation immigrants understand themselves using their country of origin, children of immigrants incorporate into established social categorizations. Therefore, under bright boundaries a Muslim religious identity might become a pan-ethnic identity: a politicized collective identity which reinterprets existent categorizations and reaches across national origins. Consequently, mosques might become pan-ethnic organizations, bringing individuals from various backgrounds together and fostering a sense of collective consciousness. Research on pan-ethnicity finds that when children of immigrants experience similar segregation and institutional discrimination from natives, they develop ties across ethnic backgrounds (Espiritu 1992; Kibria 1998; Nagel 1994; Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). Peer negative attitudes, discrimination, and imposed categorizations might force children of immigrants to turn to religion: an identity that gives them value and an accepting group (Hirschman 2004; Jamal 2005; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Warner 1993; Waters 2009). The emergence of a pan-ethnic identity among Muslims implies the primacy of religious identities and religious communities over national origin identity, and a motivation to engage with the host country's political system.

The pan-ethnic identity hypothesis is an alternative to the idea of a reactive Muslim identity or reactive religiosity, exemplified by disengagement with the host country's culture and institutions. According to segmented assimilation theory, a strong religious identity or religiosity developed out of social exclusion could reflect a reaction against the mainstream (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997). Indeed, children of immigrants sometimes incorporate into existing minority groups and cultures under experiences of segregation, discrimination, and lack of opportunity. Thus, a reactive

ethnic identity develops towards the mainstream, as a product of confrontation and rise of defensive identity (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Thomson and Crul 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012; Zhou 1997). The differentiation between reactive and pan-ethnic identities is not clear in the literature. Espiritu (1992) explains that a reactive pan-ethnic solidarity develops under threat and sometimes leads to more mobilization. However, this is not in line with segmented assimilation theorists who posit reactive identities as distinct from ethnic solidarity and definitely not a source of political engagement (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994). I argue therefore that the concept of reactive solidarity in the pan-ethnic literature and reactive identity in the incorporation literature are different. Specifically, pan-ethnic identities reflect an engagement with mainstream culture and the potential for political mobilization while reactive identities reflect a disengagement with the mainstream and the development of politically disenfranchised subcultures. Moreover, pan-ethnic identities are uniquely associated with a decrease in ties with national origins, while reactive identities can be mono-ethnic in nature.

*(H5) Alongside changes in religious identity salience and religious behavior, children of immigrants will develop stronger or weaker ties to their origin country and the host country during adolescence.*

*(H5a) Christians' origin country identity salience will decrease, and their host country identity salience will increase.*

*(H5b) Pan-ethnic Muslim identity: Muslims' origin country identity salience will decrease, and their host country identity salience will increase.*

*(H5c) Reactive Muslim identity: Muslims' host country identity salience will decrease over time.*

Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and England are ideal cases to analyze social boundaries and identity formation in Western Europe. These four countries are among the largest immigrant-receiving countries in Europe and all share a common Christian history. All four countries had several big waves of immigration in the fifty years following World

War II. Germany and Sweden had the highest per capital immigration rate, followed by the Netherlands, and finally England (Koopmans et al. 2012). According to Pew Research Center estimates, Germany has also the largest Muslim population in Western Europe, which totals to 4.8 million in 2010 (5.8% of the total population) (Hackett 2015). However, the Netherlands has one of the highest Muslim population per capita (6% of the total population is Muslim), second only to France. England and Sweden have respectively 4.8% and 4.6% of their population that is Muslim. While all four countries provide religious freedom to their members and immigrants, they each have strong ties to Christian denominations. For example, even with a mostly secularized population, the Netherlands holds Calvinism as a quasi-state church. Until 2000, the Lutheran Church was the state religion in Sweden and the Church of England (Anglican) is still formally tied to the state in England. In Germany, special state sponsored status has been given to the Roman Catholic Church, a Protestant coalition, and Jewish communities. However, Islam has not been accepted as large or stable enough to be granted the same privileges.

### **Previous Findings on the Religious Identities and Religious Behavior of Children of Immigrants in Europe**

Previous research in Europe focuses on the incorporation of Muslim children of immigrants and ignores religious identities of other children of immigrants. The few comparative studies find that Muslim children of immigrants have higher religiosity than their peers both in the survey country (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Jacob and Kalter 2013; van Tubergen 2007), and in their origin country (Güngör et al. 2013). There are no studies that compare the religious identity salience and the religious practice of Muslim children of immigrants, Christian natives, and Christian children of immigrants.

Research on immigrants' religiosity over time is sparse and inconclusive, many studies using age or generations as a proxy for changes over time. In a cross-sectional analysis of Moroccan-Dutch children of immigrants, Verkuyten et al. (2012) find that younger

adolescents are more religious compared to older children of immigrants. Looking at differences by generation, Jacob and Kalter (2013) find that the difference in religiosity between Muslims and other groups is stable across generations. Moreover, Platt (2014) finds that communal aspects of religiosity are not less important for the second-generation compared to their parents. In the only true longitudinal study on religiosity, Güngör et al. (2012) find that in adolescence there is not a decrease in religiosity for Turks in Belgium. No study compares Muslims over time to both Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants.

Social psychologists in Europe and the United States look at Muslims' religious identity in particular and argue that it is an important and meaningful social group which provides a sense of group membership linked to beliefs and practices (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Ysseldyk et al. 2010). Parents' religiosity and socialization strongly predicts children's religiosity (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Fleischmann and Phalet 2011; Jacob and Kalter 2013). Structural incorporation (better employment and education) leads to lower probability of religious affiliation and religiosity (van Tubergen 2007; van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). The strength of immigrants' religious identity is also influenced by the number of co-ethnic peers in the neighborhood and at school (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; van Tubergen 2007; Verkuyten et al. 2012). So far, no study has found a relationship between perceived discrimination, segregation, and religious identity for immigrants in Europe. Studies of Turks in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands find that there is a strong relationship between being Turkish and Muslim (Güngör et al. 2012; Maliepaard et al. 2010; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007), sometimes even stronger for second-generation immigrants compared to their parents (Maliepaard et al. 2010).



## **Data Source, Measures, and Method**

### **Data source and case selection**

I analyze adolescents and the development of their religious identities and religious behaviors in Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, and England between ninth and eleventh grade. These four countries were selected by the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) funded by the Norface Era Net Plus Migration in Europe program (Kalter et al. 2016). This project followed adolescent children of immigrants and their peers between 2010 and 2013. In 2010, the research team selected schools with a probability proportional to their size while over-sampling schools with a higher proportion of children of immigrants. Then, the team randomly selected classes within the schools in grades where most children were already fourteen years old and interviewed all students enrolled in these classes. The grades selected were equivalent to ninth grade in Germany, eighth grade in Sweden, tenth grade in England, and third grade of secondary for the Netherlands (I will use ninth grade for simplicity and equivalency with the US educational system). The initial survey covered 480 schools and 958 classrooms comprising of 18,902 students, 18,716 of whom participated in the first wave. A total of 11,896 parents were also interviewed at that time, including 157 parents with children who did not participate until the next wave and four parents whose child was never interviewed. In the second wave, the research team interviewed a total of 15,217 students both in and out of schools, and 10,902 students again in the third wave. After the third wave, the organization stopped doing a unified data collection in all four countries. I focus on adolescents who participated in at least one wave and had a parent interviewed: 11,892 students.

I compare the religious identity salience and religious practice of native Europeans and children of immigrants who report a religious affiliation. A total of 7,779 adolescents identify with a religion in the first wave or subsequently if missing at first. I keep adolescents who

become unaffiliated after the first or second wave — 10.4% of students — as this would be reflected in a decrease in religious identity salience and practice over time. Native Europeans are more likely than children of immigrants to become unaffiliated over time.

I define native Europeans as children who have both parents and grandparents born in the survey country. Of all native Europeans, 52.6% report a religious affiliation, and almost all affiliated natives (98.5%) identify as Christians. Therefore, I exclude native adolescents who report an affiliation with a religion other than Christianity. Christian natives are split between Catholicism (30.5% of Christian natives), Protestantism (30.5%), and just “Christian” or “other Christian” (38.98%). The survey questionnaire does not differentiate between denominations within “other Christian”, spanning from eastern Orthodox traditions to evangelic groups. Among participating students with a parent interviewed, a total of 3,460 are native Europeans identifying as Christians.

Alongside native Europeans, I focus on children of immigrants who have spent enough time in the host country to be familiar with its culture. I include children of immigrants who moved to the survey country at or before the age of six (1.5 generation) as well as children of immigrants who were born in the host country with at least one parent born abroad (2nd and 2.5 generation). Children of mixed parents, especially those who identify with a minority religion, are not exempt from discrimination and categorizations by natives. Among children of immigrants, 15.1% report no religious affiliation, 33.0% are Christian, 43.8% are Muslim — with no possible differentiation between Shi’a, Sunni, or other traditions — and 6.84% identify with another religion. Within Christian children of immigrants, 36.27% identify as Catholic, 20.1% identify as Protestant and 43.6% are just Christian or other Christian. Other religions include Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Judaism, but none of these groups are large enough to be included in the analysis. For example, only sixty adolescents without missing values report being Hindu, the largest group within other religions. Among participating students with a parent interviewed, 2,727 are children of immigrants identifying as either Christian or Muslim.

I restrict my sample to students who have at least two waves present for time variant measures (religious identity salience, religious practice, and national identities) in order to have the correct baseline and growth estimates. Consequently, I exclude 384 Christian natives, 215 Christian children of immigrants, and 240 Muslim children of immigrants from the analysis. I remove an additional 345 adolescents due to missing values on time invariant covariates. The final sample totals 5,003 adolescents, including 2,917 native Christians, 1,045 Christian children of immigrants, and 1,041 Muslim children of immigrants.

## National contexts

I investigate the changes in religious identity salience and religious behavior for Christian natives and Christian and Muslim children of immigrants between ninth and eleventh grade. In Table 2.1, I present the population estimates for the proportion of each immigrant generation and religious affiliation by country in 2011.

Table 2.1: Proportion of ninth graders by religious affiliation and generation status in four European countries in 2010, weighted population estimates.

<i>Percentages of population in ninth grade</i>	Germany	England	Netherlands	Sweden
Natives	0.592	0.650	0.738	0.566
No religion	0.196	0.595	0.574	0.398
Christian	0.797	0.391	0.415	0.586
Muslim	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
Other	0.006	0.013	0.009	0.014
Children of Immigrants	0.255	0.169	0.152	0.233
No religion	0.109	0.228	0.336	0.278
Christian	0.545	0.371	0.338	0.407
Muslim	0.311	0.269	0.258	0.274
Other	0.035	0.131	0.068	0.041
First-generation immigrants	0.026	0.071	0.012	0.054
Third-generation immigrants	0.126	0.109	0.098	0.146

Source: 2010 - 2013 CILS4EU.

Each country has a different history of migration which shapes the composition of immigrant generations and religious traditions. Germany and Sweden have the largest proportion of fourteen-year-olds with immigrant parents (25.5 and 23.3% of children of immigrants in ninth grade, respectively) compared to other countries. Germany and

Sweden also have the largest proportion of ninth graders who are third-generation immigrants, with at least one grandparent born outside of the survey country (12.6 and 14.6%). On the other hand, England has the largest percentage of ninth graders that are immigrants themselves (7.1%). The Netherlands, who has comparable numbers of second and third-generation immigrants to England (around 16% of children are second-generation and around 10% are third), only has 1.2% of ninth graders who are first-generation migrants. Having more third-generation adolescents present in the country might provide an already established co-religious community. However, a large wave of recent immigrants might make religious identities more salient.

Across all countries, European natives tend to be either unaffiliated or Christian. Germany has by far the largest proportion of native children that are Christian: 79.7% of all native ninth graders are Christian while only 19.6% are unaffiliated. Germany is unique in this sample. Sweden only has 58.6% of native children that are Christian and has twice the amount of unaffiliated ninth graders (39.8%) compared to Germany. There are only around 40% of native children in England and the Netherlands who are Christian while around 58% do not report a religious affiliation and around 1% are part of another religious affiliation. In all countries, almost none of the native ninth graders identify as Muslim. Christian children of immigrants in Germany or Sweden might be able to retain a higher religiosity due to the country's Christian majority. However, Muslim children of immigrants in all countries will experience institutions and contexts that were created in a Christian or secular environment.

Unsurprisingly, the largest proportion of religious children of immigrants are in Germany and Sweden. As there are many native Christians in these two countries, religious immigrants might be drawn to settle there, or culturally incorporated children of immigrants might feel like it is more acceptable to identify with a religion. More than 50% of children of immigrants in Germany are Christian and 31.1% are Muslim. In Sweden, 40.7% of children of immigrants are Christian and 27.4% are Muslim. The Netherlands has the largest proportion of second-

generation ninth graders who are unaffiliated (33.6%) while England has the largest group of children of immigrants from other religions (13.1%). Children of immigrants in Germany and Sweden may feel a bigger distinction between Christianity and Islam while in the Netherlands the boundary might be more between being secular and religious. England, on the other hand, is a more diverse national context.

### **Adolescents' religious identities, religious behaviors, families, and experiences of boundaries**

The means and proportions for my dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 2.2. The first part of the table describes the religious identities, religious practice, and demographics for natives and children of immigrants from Christian and Muslim faith traditions. The second part of the table presents national identities and other covariates specific to children of immigrants: individual experiences with social exclusion, cultural incorporation/differences, and the salience of both origin country and host country identities. All measures of social exclusion, cultural incorporation/differences, and controls were measured during ninth grade, or in subsequent grades if missing at first. Questions on experiences of discrimination are only available in ninth grade. Information on parents are measured using the survey of one parent in the first wave, but are imputed with answers from the child in case of missing values.

For my dependent variables, I include one measure of religious identity salience and two measures of religious practice. First, I include a measure of *religious identity salience* with the question “how important is religion to you” using a four-point Likert-type scale answer: very important (3), fairly important (2), not very important (1), and not at all important (0). Second, I include *frequency of prayer*, which ranges from never praying (0) to praying five times a day or more (5). Finally, I include a measure of *attendance at religious events*: how often the respondent attends a religious meeting place or a religious class, from 0 (never) to 4 (every day). These measures provide information on both current personal religious

Table 2.2: Natives and children of immigrants' identities, demographics, parental background, and experiences with social boundaries in four European countries.

	<i>Range</i>	Mean/Proportions			
		Full Sample <i>N=5,003</i>	Native Christians <i>N=2,917</i>	Children of immigrants Christians      Muslims <i>N= 1,045</i> <i>N=1,041</i>	
<b><i>All religious adolescents</i></b>					
<b>Religion</b>					
Person-mean religious identity salience	0 – 3	1.535	1.156	1.645	2.490
Person-mean frequency of prayer	0 – 5	1.516	1.156	1.617	2.421
Person-mean attendance at events	0 – 4	1.153	0.991	1.200	1.559
<b>Demographics in ninth grade</b>					
Girl	0 – 1	0.544	0.542	0.558	0.535
Age	13 – 17	14.510	14.457	14.539	14.630
<b>Parental background</b>					
Parents consider religion important	0 – 1	0.590	0.466	0.648	0.877
Single or reconstructed family	0 – 1	0.245	0.238	0.341	0.168
Neither parent with college degree	0 – 1	0.682	0.634	0.695	0.806
Unemployed household	0 – 1	0.082	0.038	0.085	0.200
<b><i>Children of immigrants</i></b>					
<b>Social boundaries</b>					
Percent immigrant in school	0 – 2				
0-30% ( <i>reference group</i> )		0.303		0.438	0.167
30-60%		0.313		0.297	0.329
60-100%		0.384		0.265	0.503
Social exclusion					
Few friends from survey country	0 – 1	0.384		0.264	0.504
Perceived discrimination scale	0 – 2.5	0.276		0.276	0.276
Cultural incorporation/differences					
Other language spoken at home	0 – 1	0.825		0.686	0.964
Non-western origins	0 – 1	0.610		0.355	0.866
<b>National identities</b>					
Person-mean origin identity salience	0 – 4	2.238		1.902	2.576
Person-mean host identity salience	0 – 3	1.832		2.007	1.656

Source: 2010 - 2013 CILS4EU.

identity salience but also signs for future developments of a collective religious identity.

In Table 2.2 are the person-mean averages of religious identity salience and religious practice over the three grades. Across ninth, tenth and eleventh grade, children of immigrants have a stronger religious identity and engage in religious behavior more frequently compared to religious natives. Native Christians on average consider religion to be not very important while children of immigrants of all faith traditions are closer to considering it fairly important. Moreover, native Christians pray on average less than once a month while Christian children of immigrants pray at least once a month. The difference in religious attendance between Christian natives and children of immigrants is very small, both groups attend religious services on average less than once a month.

Muslim children of immigrants not only have a higher frequency of religious practice (as expected from the requirements of Islam) but also consider religion to be more important and attend religious services more than all other groups. On average, Muslim children of immigrants pray and attend religious services at least once month. The greatest difference between Muslims and non-Muslims is in religious identity salience: Muslims on average consider religion to be at least fairly important.

I control for *demographics* measured in ninth grade which have been found to affect religiosity and identity development of adolescents. I investigate if identity changes are different for boys and girls. I control for age to take into account that some children might have already developed ethnic and religious identities before reaching ninth grade (I compare children to the median age for that grade). Children who are missing on information for their age are given, by country, the mode for birth year and median for month and interview date. The sample is split almost equally between boys and girls and on average children are fourteen and a half years old.

For *parental background*, I include a measure of parental subjective religiosity (1=religion is important). Compared to all other groups, Muslims tend to have parents who are very religious themselves. 87.7% of Muslim compared to 64.8% of Christian children of immigrants

and 46.6% of Christian natives have a parent who believes religion is important or very important.

To control for the household situation and socioeconomic status, I measure if the child lives in a one-parent or recomposed family, if neither parent has a university degree, and if both parents are unemployed. In Germany, England, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 24.5% of children in ninth grade live in a single-parent or reconstructed family, 68.2% of children live in a household without any college graduates, but only 8.2% are in a completely unemployed household. However, there are large variations in family background by immigrant status and religion: 34.1% of Christian children of immigrants live in single or reconstructed families compared to 23.8% of natives and only 16.8% of Muslims. On the other hand, 80.6% of Muslim children of immigrants have both parents without a college degree and 20% live in an unemployed household, compared to 63.4% and 8.5% respectively of Christian natives.

In order to measure children of immigrants' experiences with *social boundaries*, I use information on school context, social exclusion, and cultural incorporation/differences. First, I include a measure of the percentage of immigrants in the school, comparing individuals in schools with less than 30% immigrants to those with between 30 and 60% immigrants and to those in schools with more than 60% immigrants. Segregated schools may increase the number of co-religious and re-enforce social boundaries with native Europeans. Second, I include the number of friends from the survey country (1= few or less than half friends from survey country, 0=half, more than half, or all friends from survey country). Third, I include a perceived discrimination using summated scale ( $\alpha = 0.636$ ) of four measures of the frequency of discrimination 1) in school 2) in public transportation 3) in shops and by 4) the police. All four measures range from never (0) to always (3). Finally, I include *cultural incorporation/differences* in order to see if children of immigrants who are most different from natives retain these cultural differences over time. If the child speaks another language at home, they are considered less culturally incorporated. Cultural difference is measured by using a control for region of origin (non-Western=outside of Europe, Canada, the US,



Israel, and Australia).

I compare changes in religious identity salience and religious practice to changes in the strength of *national identities*. I use a measure of origin country/ethnic identity salience asking if the child feels that he or she belongs to another group than the host country (chosen from a list of countries and ethnic groups) and “how strongly” does he or she feels to that group: very strongly (4), fairly strongly (3), not very strongly (2), not at all strongly (1), or no other group (0). Most natives did not choose another group. To measure ties to the host country, I use the question “how strongly do you feel like you belong to [survey country]” which is coded from not at all strongly (0) to (3) very strongly.

Compared to Christian children of immigrants in ninth grade, Muslim children of immigrants are in more segregated schools, have more segregated friendships, are more culturally different, and identify more with their country of origin but less with the host country. Half of Muslims are in schools with at least 60% of students from an immigrant background, compared to only 26.5% of Christian children of immigrants. Moreover, half of Muslims have few friends from the host country (50.4%) while only 26.4% of Christian immigrants have segregated friendships. However, Christian and Muslim children of immigrants tend to report the same amount of overall discrimination. Muslim children of immigrants are more different culturally from native Europeans than Christian immigrants: 96.4% of Muslims speak another language at home and 86.6% come from non-Western countries. Over the three years, Muslims are fairly strongly or very strongly attached to another group while Christians are not very strongly attached. On the other hand, Christians are very strongly attached to the host country while Muslims are between fairly and very strongly attached.

### **Method: Latent Growth Curve Analysis**

*Model Specification.* I use Latent Growth Curve Analysis (LGCA) to investigate how children of immigrants develop their religious identities between ninth and eleventh grade

(Audrain-McGovern et al. 2003; Chen and Lin 2016; Needham 2007, 2008). This method models changes over time in the dependent variables (religious identity salience, frequency of prayer, and religious attendance) with a latent line (or curve) and provides estimates for the baseline and growth. Figure 2.1 represents the theoretical model of the LGCA using a Structural Equations Modeling format for simplicity. The Intra-Class Correlation (ICC) for natives and children of immigrants for each dependent variable is between 0.682 and 0.746, which shows that there is enough variation within adolescents over time to justify a latent growth analysis.

I compute the estimates for the baseline and growth in religious identity salience and religious practice by running a multilevel mixed-effects model using maximum likelihood estimations. The intercept of the model represents the latent baseline for each dependent variable and the effect of grade on the outcome represents the latent slope or growth over time (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). I choose a linear representation of changes over time as both categorical and quadratic modeling of grades lead to similar results in modeling changes in religious identity salience and frequency of prayer. However, there is evidence that attendance at religious events has a quadratic form and that changes over time taper off in eleventh grade. I use mixed-effects models in order to have time nested in each individual and include a random coefficient for time. Using likelihood-ratio tests for each measure of religious identity salience and religious practice, I find that having a random intercept and coefficient for time is better than the simple model using fixed effects.

I use a generalized linear model with unstructured covariance in STATA 15. This model allows me to incorporate survey weights. In the pooled models using all four countries, I standardize the weights so that the weighted sample sizes are identical in each country. This method enables each country to contribute equally to the estimates (Kalter et al. 2016). The results without weights show more precise significant differences between Muslim children of immigrants, Christians, and natives: at the worst, my models underestimate differences between groups. I use unstructured covariance to estimate the variance at each grade and

between each pair of grades without imposing any structure (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). I have at least two grades present for each individual and enough individuals by grade. Small sample sizes and nested models preclude separate estimates by country. I am unable to account for children of immigrants clustered in schools because the cluster option is not allowed with a multilevel mixed-effects generalized linear model with weights. The following equation presents the multilevel mixed effects model used to estimate the latent growth curves:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}t_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}W_j + \mu_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \mu_{1j}$$

This set of three nested equations predicts religious identity salience or religious practice  $Y_{ij}$  over  $i$  number of time points  $t$  (here three grade years), for  $j$  children, with a matrix of covariates  $W_j$ . The first equation is similar to a simple linear regression where  $Y_{ij}$  is the estimated outcome and the errors  $\epsilon_{ij}$  have a normal distribution. This is the level-one equation for years nested within individuals. The child specific intercept (or baseline identity salience) is  $\beta_{0j}$  and the child specific estimate for growth is  $\beta_{1j}$ . The second equation predicts the child specific baseline, which is allowed to vary in the previous equation ( $\beta_{0j}$ ). Because I am only using time invariant covariates in this case,  $W_j$ , they are only used to predict the baseline. The model with time invariant covariates does provide a better fit than the unconditional model ( $\chi^2, p < 0.001$ ). In order to investigate the effect of a covariate on the changes in religious identity salience or religious behavior, I include an interaction between that covariate and the time variable. For example, I include an interaction between religious affiliation and growth, which significantly improves model fit ( $\chi^2, p < 0.001$ ). The third equation predicts the child specific estimate for growth which is also allowed to randomly vary in the first equation ( $\beta_{1j}$ ). Both  $\mu_{0j}$  and  $\mu_{1j}$  have a bivariate distribution centered at

zero and an unstructured covariance matrix.

*Analysis Plan.* First, I investigate if religious children of immigrants (H1), and especially Muslims (H2), have a higher baseline religious identity salience and baseline frequency of religious behavior than Christian natives, unconditionally and conditionally on demographics and parental background. Second, I test if over time Christian children of immigrants become more similar to natives (H3a) and if Muslim children of immigrants experience an increase in religious identity salience and religious practice (H3b). Third, I investigate if the differences between Muslim and Christian children of immigrants is maintained when considering experiences with social boundaries (H4). Finally, I investigate the changes in the strength of national identities over time for Christians and Muslims (H5).

## Results

### Baseline religious identity salience and religious behavior

Children of immigrants, and especially Muslims, have higher measures of religious identity salience and engage in religious behavior more frequently in ninth grade compared to Christian natives. The baseline and growth estimates over three years for religious identity salience, frequency of prayer, and attendance at religious events are displayed in Table 2.3. For each outcome, I first present the unconditional model with only differences between Christian natives, Christian children of immigrants, and Muslim children of immigrants. This is equivalent as computing the baseline and growth for each group separately without any controls. Then, I add individual controls (conditional models) that might shape religious identity salience and religious behavior, and, in the final models, I include controls for family background.

Christian children of immigrants have a more salient religious identity and pray more often than natives. In the unconditional models, Christian children of immigrants believe religion to be more important compared to natives ( $p < 0.001$ ) and have a higher frequency

of prayer ( $p < 0.01$ ). Christian children of immigrants have on average a higher frequency of attendance at religious events compared to natives, but the difference is not significant. While on average children of immigrants have a higher religious identity salience and practice religion more often compared to natives, the biggest difference is between Muslim children of immigrants and all other adolescents.

Muslim children of immigrants have the strongest religious identity and the most frequent religious practice compared to all other groups. The largest difference between Muslim children of immigrants and Christian natives is in religious identity salience: in the unconditional models, Muslim children of immigrants tend to believe religion is between fairly and very important while Christian natives and children of immigrants believe it is between not very and fairly important ( $p < 0.001$ ). Muslims also tend to pray more than once a month while other groups pray less ( $p < 0.001$ ). All groups tend to have more similar frequency of religious attendance, though Muslims still have significantly higher religious practice ( $p < 0.001$ ) compared to both Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants.

The difference between children of immigrants and natives remains even when controlling for demographics and country of survey. However, there are expected differences by gender and age. Adolescent girls have a more salient religious identity ( $p < 0.01$ ) but do not pray more or attend more religious events. In the conditional models, age is associated with lower religious practice: older students in the same grade pray less frequently ( $p < 0.001$ ) and attend religious services less often ( $p < 0.001$ ) than younger students. Finally, while there are close to no differences between Germany, England, and the Netherlands, adolescents have a significantly lower religious identity salience and less frequent religious behavior in Sweden.

Children of immigrants have a higher religious identity salience and pray more frequently compared to natives even controlling for parent's religiosity and family background. Accounting for parental religiosity and other family experiences decreases, but

Table 2.3: Unconditional and conditional LGCA estimates of religious identity salience and religious behavior for adolescents who identify with a religion in four European countries from 2010 to 2013, with population weights (N=5,003).

	Religious identity salience		Frequency of prayer		Attendance at religious events		
	uncond.	cond.	uncond.	cond.	uncond.	cond.	
<b>Fixed estimates</b>							
Baseline	1.241*** (32.393)	1.189*** (23.446)	0.924*** (17.767)	1.345*** (14.401)	1.436*** (20.046)	1.068*** (12.500)	1.117*** (19.909)
Christian immigrants ( <i>ref=Christian natives</i> )	0.297*** (4.770)	0.293*** (4.736)	0.223*** (3.813)	0.307** (2.942)	0.322** (3.273)	0.205* (2.272)	0.139 (1.865)
Muslim immigrants	1.240*** (21.901)	1.237*** (22.441)	1.034*** (18.178)	1.001*** (7.195)	1.022*** (7.833)	0.673*** (5.033)	0.496*** (5.865)
Growth	-0.078*** (-5.893)	-0.078*** (-5.929)	-0.078*** (-5.941)	-0.095*** (-4.422)	-0.096*** (-4.459)	-0.095*** (-4.384)	-0.038** (-2.910)
Christian immigrants ( <i>ref=Christian natives</i> )	0.038 (1.326)	0.038 (1.322)	0.037 (1.293)	0.011 (0.297)	0.011 (0.293)	0.010 (0.260)	0.008 (0.325)
Muslim immigrants	0.050 (1.929)	0.050 (1.920)	0.049 (1.897)	0.112 (1.900)	0.111 (1.886)	0.110 (1.852)	0.084* (2.600)
Demographics in ninth grade							
Girl		0.121** (2.914)	0.125*** (3.419)	0.095 (1.108)	0.095 (1.350)	0.095 (1.350)	0.010 (0.214)
Age in 9th grade centered on median		-0.011 (-0.344)	0.007 (0.233)	-0.179*** (-3.416)	-0.142** (-3.055)	-0.142** (-3.055)	-0.104*** (-3.476)
England ( <i>ref=Germany</i> )		0.083 (1.148)	0.057 (0.902)	-0.142 (-1.190)	-0.206 (-1.896)	-0.206 (-1.896)	-0.062 (-0.666)
Netherlands		0.022 (0.211)	-0.019 (-0.279)	0.053 (0.162)	-0.026 (-0.099)	-0.026 (-0.099)	-0.135 (-0.892)
Sweden		-0.310*** (-6.330)	-0.176*** (-4.090)	-0.756*** (-9.791)	-0.555*** (-9.217)	-0.555*** (-9.217)	-0.210*** (-4.008)

*Continued*

Table 2.3 (Continued)

	Religious identity salience		Frequency of prayer		Attendance at religious events	
	uncond.	cond.	uncond.	cond.	uncond.	cond.
Parental background						
Parents consider religion important		0.523*** (13.844)		0.827*** (12.880)		0.532*** (13.473)
Single or reconstructed family		-0.122* (-2.329)		-0.237** (-2.735)		-0.203*** (-4.587)
Neither parent with college degree		0.023 (0.432)		-0.029 (-0.328)		-0.060 (-0.928)
Unemployed household		-0.073 (-0.793)		0.116 (0.700)		0.069 (0.684)
<b>Random estimates</b>						
Baseline ( $\sigma^2_{\mu_0}$ )	0.479*** (17.633)	0.469*** (17.523)	0.397*** (14.529)	1.680*** (19.390)	1.640*** (20.265)	1.458*** (16.210)
Growth ( $\sigma^2_{\mu_1}$ )	0.034*** (4.930)	0.034*** (4.913)	0.034*** (4.946)	0.093** (3.178)	0.093** (3.176)	0.030* (2.318)
Covariance growth and baseline ( $\sigma^2_{\mu_{01}}$ )	-0.017* (-2.353)	-0.017* (-2.347)	-0.015 (-1.898)	-0.151*** (-4.038)	-0.152*** (-4.066)	-0.049** (-3.139)
Within-subjects ( $\sigma^2_\epsilon$ )	0.205*** (20.701)	0.205*** (20.676)	0.205*** (20.763)	0.546*** (15.673)	0.546*** (15.683)	0.248*** (13.149)

t statistics in parentheses.

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

$\sigma^2$  are variance of errors at different levels.

Estimates based on population design and survey weights scaled for equal weights by country.

Source: 2010 - 2013 CILS4EU.

does not eliminate, the differences between groups in religious identity salience. Christian children of immigrants from an a-religious intact family with a high socioeconomic background have a more salient religious identity ( $p < 0.001$ ) and pray more often ( $p < 0.05$ ) than religious natives with the same background. Muslim children of immigrants still have a significant difference compared to natives in their importance given to religion ( $p < 0.001$ ), frequency of prayer ( $p < 0.001$ ), and frequency of attendance at religious events ( $p < 0.01$ ). The magnitude of the difference in religious identity salience and religious practices between Muslim children of immigrants and natives is, however, reduced when accounting for parents' high religiosity and socioeconomic status.

Adolescents from intact and religious families are more religious, but they are not affected by their family's socioeconomic status. As expected, having a parent who believes religion is important increases both religious identity salience and religious practice ( $p < 0.001$ ). On the other hand, not having both biological parents at home is associated with a decrease in religious identity salience ( $p < 0.05$ ), less prayers ( $p < 0.01$ ), and less frequent attendance at religious events ( $p < 0.001$ ). Parental education does not seem to affect the child's religious identity salience or religious practice, but this may be due to the fact that parent education is strongly tied to immigrant background and religiosity.

### **Growth between ninth and eleventh grade**

Figure 2.2 models the latent growth curve using estimates of the unconditional models in Table 2.3 for religious identity salience, frequency of prayer, and attendance at religious events. Each figure's vertical axis is scaled to the minimum and maximum score possible for each outcome, which provides correct comparisons of differences across outcomes. The baseline and growth values for each religious group are calculated by adding the baseline and growth estimates for natives with the difference between each group and natives.

Between ninth and eleventh grade, there is a steady decrease in religious identity salience and religious practice for Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants, though



Christian children of immigrants do not become more similar to natives. Christian natives consider religion less important and practice religion less between ninth and eleventh grade (Table 2.3,  $p < 0.01$ ). Christian children of immigrants are not significantly different from natives in any rate of change: their estimates for the decrease in measures of religious identity salience and religious behaviors are actually smaller than Christian natives. Overall, the decline in religious identity salience and religious practice for Christian children of immigrants is similar to that of natives (Figure 2.2). Therefore, Christian children of immigrants have a higher religious identity salience and practice religion more often than natives at first and the difference between the two groups is not reduced over time. Instead, Christian children of immigrants have a higher religious identity salience and engage in religious behavior more frequently compared to natives throughout high school.




Figure 2.2: Baseline and growth estimates for the latent curves of changes in religious identity salience and religious behavior for adolescents who identify with a religion (based on estimates from Table 2.3 unconditional models,  $N=5,003$ ).

Over time, Muslim children of immigrants have a slow decrease in importance given to

religion and an increase in their frequency of attendance at religious events. The growth estimates for importance and frequency of prayer for Muslim children of immigrants are not significantly different from natives and Christian children of immigrants (Table 2.3). However, the estimate for the decrease in importance for religion is not as negative as other groups and the estimate for changes in prayer is actually positive for Muslims. The greatest difference between Muslims and everyone else is in the growth of attendance at religious events. Muslim children of immigrants have an increase in religious attendance over time, different from Christian natives ( $p < 0.05$ ) even accounting for family background. Over time, Muslim children of immigrants become more and more different than the two other groups (Figure 2.2).

### **Experiences with social boundaries**

Parent religiosity, cultural differences, and levels of incorporation explain some of the high religious identity salience and frequent religious behavior of Muslims. However, Muslim children of immigrants continue to have a more salient religious identity and attend religious services more over time even accounting for parental background and social boundaries. In Table 2.4, I present the conditional growth model for children of immigrants by religion and the relationship between religious identity salience, religious practice, parental background, experiences of social exclusion, and cultural incorporation/differences. In additional analysis, I run these models with random intercepts for each school: the results are substantively the same.

The difference in religious identity salience and religious practice between Muslim and Christian children of immigrants is partially explained by parental background. Without any controls, Muslim children of immigrants have a more salient religious identity in ninth grade ( $p < 0.001$ ), pray more often ( $p < 0.001$ ), and attend more religious services ( $p < 0.01$ ) than Christian children of immigrants. However, the difference in baseline levels of attendance at religious events disappears when comparing individuals with similar parental and cultural

Table 2.4: Unconditional and conditional LGCA estimates of religious identity salience and religious behavior for Christian and Muslim children of immigrants in four European countries from 2010 to 2013, with population weights (N=2,086).

	Religious identity salience		Frequency of prayer		Attendance at religious events		
<b>Fixed estimates (demographics and random estimates in Appendix A.1)</b>							
Baseline	1.538*** (31.112)	0.918*** (8.949)	0.808*** (6.752)	1.652*** (21.518)	1.233*** (5.900)	1.163*** (24.390)	1.054*** (8.291)
Muslim immigrants ( <i>ref=Christian immigrants</i> )	0.943*** (15.087)	0.745*** (12.575)	0.479*** (6.151)	0.694*** (5.439)	-0.030 (-0.201)	0.357*** (4.129)	-0.045 (-0.485)
Growth	-0.039 (-1.512)	-0.040 (-1.528)	-0.039 (-1.514)	-0.085* (-2.384)	-0.085* (-2.397)	-0.031 (-1.353)	-0.031 (-1.379)
Muslim immigrants ( <i>ref=Christians immigrants</i> )	0.012 (0.338)	0.012 (0.336)	0.011 (0.326)	0.103 (1.596)	0.101 (1.567)	0.078* (2.022)	0.078* (2.010)
Parental background							
Parents consider religion important	0.814*** (12.147)	0.792*** (11.326)	0.792*** (11.326)	0.976*** (9.153)	0.948*** (8.456)	0.751*** (11.241)	0.755*** (11.088)
Single or reconstructed family	-0.121 (-1.723)	-0.157* (-2.164)	-0.157* (-2.164)	-0.280** (-2.670)	-0.367** (-3.222)	-0.197** (-2.882)	-0.284*** (-4.003)
Neither parent with college degree	0.086 (1.191)	0.068 (0.915)	0.068 (0.915)	-0.117 (-1.023)	-0.101 (-0.834)	-0.086 (-1.119)	-0.053 (-0.715)
Unemployed household	-0.037 (-0.389)	-0.044 (-0.470)	-0.044 (-0.470)	0.120 (0.727)	0.130 (0.800)	0.063 (0.548)	0.080 (0.712)
Social boundaries							
30-60% immigrants in school ( <i>ref=0-30</i> )	0.159* (2.483)	0.159* (2.483)	0.159* (2.483)	0.097 (0.763)	0.097 (0.763)	0.032 (0.409)	0.032 (0.409)
60-100% immigrants in school	0.232*** (4.064)	0.232*** (4.064)	0.232*** (4.064)	0.220* (2.093)	0.220* (2.093)	0.199** (2.609)	0.199** (2.609)
Few friends from survey country	0.117* (2.255)	0.117* (2.255)	0.117* (2.255)	0.178 (1.559)	0.178 (1.559)	0.016 (0.207)	0.016 (0.207)
Perceived discrimination scale	-0.002 (-0.020)	-0.002 (-0.020)	-0.002 (-0.020)	0.088 (0.754)	0.088 (0.754)	0.108 (1.242)	0.108 (1.242)
Other language spoken at home	0.068 (0.711)	0.068 (0.711)	0.068 (0.711)	-0.003 (-0.018)	-0.003 (-0.018)	-0.202* (-2.290)	-0.202* (-2.290)
Non-western origins	0.226** (3.079)	0.226** (3.079)	0.226** (3.079)	0.565*** (3.766)	0.565*** (3.766)	0.333*** (3.881)	0.333*** (3.881)

t-statistics in parenthesis, \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

Estimates based on population design and survey weights scaled for equal weights by country, Source: 2010 - 2013 CILS4EU.

background. Once including parent's religiosity, household composition, and region of origin, the difference in importance given to religion and prayer is reduced. Children of immigrants with one parent who believes religion to be important tend to also believe religion is more important ( $p < 0.001$ ), tend to pray more ( $p < 0.001$ ), and attend more religious events ( $p < 0.001$ ) compared to children with less religious parents. Children of immigrants who live in a single-parent or reconstructed family are less likely to pray ( $p < 0.001$ ) and to attend religious services ( $p < 0.001$ ) compared to children living with both biological parents.

Muslim and Christian children of immigrants' religious identities are even more similar to each other once accounting for their cultural differences and levels of segregation from natives. For children of immigrants with comparable cultural incorporation/differences and social boundaries, Muslims are not more likely to pray than non-Muslims. However, Muslim children of immigrants still have a more salient religious identity across all experiences of boundaries and incorporation ( $p < 0.001$ ). Children of immigrants have a higher baseline religious identity salience and baseline religious practice if they experience segregation and are very different culturally. Children of immigrants who live in a school with more than 60% immigrants give higher importance to religion, pray more, and attend more religious services than children of immigrants who are in schools with less than 30% immigrants ( $p < 0.05$ ). Having few friends from the survey country also increases the levels of importance given to religion ( $p < 0.05$ ). Having non-western origins is associated with more importance to religion, and more frequent prayer and religious attendance ( $p < 0.001$ ). However, there is no significant effect of perceived discrimination.

Culturally incorporated children of immigrants attend more religious services, but Muslims' growth in frequency of religious attendance is not shaped by parents, social boundaries, or cultural differences. For children of immigrants, speaking another language at home is associated with a lower baseline of religious attendance ( $p < 0.05$ ). However, Muslim children of immigrants have a growth in attendance between ninth and eleventh grade greater than Children of immigrants ( $p < 0.05$ ) that is not explained by these

covariates. In additional analysis, I compute the interaction between each covariate and the estimate for growth to investigate how background, experiences of social exclusion, and cultural difference/incorporation influence changes over time in attendance at religious events. None of these measures significantly interact with growth, and the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims remains constant across models.

## **National identities**

I investigate the changes in the strength of national identities over time for Christian and Muslim children of immigrants. Even though baseline salience varies, both Christian and Muslim children of immigrants become more German, Dutch, British, or Swedish over time. I estimate the baselines and slopes for changes in origin country national identity salience and host country national identity salience over time (Table 2.5). The visual representation of the latent curves of changes in national identities for Muslim and Christian children of immigrants are presented in Figure 2.3.

There is no evidence that Muslim children of immigrants become more attached to their national origins over time. In ninth grade, Muslims have higher origin country national identity salience than Christians ( $p < 0.05$ ). For Muslims, the slope for changes in national origins is negative and not significantly different than zero. On the other hand, Christian children of immigrants have a positive slope for origin country identity salience (though again, not significantly different than zero). Both Muslim and Christian children of immigrants have stable ties to their national origins over time, and Muslims in this sample tend to believe these origins are slightly less important over time (Figure 2.3).

Muslims increase their attachment to the host country over time, similarly to Christian children of immigrants. Over the three years in high school, Muslim children of immigrants have an increase in their ties to Germany, Sweden, England, and the Netherlands ( $p < 0.001$ ) even though they start with fewer ties to the host country compared to Christians ( $p < 0.05$ ). Muslims' increase in ties with the host country is not slower than Christian children of

Table 2.5: Unconditional LGCA estimates of national identity salience for Muslim and Christian children of immigrants in four European countries from 2010 to 2013, with population weights (N=2,086).

	Christian children of immigrants		Muslim children of immigrants	
	Origin country identity	Host country identity	Origin country identity	Host country identity
<b>Fixed estimates</b>				
Baseline	1.611*** (17.740)	1.987 <sup>C</sup> *** (39.198)	2.541*** (29.074)	1.442 <sup>C</sup> *** (31.955)
Growth	0.022 (0.607)	0.133*** (4.974)	-0.030 (-0.598)	0.173*** (7.719)
<b>Random estimates</b>				
Baseline ( $\sigma^2_{\mu_0}$ )	1.388*** (7.757)	0.494*** (9.614)	0.907*** (5.179)	0.395*** (7.641)
Growth ( $\sigma^2_{\mu_1}$ )	0.027 (0.356)	0.025 (1.024)	0.115 (1.128)	0.046 (1.578)
Covariance growth and baseline ( $\sigma^2_{\mu_{01}}$ )	-0.018 (-0.242)	-0.049 (-1.714)	-0.084 (-0.826)	-0.029 (-0.774)
Level-1 errors ( $\sigma^2_{\epsilon}$ )	1.392*** (9.751)	0.299*** (7.617)	1.738*** (12.238)	0.383*** (11.870)

t statistics in parentheses

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

$\sigma^2$  are variance of errors at different levels.

<sup>C</sup> signifies estimates are significantly different with Christians ( $p < 0.05$ ).

Estimates based on population design and survey weights scaled for equal weights by country.

Source: 2010 - 2013 CILS4EU.

immigrants (and the coefficient for change is actually greater for Muslims). Both Muslim and Children of immigrants give more and more importance to their host country national identity over time.




Figure 2.3: Baseline and growth estimates for the latent curves of changes in national identity salience for Muslim and Christian children of immigrants (based on estimates from Table 2.5 unconditional models, N=2,086).

## Summary

I investigate the development of religious identities and religious behaviors for adolescents in four European countries. This is the first paper that investigates differences between children of immigrants and natives, and between Christians and Muslims. I find that children of immigrants have a stronger religious identity salience compared to religious natives regardless of parents' religiosity (H1). Muslims specifically have a more salient religious identity compared to all other groups (H2). While Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants experience a comparable decrease over time in both religious

identity salience and religious practice (H3a), Muslim children of immigrants attend religious events more over time (H3b). Some of the differences between Muslim and Christian children of immigrants is explained by segregation and cultural differences (H4). As they experience an increase in religious attendance, Muslim children of immigrants also increase their ties to the host country and move away from their country of origin national identity (H5).

Even as they incorporate into the host country, children of immigrants in adolescence continue to be tied to their religion. In high school, children of immigrants who identify with a religion give more importance to religion, pray more, and attend religious services more frequently than Christian natives (H1). In line with my second hypothesis, Muslim children of immigrants believe religion is more important than all Christians (H2). Differences in religious doctrine might explain variations in the frequency of prayer, especially for Muslims, however, it does not explain the robust differences in subjective religiosity nor does it explain the differences between Christian children of immigrants and Christian natives. Parents' experiences of migration lead to higher family religiosity, yet children of immigrants are more religious than natives even when accounting for a parent's strength of religiosity. For Muslim children of immigrants, experiences with boundaries might explain their salient religious identity. However, while most adolescents experience a decrease in religious identity salience and religious practice, there are some differences across groups in the trajectories taken over time.

There is no convergence between Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants in religious identity and religious behavior, and there is a divergence between Muslims and all other groups in religious practice. Most adolescents experience a decrease in both religious identity salience and religious behavior between ninth and eleventh grade. In adolescence, influenced by peers and schooling, children move away from family values and traditions to become more secular. For children of immigrants, growing up is associated with a distancing from religion and national origins. However, contrary to my hypothesis,



there are no differences between Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants in the magnitude of changes over time (H3a). Therefore, Christian children of immigrants follow the same process in adolescence as Christian natives, and the two groups do not become more similar over time. On the other hand, Muslim children of immigrants have a growth in religious attendance over time, while other children practice religion less between ninth and eleventh grade. The growth in Muslim children of immigrants' attendance at religious events partly supports my hypothesis of divergence between Muslims and non-Muslims (H3b).

Children of immigrants learn about how they are excluded from the rest of society in schools or friendship groups with many other foreigners, instead of through personal experiences with discrimination. First, culturally incorporated children of immigrants are more likely to attend religious services: children who speak another language at home are less likely to attend religious services. Religious identities are therefore important for culturally incorporated children of immigrants, who have learned mainstream cultures and categorizations. Second, personal experiences of discrimination do not lead to higher religious identity salience or more religious practice, while measures of segregation and cultural differences account for some of the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims (H4). However, some of the gap between Muslim and Christian children of immigrants is still unaccounted for when including measures of social boundaries at school. Therefore, social boundaries might also be learned through institutions beyond personal experiences with social exclusion.

Finally, these findings contradict the hypothesis that a highly salient Muslim identity is "reactive" and weakens ties to the host country. Christian children of immigrants have stable ties to their national origins over time and are more attached to their host country identity (H5a). Muslim adolescents show a slight decrease in the strength of their ties to their parents' national origins over time, in line with the pan-ethnic hypothesis (H5b). Contrary to the reactive hypothesis, Muslim children of immigrants do not have less ties

with the host country over time (H5c) and instead are more engaged with the mainstream. Muslim children of immigrants therefore both attend religious services more over time and incorporate culturally into the host country.

## **Discussion**

Even as they incorporate and secularize in adolescence, children of immigrants are more tied to their religion than native Europeans. Muslim children of immigrants are especially unique: they give considerably more importance to their religious identity and start attending religious services more frequently by eleventh grade. However, this increasingly frequent religious behavior does not preclude more attachment to the host country. These findings have implications for the role of religion during the process of identity development and for the study of the political incorporation of children of immigrants. This study provides new evidence about the expression of social boundaries and the possibilities for new politicized identities.

Contrary to classic and new theories of assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964), the strength of religious identities and the frequency of religious behavior for children of immigrants and natives do not converge during high school. While children of immigrants and natives both secularize over time, and thus might be influenced by the same greater social forces, children of immigrants continue to identify more strongly with their religion even as they increase their ties to the host country. Religion, therefore, may be important for second-generation immigrants, as they try to connect with their parents' culture and incorporate into a new political context (Bankston and Zhou 1996; Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Chong 1998; Ebaugh 2001; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Smith 1978b). Children of immigrants can use religion to navigate between two worlds — their parents' national origins and their own experiences in Europe.

There is evidence of a bright social boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims expressed through segregation, cultural differences, and categorizations beyond day to day

interactions. In continuity with previous research, bright social boundaries emerge between religious traditions due to experiences of cultural differentiation and segregation (Alba 2005; Wimmer and Soehl 2014; Zolberg and Woon 1999). Beyond individual experiences with native Europeans, segregated and culturally different Muslims might learn that they do not match the norm of what it means to be German, Swedish, Dutch, or British through contact with larger institutions, such as the educational system and mainstream media. The influence of boundaries and the construction of otherness might be expressed both through personal interactions and through pervasive cultural differentiation.

Muslim children of immigrants might be developing new pan-ethnic solidarities fostered through mosques and focused on engaging with the mainstream. There is no evidence that the religious identity and religious behavior of Muslim children of immigrants is reactive (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997). Instead, culturally incorporated adolescent Muslims continue to attend religious services even as they experience bright religious boundaries that separate them from European natives. As Muslims try to understand their place in Europe, they might turn to religious organizations to meet similar others and find a place for themselves as European Muslims. Mosques in Western Europe play a significant role in bringing Muslim children of immigrants together regardless of national origins. Similar to religious communities in the US, Mosques are important for the well-being and incorporation of Muslim children of immigrants in Western Europe (Allen 2010; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Mooney 2009). Mosques can provide important resources to children of immigrants as they are trying to understand their place in the European political landscape.

As children of immigrants progress through adolescence, the increase in host country identity salience is both a mark of acculturation and an indicator of nascent political development. At the same time, children of immigrants enter adulthood with higher levels of religious identity salience and religious behavior compared to natives. In the next chapter, I investigate how religiosity among children of immigrants responds to the larger

social and political context. In order to do so, I shift the analysis from adolescence to adulthood and expand the analysis from four countries to twenty European countries.

## Chapter 3

### European State Policies, Regional Social Contexts, and Children of Immigrants' Religiosity

During the process of incorporation, religion can provide children of immigrants with a positive sense of self and a supportive community (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Warner 1997). In the previous chapter, I find that even though all Christian adolescents secularize between ninth and eleventh grade, children of immigrants continue to give more importance to religion and practice religion more often compared to natives. Muslims are especially unique and attend religious services more frequently all the while increasing their ties to the host country. However, despite its potential for more meaning and community, religion can also be a barrier to incorporation, especially for children of immigrants living in secular local communities (Foner and Alba 2008). The religious traditions and expressions of children of immigrants can exacerbate perceived cultural differences and lead to more exclusion and discrimination by native Europeans. Therefore, children of immigrants sometimes encounter a negative social context because of their distinctive religiosity.

The religiosity of children immigrants is influenced by the larger social and political context. In the US, both new assimilation and segmented assimilation theorists agree that the social context partly determines the incorporation trajectories of immigrants and their children. European research focusing on first-generation immigrants finds that their religiosity is shaped by natives' own religiosity (van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011) and anti-immigrant attitudes (Connor 2010). However, the European social context is likely to also have an enduring effect on children of immigrants' experiences in the host country and might exacerbate already existing social boundaries around religious traditions. Children of

immigrants and their local communities exist within a larger political context in which state policies also sustain categorizations and promote incorporation (Lentin 2007; Light 2008; Massey et al. 2002). State policies have an effect on the incorporation of children of immigrants even if they do not always have the intended consequences (Cornelius et al. 1994; Massey 1999). For example, there is a strong debate between political sociologists in Europe about the effectiveness of multiculturalism policies in actually reducing social divisions and inequalities (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Vasta 2007). Research on the role of multiculturalism policies finds that even though they have mixed effects on the cultural and institutional incorporation of immigrants (Koopmans 2013b), they do enable more political engagement based on ethnic identities (Wright and Bloemraad 2012). This debate around multiculturalism policies has ignored the possible positive effect of anti-discrimination provisions which have become increasingly common due to an EU mandate (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; Kesler 2006).

This chapter bridges these two separate research domains: the religious incorporation of immigrants on one hand and the effects of immigration policies on the other. I focus on how the sub-national (regional) social context and the national political context intersect to create unique religious experiences for adult children of immigrants. Extending previous research on immigrants in Europe, I investigate if children of immigrants' religiosity is influenced by regions' overall levels of religiosity and anti-immigrant attitudes. I explore how bright social boundaries around religion shape children of immigrants' response to their social conditions. To my knowledge, no empirical work has examined the religiosity of children of immigrants from multiple religions across social settings. Drawing on theories of state policies, I argue that multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies both shape the religiosity of children of immigrants across faith traditions. However, children of immigrants from minority religions (Orthodox Christians, smaller Christian groups, and Muslims) will benefit the most from policies protecting cultural diversity and will be more susceptible to the politicization of their religious identity.

## **The Religiosity of Children of Immigrants in Europe**

Immigrants in Europe come from countries that tend to be more religious than their country of residence (van Tubergen 2006; van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). However, over time and generations, immigrants will be increasingly affected by both native Europeans living around them (the social context) and state level policies (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Jacob and Kalter 2013), a process described in Figure 3.1. First, as they incorporate into European regions, children of immigrants will be affected by general levels of religiosity of native Europeans. Some children of immigrants might even stop identifying with their parents' religion, but still continue to practice religion with their families. However, Muslim children of immigrants experiencing bright social boundaries might not be able to incorporate into European regions. While some Muslim children of immigrants might renounce to their religion in a negative context of reception, religion could become more salient if they experience both anti-immigrant attitudes and bright religious boundaries. Second, state policies on multiculturalism might enable religious communities to feel legitimized and to organize. Moreover, anti-discrimination protections might allow diverse immigrant groups to retain their strong religiosity. Due to the process of politicization of religion, minority children of immigrants might be more religious in countries with both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies in place.

### **Social Contexts and Bright Religious Boundaries**

Through the process of incorporation, children of immigrants' religiosity will be shaped by natives' own religiosity. According to classic and new assimilation theorists, children of immigrants and natives become more similar over generations (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964). Most European natives are white, and either non-religious or Christian. This majority holds most of the political, economic, and cultural power in Europe; therefore, their beliefs, actions, and attitudes will affect children of immigrants' incorporation and possibilities for

advancements (Soininen 1999; Vasta 2007). First-generation immigrants might be tied to their religion for support and community in a new environment (Akresh 2011; Allen 2010; Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Warner 1993). However, second-generation children of immigrants will be strongly influenced by the countries and localities in which they reside. Children of immigrants who do not affiliate with a religious tradition still participate in some traditional religious activities, especially with their families, and therefore are still influenced by the social acceptability of religious behavior in the region. Due to the process of incorporation, children of immigrants will have a religiosity similar to natives living around them.




Figure 3.1: Theoretical model for Chapter 3.

However, Muslim children of immigrants might not incorporate into their surrounding social context due to experiences with bright boundaries around religion. Other minority children of immigrants will incorporate but at a slower pace than those sharing the same religion as natives. Due to the history of European migration, native Europeans with a mostly Catholic or Protestant background consider Muslim children of immigrants as especially different from them and through day to day interactions form bright social boundaries around religious differences (Alba 2005; Wimmer and Soehl 2014; Zolberg and Woon 1999). Children of immigrants experiencing bright religious boundaries will be especially aware of their outsider status and incorporate at a slower pace (Massey and



Sánchez 2010). In line with Alba (2005), I argue that these bright religious boundaries separate “us” Europeans and “them” Muslims. However, non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants will not benefit from Protestant or Catholic religious communities and therefore will still experience some barriers to practice their religion. Children of immigrants firmly inside of the religious boundary (Protestant or Catholic “mainstream” Christians or non-religious) will have a lower religiosity in a secular context and a higher religiosity in a religious context. Mainstream Christians will especially benefit from religious communities in their region. Non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants will be less affected by natives’ religiosity but still overall incorporate into the social context. Finally, Muslim children of immigrants with religious identities at odds with natives’ perception of what is normal will not be affected by natives’ religiosity.

*(H1) The religiosity of children of immigrants will depend on their religious affiliation and on the religiosity of natives in the same region:*

*(H1a) Among Christians and the unaffiliated, religiosity will be positively correlated with the religiosity of natives in the local region.*

*(H1b) The positive correlation between the religiosity of children of immigrants and the religiosity of natives will be stronger among mainstream Christians as compared to other Christians or the unaffiliated.*

*(H1c) There will be no correlation between the religiosity of Muslims and the religiosity of natives in the local region.*

In a context of anti-immigrant attitudes, Muslim children of immigrants outside of bright religious boundaries might either suppress their religiosity to incorporate or have a more salient identity due to continuous experiences of exclusion. Day to day interactions between native Europeans and children of immigrants reinforce boundaries and shape children of immigrants’ religious identity (Alba 2005; Massey and Sánchez 2010; Wimmer 2013). Therefore, anti-immigrant attitudes will exacerbate existing religious boundaries that permeate European cultures and institutions. On the one hand, in line with classic

assimilation theory, Muslim children of immigrants might hide any cultural distinctiveness in order to incorporate economically to the host country (Gordon 1964; Park 1928). In a context of anti-immigrant attitudes, Muslim children of immigrants will be at a disadvantage and might be discriminated against if they remind others of their national origins through their religiosity. On the other hand, in line with segmented assimilation theory, under a context of anti-immigrant attitudes, Muslim children of immigrants may be even more aware of their exclusion by European societies and therefore retreat in their communities and reject norms from the majority (Ersanilli 2012; Padilla and Perez 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2009).

*(H2) The religiosity of Muslim children of immigrants will be moderated by natives' anti-immigrant attitudes:*

*(H2a) Classic assimilation theory: Muslims living in regions with strong anti-immigrant attitudes will be less religious, minimizing their "otherness."*

*(H2b) Segmented assimilation theory: Muslims living in regions with strong anti-immigrant attitudes will be more religious, embracing their "otherness."*

## **State Policies and Religion**

Modern states are under pressure both from new immigrant groups asking for more recognition and from natives asking for stronger nationalism (Cornelius et al. 1994; Joppke 1999; Soininen 1999). Moreover, European states are themselves subject to requirements from supra-national entities such as the EU. While the goals of policies born out of these conflicts might differ, I argue that they will shape, directly or indirectly, the experiences of children of immigrants (Cornelius et al. 1994; Massey 1999). Even though sometimes policies do not have the intended consequences, they still affect children of immigrants' lives and the context for their incorporation (Massey 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Policies surrounding immigration and incorporation will include or exclude groups and shape future social stratification and inequalities (Lentin 2007; Light 2008; Massey et al. 2002). In

the following sections, I explain how multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies can influence children of immigrants' religiosity.

Multiculturalism policies reflect the relationship between states and minority groups, and thus shape children of immigrants' religiosity (Kastoryano 2002; Mooney 2009; Taylor et al. 1994). Multiculturalism policies enable more religious freedom and provide a space for religious communities. As defined by Wright and Bloemraad (2012, pg.78), multiculturalism policies are "government policies designed to positively recognize diversity and help minorities maintain cultural and religious practices while integrating them into public life." Therefore, by design, multiculturalism policies should provide spaces for minority religious communities and encourage or even celebrate non-native European identities. However, there has been a discussion about the role of multiculturalism for the "successful" incorporation of children of immigrants. Multiculturalism policies are associated with less cultural assimilation from immigrants (Joppke and Morawska 2003) but might reduce social divisions (Vasta 2007). More recently, multiculturalism experts have been debating if multiculturalism policies increase segregation, and therefore might lead to a rise of religious fundamentalism, or if they instead enable religion to play a positive role for immigrants' incorporation (Koopmans 2013b; Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Modood 2013). Either way, children of immigrants should be more religious in countries with more multiculturalism policies, especially non-mainstream religious groups.

Despite strong multiculturalism rhetoric, states may not actually protect minorities against discrimination. In Europe, there has been a strong convergence regarding anti-discrimination policies, following EU directives in 2000 (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; Joppke 2007; Kesler 2006; Koopmans 2013a). However, there are still variations by country (Ersanilli 2012; Kesler 2006; Koopmans 2013a) which reflects different levels of acknowledgment of a multi-ethnic population and of dedication towards equality between groups (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; Joppke 2007). Anti-discrimination policies can create an accepting environment and may be a sign of blurred boundaries between groups

(Ersanilli 2012). Therefore, due to more protection, anti-discrimination policies should be reflected in higher levels of religiosity for children of immigrants. Minority groups may especially need anti-discrimination policies to feel safe practicing their religion.

Multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies provide more rights and freedom to children of immigrants; however, they also both reflect a national debate surrounding minority religions. Therefore, the implementation of these policies can sustain and create more politicization of religious identities. Multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies are not created in a vacuum but instead emerge out of national level discussion and concerns about new immigrant communities. If these policies emerge from the top-down (EU mandate or from one political group), then native Europeans may become more aware of religious differences and of perceived special treatment of certain religious groups (Fossati 2011; Taylor et al. 1994). Therefore, both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies might reflect a strong politicization of some or all religious identities. Through that process, minority identities that are the focus of this debate will become more salient. However, regardless of the mechanism, religious identities and subsequently religiosity will be stronger in the context of either anti-discrimination or multiculturalism policies.

*(H3) The religiosity of children of immigrants will be influenced by national policies:*

*(H3a) Strong multiculturalism policies will be associated with higher levels of religiosity.*

*(H3b) Strong anti-discrimination policies will be associated with higher levels of religiosity.*

*(H3c) Compared to mainstream Christians, the effect of multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies on religiosity will be stronger for Muslims and other Christians.*

## Previous Findings on the Religiosity of Immigrants Across Regional and National Contexts

Large cross-national studies on religiosity in Europe have been confined to the experiences of first-generation immigrants (Connor 2010; van Tubergen 2006; van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). Empirical studies investigating children of immigrants tend to focus only on Muslims in a few countries (e.g., de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Fleischmann and Phalet 2011; Fleischmann et al. 2011; Jacob and Kalter 2013; Torrekens and Jacobs 2016). However, findings regarding the first-generation's religiosity across contexts can still inform the possible experiences of their children. First, at the individual-level, Muslim immigrants are generally more religious than other groups (van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). Unlike natives, immigrant women are not more religious than men (Fleischmann and Phalet 2011; van Tubergen 2006), but economic insecurity does seem to predict higher levels of religiosity (van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). Second, at the sub-national or regional level, Connor (2010) is the only one who tests how negative attitudes towards immigrants from the majority shape the religiosity of immigrants. He finds that Muslim immigrants attend more religious services compared in regions with less welcoming attitudes from natives towards immigrants (Connor 2010). However, Connor (2010) does not compare Muslims to other religious immigrant groups. Third, at the country-level, average religiosity in the country of origin, and average religiosity and religious diversity in the host country, all affect immigrants' religiosity (van Tubergen 2006; van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). In both papers, van Tubergen (2006, 2011) does not include the potential role of multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies.

Previous empirical work finds that policies on multiculturalism and anti-discrimination affect some measures of incorporation other than religiosity. In his review, Koopmans (2013b) summarizes European research on multiculturalism: they have no effect on socio-economic outcomes, negative effects on socio-cultural integration, and positive effects

on political incorporation. However, Koopmans (2013b) does not present any research that looks at the relationship between multiculturalism policies and religiosity. Güngör et al. (2013) and Fleischmann et al. (2011) all investigate the role of city-level policies in the incorporation of Turks and Moroccans, but their results diverge when investigating the effects of policies on religiosity. Fleischmann and Phalet (2011) find that second-generation Turks secularize in cities with the least accommodations for Islam. However, Güngör et al. (2013) find that there is a stronger Muslim identity in cities with less accommodations but more social inequalities (segregation and educational differences). Little research looks specifically at anti-discrimination policies and their consequences for incorporation. Unlike multiculturalism policies, anti-discrimination policies alone do not have a positive effect on children of immigrants' civic engagement (Aleksynska 2011; Fossati 2011).

## **Data Source, Measures, and Method**

### **Data source and case selection**

I investigate adult children of immigrants' religiosity using the European Social Survey (ESS) between 2010 and 2016. The ESS provides information on individuals nested in regions within countries, which enables me to analyze individual religiosity under a variety of social contexts and national policies. The ESS selects residents within private households using a strict random probability method. I focus on individuals who are at least 18 years old to analyze established religiosity after identity exploration in adolescence. As in Chapter 2, I include children of immigrants with at least one parent born abroad and who either were born in the survey country or moved there as young children (1.5, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 2.5 generations). I include adults who moved before or at ten years old, having thus spent at least eight years in the survey country. To compare religious groups, I include unaffiliated, Catholic, Protestant, other non-mainstream Christian, and Muslim adults. Children of immigrants from other non-Christian religions (only 2% of all adult children of immigrants) are excluded due to small sample sizes across all countries. Orthodox Christians and members of other Christian

sects are grouped together to represent children of immigrants who are Christians but still part of a religious minority. I drop from the analysis children of immigrants missing on covariates used in this chapter and the next. All variables in the analysis have less than 1% of their observations missing, except for measures of household income and political leaning (used in the next chapter). Nevertheless, the results with multiply imputed data are not substantively different from those presented here.

I include twenty European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK). These twenty countries represent north, west, south, south-east, central, and eastern Europe; large immigrant countries, new immigrant countries, and countries with few immigrants overall. My sample includes the four countries discussed in Chapter 2: Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. I only include countries where Catholicism or Protestantism is the majority religion, excluding countries with a majority Orthodox population such as Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Russia, and the Ukraine, and those with a majority Muslim population such as Kosovo. I use the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) from 2008 to 2014 (to provide a lag time of two years between policies and religiosity) for multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policy scores. For national controls, I also include data from The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Pew Research Center. Two countries — Croatia and Lithuania — are excluded because they do not have information on policies or controls for these years. Two other countries — Iceland and Italy — are excluded because they have only one year of data available with less than thirty children of immigrants interviewed.

The final sample comprises of 8,129 adult children of immigrants in 257 European regions. To measure the social context, I use the ESS to estimate natives' religiosity and their attitudes towards immigrants for each year in each region. Regions in the ESS are

sub-national entities that reflect each country's actual administrative regions using the NUTS nomenclature. Not every country has the same NUTS level for its regions: if a country is so small that it would only contain one NUTS 2 unit, the ESS chooses instead multiple NUTS 3 units. Half of the countries in this analysis use NUTS 2 regions, but the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden all have NUTS 3 regions, and Germany and the UK both have NUTS 1 regions. Nine children of immigrants are dropped because they live in a region with no natives interviewed that year. To run the multilevel models, I only include children of immigrants in regions with at least two observations: eleven regions (and children of immigrants) are subsequently dropped.

### **National political contexts**

In order to measure the strength of *multiculturalism policies*, I include a subset of MIPEX indicators from 2008 to 2014. The MIPEX focuses on equal rights for immigrants and gives a score from 0 to 100 to each country for each indicator within policy strands (e.g., access, rights, eligibility) and policy dimensions (e.g., education, employment, etc.) (Huddleston et al. 2015). As multiculturalism theorists explain, the MIPEX data is set up to measure civic integration but not multiculturalism per se (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Koopmans 2013b). However, the other alternative, the Multiculturalism Policy Index, is only available until 2010 (Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Therefore, instead of using the whole MIPEX index, I only include indicators that match Wright and Bloemraad (2012)'s definition of multiculturalism: "government policies designed to positively recognize diversity and help minorities maintain cultural and religious practices while integrating them into public life." I focus on policies that recognize, enable, and encourage diversity in schools, employment opportunities, legal status, and in politics (when available). Policies that enable diversity are necessary for the successful incorporation into public life and policies that encourage diversity help minorities maintain cultural practices across generations. Measures of anti-



discrimination policies are considered separate from multiculturalism policies as they focus on equal rights rather than recognition and often reflect an EU mandate (Koopmans 2013b). Measures of political rights for migrants, beyond funding and representation included in the multiculturalism score, are examined in Chapter 4. In Appendix B.1, I describe each policy strand and dimension used to measure the multiculturalism score and the scoring process. The final multiculturalism scores over time for each country are in Table 3.1 and averages for the whole time-period are presented, with controls, in Table 3.3.

Table 3.1: Multiculturalism scores from 2008 to 2014 in twenty European countries.

Country	Year						
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria					43.9	46.4	46.4
Belgium	52.5	56.0	58.5		61.0	60.5	60.7
Czech Republic		22.4		31.5	32.5	32.5	37.6
Denmark	52.9	50.4		47.1	50.4	53.9	
Estonia		32.9	40.5	40.5			45.5
Finland	69.0		66.4	73.9	73.9	73.9	73.9
France	54.6	57.9		49.8	50.7	51.4	51.4
Germany	67.9	70.1	63.9	64.0	67.1	67.1	70.5
Hungary	25.0		25.8	25.8		25.8	
Ireland		64.0	57.3	56.1	56.1	56.1	56.1
Netherlands	69.4	66.5	67.1	51.3	48.1	38.7	37.9
Norway	78.7	78.7	77.3	77.3	77.3		74.5
Poland	16.5		17.7	17.7		22.6	22.6
Portugal			74.0	74.0		74.0	
Slovakia	16.2	16.2	18.8	18.8			
Slovenia	29.6	32.9	30.7		30.7	30.7	64.1
Spain		46.0		46.3		43.4	
Sweden	82.1	82.1	84.6	84.6	84.6		84.6
Switzerland	35.6	36.1	37.9	37.9	37.9	37.9	38.1
United Kingdom	46.4	47.6	52.8	49.7	44.4	43.3	43.3

Source: MIPEX 2008-2014.

Sweden, Portugal, and Finland have many multiculturalism provisions. Between 2008 and 2014, Sweden has a multiculturalism score always higher than 80/1000 for recognizing, enabling, and encouraging cultural diversity at school, in employment opportunities, in the legal system, and in politics. On the other hand, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary do not provide much recognition or encouragement for diverse cultures, with scores around 20/100. There are a few changes between 2008 and 2014 in multiculturalism provisions.

Many countries — Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Switzerland — have a slow increase in their multiculturalism score over time. Nevertheless, some countries with above average multiculturalism, such as Norway, France and the UK, experience a small decrease over time in their scores. This is consistent with Banting and Kymlicka (2013)’s descriptions of changes in multiculturalism over time by country: most countries continue to have more multiculturalism policies over time even though the political and public discourse has shifted away from the concept itself.

The Netherlands starts with many encouragements for cultural diversity, a score of 69.4/100 in 2008, but its score goes down to 37.9 in 2014. The Netherlands is a somewhat unique country, its government was one of the strongest proponents for multiculturalism in the 1980s, but then was faced with strong criticism due to the perceived lack of incorporation of Muslims and the terrorist attacks on Theo van Gogh in 2004 (Vasta 2007). In 2010, there was a general election in the Netherlands which was a victory for right-wing and far-right political groups who used strong nationalistic rhetoric and anti-Muslim feelings in the population. The election was won by the conservative-liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), and there was a rise in popularity of the Party for Freedom (PVV). The PVV, led by Geert Wilders, is known for racist language and strong anti-Muslim sentiment (Erlanger 2011). Between 2008 and 2014 (Table 3.1), we see a decline over time in the strength of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, with a sharp drop between 2010 and 2011, reflecting the right shift of the Dutch government after 2010.

I include scores for the strength of *anti-discrimination policies* which is one policy strand of the MIPEX data used to measure overall social integration. The MIPEX anti-discrimination score includes multiple dimensions: definitions of anti-discrimination, fields of application, enforcement mechanisms, and equality policies. Adding the strength of anti-discrimination policies to multiculturalism scores can distinguish countries who just give lip service to multiculturalism from those who actually protect ethnic and religious minorities. In Appendix B.2 are each policy dimension and indicators used to measure

anti-discrimination scores. The strength of anti-discrimination policies over time for each country are in Table 3.2 and averages for the whole time-period are in Table 3.3.

Table 3.2: Anti-discrimination scores from 2008 to 2014 in twenty European countries.

Country	Year						
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria					56.8	56.8	56.8
Belgium	77.8	77.8	77.8		77.8	77.8	77.8
Czech Republic		48.4		48.4	48.4	48.4	48.4
Denmark	43.4	46.2		46.2	46.2	46.2	
Estonia		32.2	32.2	32.2			32.2
Finland	74.5		74.5	74.5	74.5	74.5	77.3
France	75.9	75.9		75.9	75.9	77.3	77.3
Germany	55.9	55.9	55.9	55.9	58.0	58.0	58.0
Hungary	81.1		81.1	83.2		83.2	
Ireland		66.0	66.0	66.0	66.0	66.0	66.0
Netherlands	72.6	72.6	72.6	72.6	72.6	72.6	72.6
Norway	59.2	59.2	59.2	59.2	59.2		59.2
Poland	26.6		47.7	52.4		52.4	52.4
Portugal			88.0	88.0		88.0	
Slovakia	70.3	70.3	70.3	70.3			
Slovenia	67.0	67.0	67.0		67.0	67.0	67.0
Spain		49.1		49.1		49.1	
Sweden	84.9	84.9	84.9	84.9	84.9		84.9
Switzerland	30.9	30.9	30.9	30.9	30.9	30.9	30.9
United Kingdom	82.5	82.5	86.6	86.6	85.2	85.2	85.2

Source: MIPEX 2008-2014.

Portugal, Sweden, and the UK provide the most protections for immigrants and ethnic minorities while Switzerland and Estonia have the fewest. Switzerland, being outside of the EU, is not required to have a minimum of anti-discrimination policies. These results match other work investigating anti-discrimination policies in Europe (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; Joppke 2007). For example, the UK is known for having the most anti-discrimination provisions while Germany is reticent to provide more protections, even under EU mandate. Anti-discrimination policy scores are more stable over time compared to multiculturalism scores, partly because of the smaller number of indicators used in the measure. If there is a small change, they tend to increase over time. Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, all give a few more protections to minorities in 2014 compared to 2008.

The biggest increase in anti-discrimination policies over time happens in Poland, going

from a score around 27/100 in 2008 to 52 in 2014. In 2004, Poland joined the EU and therefore had to implement EU mandates for anti-discrimination legislature. In 2010, Poland passed the “Act of 3rd December, 2010 on the implementation of some regulations of the European Union regarding equal treatment.” This act was put in place to reduce discrimination based on sex, race, ethnic origin, nationality, religion, beliefs disability, age and sexual orientation (Tusk 2010). It covered areas such as employment, health care, education, and state sponsored services. However, since 2015, the Law and Justice party in power has been dismantling the democratic system and ending the previous provisions put in place to implement anti-discrimination policies (New York Times Editorial Board 2016; Polskie Radio 2016). However, my analysis, from 2008 to 2014, only reflects the implementation of new anti-discrimination laws.

As shown in Figure 3.2, countries tend to have both strong (or many) multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies. For each country, I compute the average score between 2008 and 2014 for multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies (Figure 3.2). Most countries have more anti-discrimination policies if they have many multicultural provisions, and vice versa. However, there is a large variation between countries. Norway, Germany, and Denmark, for example, have fewer anti-discrimination policies than the average for that level of multiculturalism. Estonia and Switzerland who have few multiculturalism policies have even less anti-discrimination protections. On the other hand, Portugal, the UK, and Hungary have stronger anti-discrimination policies than the average for their level of multiculturalism.

As a national level control, I measure *migrant inflow per capita*. Immigration flow can redefine communities and increase the salience of religious identities and religious behavior (Foner and Bertossi 2011; Jiménez 2008). For the total number of migrants moving into the country in one given year, I use the OECD international migration database (OECD 2014). The OECD dataset provides easily comparable numbers of migrants by countries. To calculate the total number of migrants per capita (of the destination population), I




Figure 3.2: Relationship between multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies in twenty European countries between 2008 and 2014.

include total population indicators from the United Nations World Population Prospects (WPP) (United Nations 2017). On average, Switzerland and Austria have the largest flow of immigrants per capita (1.8% and 1.6% respectively, Table 3.3). They are followed by Norway, Belgium, Germany, and Slovenia. On the other hand, Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia have on average an inflow of immigrants that comprises only around 0.1-0.2% of their total population.

I control for the *percentage of Christians* in the country using Pew Research Center estimates for each religious group in 2010 (Hackett et al. 2015). I include this measure as a proxy for overall religiosity in the country and if the country has a strong Christian identity. This measure also reflects country-level religious diversity, or lack thereof. Poland and Portugal have both around 90% of their population that identifies as Christian in 2010. The Czech Republic and Estonia have lower proportions of residents identifying as Christian. In 2010, 76.4% of the Czech Republic was unaffiliated and 59.1% of Estonians

Table 3.3: Country-level policy scores and controls in twenty European countries between 2008 and 2014.

Country	Average 2008-2014			2010
	Multiculturalism score	Anti-discrimination score	Migrant inflow per capita	Percent Christian
Austria	45.6	56.8	1.61	80.4
Belgium	58.2	77.8	1.05	64.2
Czech Republic	31.3	48.4	0.29	23.3
Denmark	50.9	45.6	0.65	83.5
Estonia	39.8	32.2	0.12	39.9
Finland	71.8	74.9	0.40	80.1
France	52.6	76.3	0.37	63.0
Germany	67.2	56.8	1.08	68.7
Hungary	25.6	82.1	0.26	81.0
Ireland	57.6	66.0	0.82	92.0
Netherlands	54.1	72.6	0.69	50.6
Norway	77.3	59.2	1.29	84.7
Poland	19.4	46.3	0.11	94.3
Portugal	74.0	88.0	0.41	91.9
Slovakia	17.5	70.3	0.24	85.3
Slovenia	30.9	67.0	1.06	78.4
Spain	45.2	49.1	0.68	78.6
Sweden	83.8	84.9	0.90	67.2
Switzerland	37.4	30.9	1.83	72.7
United Kingdom	46.8	84.8	0.69	64.3

Source: MIPEX 2008-2014, OECD 2008-2014, WPP 2008-2014, Pew Research Center 2010.

also did not choose any religion (Hackett et al. 2015). Both countries experienced a decline of Catholicism and Protestantism under Soviet occupation. According to the Pew Research Center’s estimates (Hackett et al. 2015), the Czech Republic has the most people in the world who do not affiliate with any religions.

### Regional social contexts

I measure the religiosity and attitudes of natives in each region of the ESS. I consider individuals to be European natives if they themselves and their parents were born in the survey country (the ESS does not provide information on grandparents), if they only speak an official language at home, and if they are not part of a minority religion (and therefore are either unaffiliated, Catholic, or Protestant). For each year available, I divide the ESS using their regional categories and use survey weights to estimate natives’ average religiosity and

attitudes towards immigrants. In Table 3.4, I present the 2010-2016 averages and standard deviations for all regions within each country.

Table 3.4: Regional social context in twenty European countries between 2010 and 2016.

Country	Number of regions	Regions' average and standard deviation			
		Natives' anti-immigrant attitudes		Natives' religiosity	
All	257	0.041	(.308)	-0.100	(.392)
Austria	9	0.304	(.206)	0.139	(.140)
Belgium	11	0.051	(.145)	-0.306	(.066)
Czech Republic	14	0.535	(.08)	-0.646	(.129)
Denmark	5	-0.12	(.148)	-0.274	(.063)
Estonia	5	0.201	(.071)	-0.509	(.071)
Finland	21	-0.036	(.158)	0.024	(.136)
France	37	0.150	(.182)	-0.320	(.137)
Germany	16	-0.264	(.232)	-0.237	(.306)
Hungary	17	0.425	(.131)	-0.129	(.204)
Ireland	8	0.121	(.121)	0.557	(.118)
Netherlands	12	-0.053	(.089)	-0.207	(.156)
Norway	7	-0.224	(.105)	-0.286	(.091)
Poland	16	-0.180	(.123)	0.827	(.212)
Portugal	5	0.296	(.083)	0.304	(.241)
Slovakia	8	0.262	(.151)	0.478	(.288)
Slovenia	12	0.222	(.142)	0.017	(.137)
Spain	14	0.007	(.117)	-0.049	(.158)
Sweden	21	-0.549	(.088)	-0.407	(.093)
Switzerland	7	-0.185	(.121)	0.081	(.095)
United Kingdom	12	0.179	(.133)	-0.284	(.230)

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).

Standard deviations for regions within the country in parenthesis.

To investigate the incorporation process of children of immigrants within regions, I include an average measure of *natives' religiosity*. I standardize measures of subjective religiosity, religious attendance, and frequency of prayer into a summated scale for each native European in the region ( $\alpha = 0.854$ ). I then estimate the average religiosity by region and year using population weights provided by the ESS. Poland, Ireland, and Slovakia have on average regions with very religious natives while natives in the Czech Republic and Estonia are not very religious. This matches the Pew Research Center's estimates of religious affiliation by country in 2010 (Hackett et al. 2015). Germany and Slovakia have the largest variation in their native residents' religiosity.

For each region, I also average *natives' anti-immigrant attitudes* using both opinions on how migration is affecting the country and how much migration should be allowed. This includes the three measures used by Connor (2010): would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people from other countries come to live in [country] (1-10), is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? (1-10), and would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (1-10). However, I supplement these three measures with an additional three questions on allowing none, few, some, or many immigrants from the same racial group, from a different racial group, and from outside of Europe. These additional questions add critical information on how natives perceive migration and migrants generally and not just their effect on the host country. All these measures are standardized and summated to create a scale ( $\alpha = 0.893$ ) for each native European. I then compute the estimated average of anti-immigrant attitudes for all natives in that region, using population weights.

### **European children of immigrants' religiosity, SES, cultural incorporation, and demographics**

I investigate the religiosity of unaffiliated children of immigrants and those who identify with a religion: Catholic or Protestant (mainstream Christian), other non-mainstream Christian (Eastern Orthodox and smaller Christian sects), and Muslim. I do not include other non-Christian religions due to variation in dogma and small sample numbers. In my sample (Table 3.5), most children of immigrants are not affiliated with any religion (51.6%). The second largest group are mainstream Christians (35.0%). Muslims and other Christians are smaller minorities (7.5% and 6.0% of all children of immigrants in the sample respectively). Non-mainstream Christians are mostly Orthodox (74.7%) but also include smaller Christian sects (25.2%).



Table 3.5: Children of immigrants' religiosity, SES, cultural incorporation, and demographics in twenty European countries.

Variable	Range	Mean/Proportion				
		All <i>N</i> =8,129	Mainstream Christians <i>N</i> =2,843	Other Christians <i>N</i> =484	Muslims <i>N</i> =608	Unaffiliated <i>N</i> =4,194
<b>Religiosity</b>						
Subjective religiosity (Std. dev)	0 - 10	4.357 (3.139)	6.008 (2.375)	6.219 (2.177)	7.299 (2.255)	2.596 (2.718)
Frequency of prayer (Std. dev)	0 - 6	1.934 (2.317)	3.176 (2.300)	3.101 (2.173)	3.558 (2.435)	0.723 (1.537)
Religious attendance (Std. dev)	0 - 5	1.223 (1.371)	1.963 (1.401)	2.056 (1.298)	2.053 (1.619)	0.505 (0.819)
Summated scale (Std. dev)	-1 - 2	-0.094 (0.833)	0.423 (0.730)	0.456 (0.688)	0.640 (0.759)	-0.614 (0.530)
<b>Controls</b>						
SES						
Secondary education or more	0 - 1	0.593	0.540	0.756	0.457	0.63
Household income percentile (Std. dev)	1 - 10	5.450 (2.784)	5.420 (2.780)	5.424 (2.724)	4.850 (2.658)	5.561 (2.801)
Cultural incorporation/differences						
Citizen of country	0 - 1	0.914	0.936	0.707	0.837	0.934
Speaks only official language	0 - 1	0.933	0.961	0.909	0.656	0.958
Western origins only	0 - 1	0.759	0.841	0.829	0.146	0.784
Demographics						
Women	0 - 1	0.513	0.547	0.548	0.482	0.491
Age (Std. dev)	18 - 96	46.148 (17.123)	51.095 (17.458)	44.039 (15.574)	31.533 (9.929)	45.157 (16.446)
Children living at home	0 - 1	0.370	0.362	0.430	0.475	0.353
Paid work last week	0 - 1	0.561	0.501	0.607	0.572	0.594

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).

*Religiosity* combines three measures: subjective religiosity, frequency of prayer, and attendance at religious events. I do not include measures of religious belief as the subject of belief will vary across faith traditions. First, I include responses to the question “how religious would you say you are” on a scale of 0 (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious). Second, I measure frequency of prayer from 0 (never) to 6 (every day). Even though Muslims are more likely than Christians to pray multiple times a day, there should not be any differences, due to dogma, on the probability of praying every day. Finally, I include a question on frequency of attendance at religious events, coded from 0 (never attends) to 5 (more than once a week). I create a summated scale of these three standardized measures

of religiosity for each adult with immigrant parents ( $\alpha = 0.819$ ). This is a popular measure of religiosity in empirical sociological research using the ESS and captures both public and private aspects of religion (Connor 2010; van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). While unaffiliated children of immigrants do not identify with a religion, some of them still call themselves religious and behave as such. On average, unaffiliated children of immigrants give a score of 2.59/10 for their personal religiosity. Moreover, 8.5% of unaffiliated adults pray at least once a week and 13.6% attend religious services at least for holy days.

Muslim children of immigrants in adulthood believe they are more religious, pray more frequently, and attend religious services more often than all other groups. On a scale of -1 to 2 for overall religiosity, Muslims on average consider themselves 0.2 of a point higher compared to all Christian children of immigrants. While mainstream Christians tend to pray on average around once a month (3), Muslims are closer to praying once a week (4). Mainstream Christians, however, pray slightly more often than other Christian children of immigrants. All Christians have close averages for frequency of attending religious events: mostly just for special holy days (2). Muslims tend to attend religious services more often. Yet, Muslim children of immigrants have a higher standard deviation for religious practice: Muslims in this sample are a more heterogeneous group compared to Christians.

Muslims are less educated, have lower incomes, and are less culturally incorporated compared to other children of immigrants. While 63.0% of unaffiliated children of immigrants have a secondary education or more, only 45.7% of Muslims do. Non-mainstream Christians have the highest proportion of members with a secondary education or more (75.6%), a potential consequence of high educational attainment in ex-USSR countries. Muslim children of immigrants are also part of a slightly lower income percentile. At the other extreme, unaffiliated children of immigrants are on average in a higher income percentile compared to all other groups, but also have the largest variation around that number. Many children of immigrants are citizens of the survey country (91.4% of the sample) but there are fewer Muslims (83.7%) and even less non-mainstream

Christians (75.6%) who have that status. There is an especially large difference between Muslims and other groups in language patterns. Only 65.6% of Muslim children of immigrants speak the official language at home compared to around 93% of mainstream Christians or unaffiliated children of immigrants, and 90.9% of other Christians. Finally, I include a measure of region of origins, separating children of immigrants with “Western” origins from the rest. Western countries include Europe, the US, Canada, Israel, and Australia. As expected, Muslim children of immigrants are the least likely to have only Western origins (14.6% do).

*Controls.* To be able to compare individuals with different backgrounds, I control for gender, age, household, and employment status. There are slightly more women in the sample and children of immigrants are on average around 46 years old. There is quite a variation in the average age between groups, Catholic and Protestant children of immigrants are the oldest (on average 51 years old) while Muslims are younger (on average 32 years old). Mainstream Christian children of immigrants also have one of the largest variation for age. This might reflect the timing of earlier Catholic migrations from Southern Europe and later Christian migration from sub-Saharan Africa. Around a third of children of immigrants above eighteen have children at home, and Muslims have the largest proportion of parents (47.5%). Between 50.7% and 60.7% of children of immigrants are employed full time, the rest being unemployed, in school, at home, or retired.

### **Method: random intercept multilevel models for children of immigrants nested in regions**

*Model specification.* I break down the ESS dataset by regions and conduct mixed effects linear regressions on religiosity for children of immigrants nested in regions. I use a two-level random intercept model to account for non-independence between individual betas for children of immigrants in the same regions. In the fixed effects model with only individual-level covariates described above (Table 3.5), 14.8% of the variance in religiosity is due to

variations across regions ( $F_{(256,7857)} = 1.85, p < 0.001$ ). Using Likelihood ratio tests, I find that a random intercept model using maximum likelihood estimations is better than the linear model ( $\chi^2_{(1)} = 53.22, p < 0.001$ ). Moreover, regional predictors increase the fit of the model compared to having fixed effects for regions ( $\chi^2_{(2)} = 86.64, p < 0.001$ ), and national level variables increase the fit compared to only having regional-level variables ( $\chi^2_{(2)} = 23.80, p < 0.001$ ). I include national-level variables (scores on policies and controls) as fixed effects for each region and do not include country varying intercept due to the relatively small number of countries (Bryan and Jenkins 2016). While regional context does matter for predicting religiosity, once accounting for individual-level predictors, there is only 0.6% of variation in religiosity due to differences between regions within the same countries. Most of the variation between regions is accounted for by variations between countries, and vice versa. However, there is enough evidence described above to use regions as the second level of analysis. I use the following model to predict individual  $i$ 's religiosity in region  $j$ :

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}W_j + \mu_{0j}$$

The first equation is similar to a simple linear regression where  $Y_{ij}$  is the estimated outcome and the errors  $\epsilon_{ij}$  have a normal distribution. This equation predicts the religiosity for the adult child of immigrant(s)  $i$  in region  $j$  with a matrix of covariates  $X_{ij}$ . The second equation predicts each region's average religiosity for children of immigrants, which was allowed to vary in the previous equation ( $\beta_{0j}$ ), with a variability between regions of ( $\mu_{0j}$ ) and region-specific covariates  $W_j$  (which includes both regional- and country-level variables that do not vary within regions). The ESS does not provide weights for regions which precludes multilevel analysis with population weights.

*Analysis Plan.* For my baseline models, I investigate children of immigrants' average religiosity with only individual-level variables and fixed effects for regions. I then investigate

how regional levels of native religiosity influence the religiosity of children of immigrants, and differences by religious affiliation (H1). I further explore the role of the regional social context by testing how anti-immigrant attitudes influence religiosity, specifically for Muslim children of immigrants (H2). Finally, I include measures of the national political context and investigate how strong multiculturalism (H3a) and strong anti-discrimination policies (H3b) lead to higher levels of religiosity regardless of the regional context and across religious affiliations (H3c).

## Results

### The religiosity of children of immigrants across social contexts

The fixed effects models (Models 1 and 2) and the multilevel models (Models 3 through 5) for individuals nested in regions are in Table 3.6. I only include religious affiliation when comparing effects across groups (Models 2 and 5). Identifying with a religion is correlated with strong religiosity and therefore including controls for religious traditions in the model would not give a good estimate on how the regional context shapes children of immigrants' religiosity. As shown in the random effects component, the variance between and within regions decreases across models except when adding the interaction between religious affiliation and natives' anti-immigrant attitudes. No additional information is gained when considering that the attitudinal context shapes children of immigrants' religiosity differently by religion.

Classic predictors of religiosity apply to children of immigrants in Europe. Children of immigrants with a high school degree or more are less religious compared to those with less education ( $p < 0.05$ ), and an increase in income percentile is associated with lower religiosity ( $p < 0.001$ ). Women are more likely to be religious than men ( $p < 0.001$ ) and having children or being older are both associated with higher religiosity ( $p < 0.001$ ). In this case, working does not have a significant relationship with religiosity.

Culturally incorporated children of immigrants are less religious. Children of immigrants

Table 3.6: Fixed and random effects models on religiosity for children of immigrants in 257 European regions between 2010 and 2016 (N= 8,129).

	(1) Fixed effects	(2) Fixed effects with affiliation	(3) Random effects by region	(4) Affiliation and natives' religiosity	(5) Affiliation and natives' attitudes
<b>Fixed estimates</b>					
Individual SES					
Secondary education or more	-0.046* (0.020)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.044* (0.019)	0.002 (0.015)	0.003 (0.015)
Household income <sup>a</sup>	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)
Cultural incorporation/differences					
Citizen of country	-0.122*** (0.034)	-0.017 (0.027)	-0.132*** (0.033)	-0.024 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.026)
Speaks only official language	-0.386*** (0.037)	-0.159*** (0.030)	-0.392*** (0.037)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.153*** (0.030)
Western origins only	-0.212*** (0.024)	-0.081*** (0.020)	-0.219*** (0.023)	-0.080*** (0.019)	-0.081*** (0.019)
Individual demographics					
Women	0.199*** (0.018)	0.151*** (0.014)	0.195*** (0.018)	0.153*** (0.014)	0.153*** (0.014)
Age <sup>a</sup>	0.007*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
Children living at home	0.118*** (0.019)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.127*** (0.019)	0.068*** (0.015)	0.072*** (0.015)
Paid work last week	-0.035 (0.020)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.039 (0.020)	0.007 (0.016)	0.005 (0.016)
Year (included 2010-2016)	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Affiliation (ref=Christian: mainstream)					
Christian: other		0.058 <sub>U,M</sub> (0.035)		0.030 (0.047)	0.080* (0.035)
Muslim		0.210 <sub>U,O</sub> (0.033)		0.121** (0.040)	0.230*** (0.033)
Unaffiliated		-0.979 <sub>O,M</sub> (0.017)		-0.973*** (0.018)	-0.972*** (0.016)

*Continued*

Table 3.6 (Continued)

	(1) Fixed effects	(2) Fixed effects with affiliation	(3) Random effects by region	(4) Affiliation and natives' religiosity	(5) Affiliation and natives' attitudes
<b>Regional social context</b>					
Natives' religiosity			0.542*** (0.033)	0.292*** (0.033)	0.245*** (0.025)
Natives' anti-immigrant attitudes			0.027 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.029 (0.041)
<b>Affiliation and regional context (ref=Christian: mainstream)</b>					
Other Christian in highly religious regions				-0.189 (0.111)	
Muslim in highly religious regions				-0.486*** (0.114)	
Unaffiliated in highly religious regions				-0.051 <sub>M</sub> (0.046)	
Other Christian in anti-immigrant regions					-0.125 (0.119)
Muslim in anti-immigrant regions					0.110 (0.097)
Unaffiliated in anti-immigrant regions					-0.066 (0.048)
Constant	0.449*** (0.054)	0.515*** (0.046)	0.547*** (0.053)	0.546*** (0.045)	0.524*** (0.045)
<b>Random estimates</b>					
Between regions ( $\sigma_{\mu_0}$ )	0.374	0.249	0.101*** (0.013)	0.060*** (0.011)	0.066*** (0.011)
Within regions ( $\sigma_{\epsilon}$ )	0.780	0.616	0.780*** (0.006)	0.615*** (0.005)	0.615*** (0.005)
ICC ( $\rho$ )	0.187	0.141	0.016	0.009	0.011

Standard errors in parenthesis, \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Under-script signifies estimate is different ( $p < 0.05$ ) with: *O* - other Christians, *M* - Muslims, and *U* - unaffiliated children of immigrants.

<sup>a</sup> Variable centered on median: age=45, income percentile=5.

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).

who are citizens of the survey country have a lower religiosity compared to non-citizens ( $p < 0.001$ ). Moreover, children of immigrants who only have western origins are less religious compared to those who have at least one parent from a non-western country ( $p < 0.001$ ). Finally, children of immigrants who speak only the official language have lower religiosity scores compared to those who speak another language at home ( $p < 0.001$ ). However, some of the relationships between SES, incorporation, and religiosity change when including a control for religious affiliation.

Muslims are more religious than Christians (Table 3.6, Model 2). As expected, unaffiliated children of immigrants are less religious than mainstream Christians ( $p < 0.001$ ) and Muslim children of immigrants are more religious than mainstream Christians ( $p < 0.001$ ). There are no differences between mainstream Christians and other Christians. I used Wald tests to see if the estimates between unaffiliated, other Christian, and Muslim children of immigrants are different from each other. I find that in the fixed effects model (Model 2), Muslims are more religious than both unaffiliated ( $p < 0.51$ ) and other Christian children of immigrants ( $p < 0.05$ ). Non-mainstream Christians have a higher religiosity compared to unaffiliated children of immigrants ( $p < 0.05$ ). Controlling for religious affiliation decreases the effects of education and citizenship. This might be because Muslim children of immigrants have very low rates of education and citizenship compared to any other group.

Children of immigrants incorporate into a particular religious context but are not affected by natives' attitudes towards immigrants (Table 3.6, Model 3). Children of immigrants living in a region with natives with high levels of religiosity are themselves more religious compared to children of immigrants in other regions ( $p < 0.001$ ). However, there is not a significant relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and religiosity for children of immigrants (in additional analysis I remove regional religiosity from the model and the results are the same). I investigate further the regional context by religious affiliation in the next two paragraphs. In Figure 3.3, I present predicted children of immigrants' religiosity by religious affiliation



and across the range of regional social contexts. The values for the predicted religiosity scores under extreme natives' religiosity and attitudes are in Table 3.7.




Figure 3.3: Predicted religiosity scores for children of immigrants in 257 European regions (linear estimates based on Table 3.6 Models 4 and 5, N= 8,129).

The strength of natives' religiosity has the opposite effect for Muslims than it has for non-Muslims. Most groups — unaffiliated, mainstream Christians, and other Christians — are more religious in regions with natives who are also religious (Figure 3.3). Mainstream Christian children of immigrants have the highest increase in religiosity when comparing those living in regions with the lowest religiosity to those in regions that are very religious (0.677, Table 3.7,  $p < 0.001$ ). Unaffiliated children of immigrants, who are the least religious, also experience a large increase in their scores when comparing extreme regions (0.559,  $p < 0.001$ ). Non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants have a stable religiosity across regions but are not significantly different from mainstream Christians or unaffiliated children of immigrants. However, Muslim children of immigrants are less religious in regions

with high native religiosity compared to those living in regions with low native religiosity (Figure 3.3). Muslim children of immigrants living in regions with low native religiosity have a religiosity score of 0.747, and this score goes down to 0.297 in regions with high native religiosity. The change between the two types of regions is significantly different from unaffiliated and mainstream Christian children of immigrants ( $p < 0.05$ ).

Table 3.7: Predicted religiosity scores for children of immigrants in 257 European regions (linear estimates based on Table 3.6 Models 4 and 5, N= 8,129).

	Minimum	Maximum	Difference
<i>Value: natives' religiosity (Model 4)</i>	-1.022	1.296	
<b>Predicted religiosity:</b>			
Christian: mainstream	0.129	0.806	0.677 <sub>M</sub> ***
Christian: other	0.352	0.590	0.238
Muslim	0.747	0.297	-0.449 <sub>U,C</sub>
Unaffiliated	-0.792	-0.233	0.559 <sub>M</sub> ***
<i>Value: natives' anti-immigrant attitude (Model 5)</i>	-0.997	1.069	
<b>Predicted religiosity:</b>			
Christian: mainstream	0.347	0.406	0.060
Christian: other	0.551	0.353	-0.198
Muslim	0.467	0.755	0.288
Unaffiliated	-0.559	-0.636	-0.077

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Under-script signifies estimate is different ( $p < 0.05$ ) with: *O* - other Christians, *M* - Muslims, and *U* - unaffiliated children of immigrants.

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).

Children of immigrants have similar levels of religiosity in regions with more or less anti-immigrant sentiments. Children of immigrants living in regions with strong anti-immigrant attitudes are not significantly different to those living in regions with low anti-immigrant attitudes (Table 3.7). There are, however, some descriptive differences reflected in Figure 3.3. Mainstream Christians and Muslim children of immigrants both tend to be more religious in regions with more anti-immigrant attitudes. On the other hand, other Christians and unaffiliated children of immigrants have a weaker religiosity in a similar context. All the results described above hold even when accounting for the national context.

## The religiosity of children of immigrants across political contexts

To investigate the national context, I test the effects of the strength of multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies on religiosity (Table 3.8). These results include individual controls and regional social contexts described in Table 3.6. The overall explained variance in religiosity (ICC) does not decrease after adding national level controls (Model 1) or policies (Model 2), compared to the model with only regional variables (Table 3.6 Model 3). However, it decreases from 1.6% to 0.4% when including interactions between religious affiliation, multiculturalism, and anti-discrimination scores (Model 4). Model 4 of Table 3.8 has the smallest variation left unexplained of all models. This reflects the diversity of experiences by religious affiliation in response to national policies.

For children of immigrants in a similar regional context, national controls do not have the expected effect. First, children of immigrants living in countries with a higher percentage of Christians (e.g., Poland, Norway, and Austria) are not more or less religious than those living in countries with average levels of Christian representation (Model 1). Second, a large recent inflow of immigrants (typical of Switzerland, Austria, and Norway) does not increase children of immigrants' religiosity. On the contrary, in countries with a larger recent inflow of immigrants, children of immigrants are on average less religious ( $p < 0.001$ ). Migration inflows may only shape first-generation immigrants' religiosity but not their children's. The ethnic, racial, and religious composition of recent migrants may be too different from children of immigrants already part of established communities.

Children of immigrants living in countries with stronger multiculturalism policies are on average less religious. However, on average, the strength of anti-discrimination policies does not have any influence on religiosity (Model 2). This is true for children of immigrants living in regions with similar levels of religiosity and anti-immigrant attitudes. Across all faith traditions, the combination of strong multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies does not change the levels of religiosity among children of immigrants (Model 3). However, the relationships between multiculturalism, anti-discrimination, and religiosity changes

Table 3.8: Fixed and random effects models on religiosity for children of immigrants in twenty European countries between 2010 and 2016 (N= 8,129).

	(1) National controls	(2) Policies	(3) Interaction of policies	(4) Affiliation and policies
<b>Fixed estimates</b>				
Individual controls and regional context	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>
National controls				
Percent Christian <sup>a</sup>	0.152 (0.107)	0.216 (0.112)	0.223 (0.116)	-0.229** (0.080)
Migrant inflow per capita	-0.073** (0.025)	-0.070** (0.026)	-0.069** (0.026)	-0.038* (0.018)
National political context				
Multiculturalism policy score <sup>b</sup>		-0.032* (0.015)	-0.033* (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.014)
Anti-discrimination policy score <sup>b</sup>		-0.008 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.017)	0.024 (0.017)
Multiculturalism and anti-discrimination			0.003 (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)
Individual affiliation (ref=Christian: mainstream)				0.192*** (0.046)
Christian: other				0.168*** (0.036)
Muslim				-0.972*** (0.018)
Unaffiliated				

*Continued*

Table 3.8 (Continued)

	(1) National controls	(2) Policies	(3) Interaction of policies	(4) Affiliation and policies
<b>Affiliation and national context (ref=Christian: mainstream)</b>				
Other Christian with strong multiculturalism				-0.044 (0.049)
Muslim with strong multiculturalism				0.041 (0.041)
Unaffiliated with strong multiculturalism				0.071*** (0.018)
Other Christian with strong anti-discrimination policies				0.195*** (0.042)
Muslim with strong anti-discrimination policies				0.121** (0.038)
Unaffiliated with strong anti-discrimination policies				-0.049* (0.019)
Other Christian with both types of policies strong				0.020 (0.046)
Muslim with both types of policies strong				0.044 (0.044)
Unaffiliated with both types of policies strong				-0.006 (0.018)
Constant	0.624*** (0.059)	0.625*** (0.060)	0.624*** (0.060)	0.553*** (0.050)
<b>Random estimates</b>				
Between regions ( $\sigma_{\mu_0}$ )	0.099*** (0.014)	0.098*** (0.013)	0.098*** (0.013)	0.039** (0.013)
Within regions ( $\sigma_{\epsilon}$ )	0.779*** (0.006)	0.779*** (0.006)	0.779*** (0.006)	0.613*** (0.005)
ICC ( $\rho$ )	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.004

Standard errors in parenthesis, \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Under-script signifies estimate is different ( $p < 0.05$ ) with: *O* - other Christians, *M* - Muslims, and *U* - unaffiliated children of immigrants.

<sup>a</sup> Variable centered on median: percent Christian in country=68.7%. <sup>b</sup> Standardized.

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016), MIPEX 2008-2014, OECD 2008-2014, WPP 2008-2014, Pew Research Center 2010.

when looking at effects by religious groups. In Figure 3.4, I present the estimated scores for religiosity by religious affiliation under various national contexts. The score estimates' confidence intervals are listed in Table 3.9.

Depending on their faith tradition, children of immigrants respond very differently to national policies. As shown in Figure 3.4, the direction of effects for each religious affiliation are somewhat opposite. For unaffiliated children of immigrants (the largest group), there is not much change between countries with various policy configurations: their religiosity is weak across national contexts (Figure 3.4.a-d). I will now focus on children of immigrants who identify with a religion.

Overall, children of immigrants who identify with a religion are less religious in countries with more multiculturalism policies but few anti-discrimination protections. Compared to countries with weak anti-discrimination policies and weak multiculturalism policies (such as Poland or the Czech Republic), children of immigrants who live in a country with only multiculturalism (Denmark or Germany) have a weaker religiosity (Figure 3.4.a). This difference is significant for mainstream Christians (Table 3.4,  $p < 0.001$ ). With many anti-discrimination provisions in place, more multiculturalism policies do not make much of a difference, except for Muslim children of immigrants (Figure 3.4.b). On the other hand, with strong or weak multiculturalism policies, children of immigrants living in a country with more anti-discrimination policies have stable and sometimes even stronger religiosity.

Non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants are the most affected by the strength of anti-discrimination policies. With many or few multiculturalism policies in place, non-mainstream Christians who live in a country with strong anti-discrimination provisions are more religious compared to those in countries with low provisions (Figure 3.4.c-d). For non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants, being in a country with only strong anti-discrimination policies — for example, Hungary and Slovakia — or with both strong anti-discrimination policies and multiculturalism — such as Sweden or Finland — is associated

with higher religiosity compared to countries with only strong multiculturalism provisions (Table 3.4,  $p < 0.05$ ). However, there are no significant differences between non-mainstream Christians who live in a country with strong or weak multiculturalism.




Figure 3.4: Predicted religiosity scores for children of immigrants in twenty European countries (linear estimates based on Table 3.8 Model 4,  $N = 8,129$ ).

Table 3.9: Predicted religiosity scores for children of immigrants in twenty European countries (linear estimates based on Table 3.8 Model 4, N=8,129).

Religious affiliation	Both types of policies weak		Strong multiculturalism policies	
Christian: mainstream	0.528	[0.415, 0.641]	0.144	[-0.035, 0.322]
Christian: other	0.533	[0.196, 0.869]	-0.182	[-0.715, 0.351]
Muslim	0.560	[0.187, 0.934]	0.009	[-0.462, 0.480]
Unaffiliated	-0.527	[-0.640, -0.415]	-0.578	[-0.740, -0.417]
Religious affiliation	Strong anti-discrimination policies		Both types of policies strong	
Christian: mainstream	0.465	[0.352, 0.577]	0.353	[0.256, 0.449]
Christian: other	0.968	[0.610, 1.326]	0.795	[0.536, 1.053]
Muslim	0.584	[0.302, 0.866]	0.897	[0.663, 1.132]
Unaffiliated	-0.709	[-0.813, -0.606]	-0.566	[-0.639, -0.494]

95% confidence intervals in brackets.

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016), MIPEX 2008-2014, OECD 2008-2014, WPP 2008-2014, Pew Research Center 2010.

Muslim children of immigrants benefit the most from multiculturalism, but only in countries that also have many anti-discrimination policies. Moreover, Muslim children of immigrants need multiculturalism policies in place to benefit from anti-discrimination policies. Muslim children of immigrants, as all other children of immigrants, have a decrease in religiosity with only more multiculturalism policies in place. However, Muslims have stronger religiosity in countries with both more multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies in place (Figure 3.4.b). They are the only religious group to have a stronger predicted religiosity in countries with both strong multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies compared to countries with only strong anti-discrimination policies. Muslim children of immigrants have a predicted religiosity score of 0.584 in a country with only anti-discrimination policies (a similar score to all other groups), which goes to 0.897 in countries with both strong multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies, a score significantly higher than mainstream Christians (Table 3.4,  $p < 0.05$ ). Anti-discrimination policies alone also do not increase the religiosity of Muslims. Muslim children of immigrants who live in countries with low multiculturalism (for example Poland or Slovakia) are not strongly affected by the strength of anti-discrimination policies (Figure



3.4.c).

## Summary

Muslims are more religious compared to all other children of immigrants. However, beyond religious affiliation, religiosity is also shaped by both the local social environment and the national political context. Indeed, Christian children of immigrants are more religious in regions with more religious natives (H1a), though the relationship is stronger for mainstream Christians compared to Orthodox or other Christians (H1b). Muslim children of immigrants' religiosity runs opposite to the religiosity levels of natives in the same region (H1c). Surprisingly, anti-immigrant attitudes do not seem to lead to less or more religiosity for children of immigrants of all faith traditions (H2). National policies only affect religious minorities (H3d): non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants are more religious in countries with more anti-discrimination policies (H3b) and Muslim children of immigrants are more religious in countries with both strong anti-discrimination and multiculturalism policies.

Most children of immigrants incorporate into regions with specific levels of religiosity (H1a). However, Muslim children of immigrants are the only group for whom religiosity is low in regions with high levels of natives' religiosity, and high in regions with low levels of natives' religiosity (H1b). Mainstream Christians, other Christians, and unaffiliated children of immigrants, all have strong religiosity if they live in a region where natives also have a strong religiosity. As expected, mainstream Christians and unaffiliated children of immigrants are the most affected by natives, having a similar religious identity. However, the relationship is also positive for other Christian children of immigrants who do not share the in-group status with natives. Unlike all other groups, Muslim children of immigrants have the opposite religiosity compared to natives living in the same region.

Children of immigrants tend to have a stable religiosity regardless of anti-immigrant attitudes from natives (H2). Surprisingly, there are no significant differences in how

children of immigrants react to negative attitudes towards them, even if, in this sample, Muslim children of immigrants have a slightly higher religiosity in an anti-immigrant context. Combining results from hypothesis testing and descriptive analyses, there is no evidence that Muslim children of immigrants try to leave their religion because of discrimination. For non-mainstream children of immigrants, there is no evidence that they have a more salient religiosity in response to discrimination. However, there is descriptive evidence that each religious sub-group might react differently to anti-immigrant attitudes.

Mainstream Christians and unaffiliated children of immigrants are overall unaffected by multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies, but non-mainstream Christians and Muslims benefit from the combination of both provisions. Children of immigrants are not more religious in countries with only multiculturalism policies in place (H3a). While there is no evidence of a positive effect of anti-discrimination policies for children of immigrants of all faith traditions (H3b), the strength of anti-discrimination policies is important for non-mainstream Christians' religiosity (H3c). For Muslim children of immigrants, their religiosity is highest in countries with both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies. More multiculturalism policies enable higher religiosity of Muslims if anti-discrimination policies are in place, and anti-discrimination policies only have a positive effect on Muslims' religiosity if strong multiculturalism policies are also present (H3c).

## **Discussion**

Most children of immigrants incorporate into their local communities; however, Muslims have a distinctively high religiosity across contexts. Moreover, the religiosity of minority religious groups is dependent on the country's provision of multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies. Research on religiosity among immigrants in Europe has largely centered on the foreign-born generation, and the handful of studies that address the second-generation are limited to a single country. By introducing a cross-national framework centered on children of immigrants, this research shows that religiosity is

shaped not only by immigrant family origins, but also by local and national contexts.

Christian children of immigrants from majority or minority religions incorporate into their local religious communities. However, there is evidence of a bright social boundary between Muslims and all other groups, exemplified in salient Muslim religiosity across social contexts. In Europe, the “us” and “them” differentiation seems to be between Muslims and non-Muslims (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999) instead of between mainstream Christians and all other groups (Wimmer and Soehl 2014). In line with new assimilation theories, I find that children of immigrants inside of these bright boundaries — all Christians and the unaffiliated — seem to be culturally incorporating into European regions and have similar levels of religiosity than natives around them (Alba 2005). Muslim children of immigrants outside of this boundary are less culturally assimilated: keeping strong ties to religion across social contexts. However, this boundary seems to be infused in the culture and institutions rather than through experiences with discrimination. Even though Muslims do not suppress their religiosity for incorporation, there is no evidence of a “reactive” religiosity in the context of anti-immigrant attitudes. Muslims therefore might be very religious as a way to engage with the European mainstream.

Lip service to multiculturalism alone does not encourage religiosity; however, anti-discrimination policies have a significant effect for religious minorities. The multicultural intentions of the state do have the intended consequences on religious diversity, but only if the state also provides legal protections and requirements (Cornelius et al. 1994; Massey 1999). Anti-discrimination policies, mandated by the EU, are critical in providing a space for minorities to practice their religion. Children of immigrants may feel especially free to identify with their minority religion in countries with strong anti-discrimination policies traditionally defined as economically *laissez-faire*, such as the UK and Portugal. The role of multiculturalism is less clear: Muslim children of immigrants, being outside of social boundaries, might be more religious as a result of the politicization of their identity. In the debate over the future of multiculturalism, I provide

evidence that other provisions, such as anti-discrimination policies, should go alongside multicultural rights and recognition.

This chapter demonstrates how the religiosity of children of immigrants is shaped within a specific context. In the next chapter, I turn from contextual influences on religiosity to the consequences of religiosity for immigrant incorporation into the political sphere. Specifically, I examine the relationship between engagement with religious institutions and political participation among children of immigrants. In addition, I continue the analysis of the political context in twenty European countries by asking whether state policies can facilitate or inhibit political participation among children of immigrants.

## Chapter 4

### **Immigrant Religious Communities, Collective Identities, and Political Participation Across European Countries**

Across social and political European contexts, religion is important for children of immigrants, especially Muslims. A question that remains is how religiosity, and specifically involvement in religious communities, fosters or inhibits political incorporation. Through participation in political acts, children of immigrants demonstrate their inclusion in the host country and in the national political discourse. Political engagement is critical when assessing immigrants' assimilation, as it represents a cultural, social, and institutional incorporation (Bloemraad 2006; de Rooij 2012). By participating in politics, immigrants and children of immigrants can also actively change the political landscape and policies affecting them (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Putnam 2001; Warner 1993). Cross-national studies in Europe have found that western and non-western children of immigrants are overall less likely to participate in non-electoral politics compared to natives (Aleksynska 2011; de Rooij 2012). However, studies in Germany and the Netherlands find that ethnic organizations and strong ethnic identities are associated with more political activities (Fennema and Tillie 2001; Fischer-Neumann 2014; Klandermans 2008; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014).

European research on the political participation of children of immigrants has neglected the role of religious organizations and state policies. According to theories of political engagement and social capital, ethnic organizations provide resources for group mobilization and other political activities (Brady et al. 1995; Coleman 1988; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Portes 1998; Putnam 2001; Verba et al. 1995). In practice, religious

institutions are often the only ethnic organization available to children of immigrants. In the US, religious organizations have been found to increase children of immigrants' human resources, material security, group identity, social capital, and group consciousness (Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1993). I expect these resources to be present in European immigrant religious organizations as well. The bright social boundary in Europe between Christianity and Islam (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999) results in an imposed social categorization shared by Muslim immigrants from multiple countries, cultures, and diverse religious traditions. I argue that Muslim children of immigrants will use religious organizations to connect with individuals across ethnic groups who experience that same imposed categorization. Therefore, I posit mosques as pan-ethnic organizations which foster new identities as a platform for collective action (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). While European countries tend to give less freedom and recognition to religion than the US (Foner and Alba 2008; Mooney 2009), multiculturalism policies and political rights for foreigners will both enable more collective political participation of children of immigrants and increase the potential for religious organizations to link their members to the political mainstream (Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005; Mooney 2009).

I combine theories of political participation, ethnic organizations, pan-ethnic identities, and state policies to explain how religious organizations can be a forum for collective political mobilization. Using the ESS dataset, I first investigate how participation in religious events encourages political participation of children of immigrants in twenty European countries. Second, I test if attendance at religious events intersects with experiences of religious discrimination to create a sense of group consciousness. I ask if the role of religious organizations is greater for Muslims compared to mainstream Christians (Protestant and Catholic), other Christians (Orthodox and other sects), and the unaffiliated. Finally, I investigate cross-national variation in the relationship between involvement with religious organizations and political engagement, and whether this

relationship is moderated by states' strength of multiculturalism policies and political rights for foreigners.

## **Models of Individual and Collective Political Participation**

Political participation consists of the set of “voluntary activities by ordinary people directed towards influencing directly or indirectly political outcomes at various levels of the political system” (de Rooij 2012, p.456). Classical political theorists argue that multiple individual factors can shape political participation: material and human capital are the strongest predictors, however, organizational resources (civic skills and culture) and psychological resources (interest in politics, group identity, and political knowledge) all increase participation as well (Brady et al. 1995; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Verba et al. 1995). Since then, research has moved away from individual resources to focus instead on group level factors shaping political participation. Social capital theory re-conceptualized organizational resources to include networks and the creation of collective identities (Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Putnam 2001). I investigate if religious organizations increase political participation overall but also specifically by increasing a sense of shared resources and new collective identities. I supplement theories of organizations and political participation by including the state as an active agent shaping institutions.

In Figure 4.1, I present the theoretical framework. I argue that religious organizations lead to more political engagement of children of immigrants from all faiths, but this effect will be moderated by a sense of group consciousness. For Muslim children of immigrants under bright boundaries, their religious identity can also become a pan-ethnic identity — a form of group consciousness reaching across ethnic backgrounds — and religious organizations can thus encourage even more political participation. Finally, the strength of multiculturalism policies and political rights for migrants will affect political engagement of children of immigrants directly and indirectly through increasing the effect of religious organizations.




Figure 4.1: Theoretical model for Chapter 4.

### Religious Organizations and Children of Immigrants' Political Participation

Religious organizations provide critical human and material resources to children of immigrants in often-tenuous situations in the host country. First, children of immigrants can develop political skills and increase their knowledge of the host country's political system through religious messages, religious classes, and religious organizational structures. Religious leaders sometimes discuss directly the political landscape and upcoming opportunities for political engagement. For example, Catholic and Protestant churches in the US are found to increase the political participation of ethnic minorities through information spread through the pulpit (Harris 1994; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). Minority religious organizations often hold classes and meetings to help children of immigrants incorporate in the host country and develop their civic skills. During classes, immigrants can learn basic skills necessary for political participation, such as reading and speaking in the host country language (Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Local religious organizations also have their own bureaucratic structure that enables individuals to practice their civic skills (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Secret et al. 1990). Children of immigrants with more human capital gained through religious organizations will be able to be active in the mainstream political arena. Second, religious organizations sometimes provide actual material resources to their members, enabling them to be more civically and politically engaged. Religious organizations can help their members directly with financial and other necessary resources



to participate in politics (Pattillo-McCoy 1998; Timpone 1998). For example, African-American churches often function as a bank and benevolent society for their members (Pattillo-McCoy 1998). If children of immigrants feel more secure financially because of their religious organization's propensity to help, they can spend more time and resources attending rallies, calling representatives, etc.

Religious organizations also provide a larger and stronger social network for children of immigrants, bridging ties across social class and bonding individuals from similar cultures (Allen 2010; Cadge and Ecklund 2007). First, by attending religious organizations, individuals can expand their network. According to classic theories, ethnic organizations are a key place to increase social capital (Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Putnam 2001). At religious organizations, members can meet individuals in their own ethnic group but from higher social classes, with more human and material capital (Allen 2010; Withnow and Hackett 2003). Through their social contacts at religious organizations, congregants with less resources can learn about political issues and receive information necessary to be engaged. Second, religious organizations not only offer a larger network, but a group of similar others and a place to develop strong group identities (Cadage and Ecklund 2007). This is especially the case for minority groups who tie religion to their ethnic origins. Religious organizations can offer a "free space" for immigrants and their children to embrace and celebrate their cultural particularities (Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; Lim and Putnam 2010; Putnam 2001; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1993). Through participating in traditional activities at religious organizations, children of immigrants can learn about their cultural origins (Cadage and Ecklund 2007; Mooney 2009; Warner 1993). For example, churches in the US are a place for Korean and Vietnamese Americans to learn about and maintain cultural traditions (Bankston and Zhou 1996; Min 1992). These activities are essential for building a strong ethnic identity which has been found to increase political participation (Cadage and Ecklund 2007).

I expect religious organizations to provide children of immigrants with human and

material resources as well as large and strong social networks. Theories of the role of religious organizations and political participation are based in the US, where most religious organizations become *de facto* congregational (Warner 1993) and the place of religious organizations is well established and accepted by larger institutions (Mooney 2009). However, European countries are significantly different from the US American context: many have been secularizing at a fast rate and have weaker religious institutions (Foner and Alba 2008; Gorski and Atinordu 2008; Mooney 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2011). Even so, children of immigrants in Europe also experience economic or social insecurity; therefore, they are likely to turn to religious communities for help and resources.

*(H1) Attendance at religious services will be associated with higher levels of political participation for children of immigrants.*

### **Collective Identities, Group Consciousness, and Pan-ethnic Organizations**

Participation in a religious community can be a resource for immigrants who share a faith tradition and experience discrimination because of it. Across affiliations, religious organizations can develop a sense of religious group consciousness for children of immigrants who experience religious discrimination. However, when religion forms a bright social boundary, religious identities can also become politicized and even racialized (Kastoryano 2004; Lamont 2003). In Europe, a bright religious boundary separates Christianity and Islam. Therefore, mosques might act as pan-ethnic organizations and help Muslim children of immigrants from various national origins to mobilize around politicized and racialized categorizations.

High levels of group consciousness lead individuals to realize that their group might be at a disadvantage but also that they can take action and influence politics (Peterson 1992). The political science literature defines group consciousness as a strong group identity with an added sense of power deprivation and commitment to collective action (Harris 1999; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Wilcox and Gomez 1990). Mobilization around a collective

identity develops in the context of shared personal experiences of stigma and discrimination (Bernstein 2005; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005). Religious organizations are both a place of refuge from discrimination and a place to learn about systematic discrimination happening by all members of the same group. In the US, African Americans and Latinos/as discuss issues pertaining to their group and narratives of empowerment at church events and services; therefore, church members have a greater sense of group consciousness (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Harris 1999; Sanchez 2006; Secret et al. 1990; Stokes 2003; Wilcox and Gomez 1990). I expect children of immigrants who attend religious services and have a sense of group consciousness to participate more in politics.

*(H2) Religious attendance will have a stronger effect on political participation for children of immigrants who perceive their religious group to be discriminated.*

The bright social boundaries around Islam imply that religious organizations will play a larger role for Muslim children of immigrants' political participation through the development of new politicized collective identities. For children of immigrants across faith traditions, personal experiences of religious discrimination may increase a sense of group consciousness. However, bright social boundaries which impose categorizations on children of immigrants can create new types of identities across ethnic backgrounds and within organizations. Social boundaries in Europe are around religion and children of immigrants will integrate into the division between "us" Christians and "them" Muslims (Alba 2005; Zolberg 1999). Through this process, Islam is politicized and racialized by European natives, institutions, and cultures (Kastoryano 2004; Lamont 2003). Therefore, Muslim children of immigrants have a greater potential for political engagement if they mobilize around their Muslim identity.

In Europe, mosques can function as pan-ethnic organizations: encouraging Muslims from various backgrounds to re-interpret imposed categorizations and mobilize as a collective. Due to similar experiences with bright social boundaries, children of immigrants appropriate imposed identities and use them as a tool for political mobilization (Kibria 1998; Lopez and

Espiritu 1990; Nagel 1994; Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). Studies in the US find that children of immigrants from multiple countries are influenced by current social boundaries and experiences of discrimination, and thus take on labels such as “Latino” and “Asian” for collective solidarity and mobilization (Cornell 1996; Feliciano 2009; Kibria 2000; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Tuan 1999; Waldinger et al. 1990). This re-interpretation of a categorization unifying individuals from different backgrounds is called a pan-ethnic identity. Pan-ethnic organizations promote these identities and help individuals to bring their concerns to the national level (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). In the US, Hispanic organizations brought together Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and other central and south American groups together to push for a Hispanic category on the census which helped them advance their rights as a group (Mora 2014). Pan-ethnic Asian-American organizations continue to play a key role in connecting Asian children of immigrants from different national backgrounds but experiencing the same discrimination and anti-Asian violence (Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 2014). In Chapter 2, I find that Muslim children of immigrants attend religious services more in adolescence while moving away from their national origins, a sign that this religious identity may indeed be pan-ethnic. If the Muslim identity functions as a pan-ethnic identity, mosques will function as pan-ethnic organizations and will be a way for children of immigrants to organize around a collective identity and advocate for their rights as a religious minority.

*(H3) Religious attendance will have a stronger effect on political participation for Muslims compared to all other children of immigrants.*

## **States, Political Participation, and Religious Organizations**

Policies on political rights and multiculturalism can shape the political participation of children of immigrants, and the relationship between religious organizations and politics. Political rights for foreigners will increase political engagement directly and moderate the role of religious organizations for political engagement. Political rights for non-citizens will

directly enable non-citizen children of immigrants to vote at the regional and European level. The potential for voting in these elections will increase children of immigrants' involvement in other political acts such as signing a petition or participating in a protest. Ethnic minorities have a greater trust in institutions if the state defends political freedom and there is diverse political representation as a result. This trust can be translated into more political mobilization and dissent (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Joppke 1999). Indirectly, political rights for foreigners will enable resources from religious organizations to be translated in actual political participation.

Multiculturalism policies create a greater sense of inclusiveness in the country and enable religious organizations to provide more resources to children of immigrants. Multiculturalism policies also create a culture of trust in institutions and acceptance of all cultures. Therefore, in countries with more multiculturalism policies, children of immigrants will feel more comfortable participating in mainstream politics. Multiculturalism policies foster religious communities through acknowledging the presence of minority groups and recognizing the legitimacy of minority organizations (Koopmans 2013b; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). In countries with fewer religious rights and recognition, religious organizations might not be able to provide the capital and resources necessary for engagement with national institutions. There is qualitative evidence that the relationship between the state and minority groups will either reinforce or dampen the positive role of religious organizations (Kastoryano 2002; Mooney 2009). For example, Mooney (2009) finds that while Haitian immigrants and their children in the US use religious organizations to help them with bureaucratic and language issues, Haitians in France cannot turn to religious organizations for help due to the fragile institutional position of minority churches. The relationship between the state and diversity will therefore shape if and how religious organizations can help children of immigrants.

*(H4) States will shape children of immigrants' political participation directly and indirectly through religious organizations:*

(H4a) *Expansive political rights for foreigners will be associated with higher levels of political participation.*

(H4b) *The positive relationship between religious attendance and political participation will be stronger in countries with expansive political rights for foreigners.*

(H4c) *Strong multiculturalism policies will be associated with higher levels of political participation.*

(H4d) *The positive relationship between religious attendance and political participation will be stronger in countries with more multiculturalism policies.*

## **Previous Findings on the Political Participation of Children of Immigrants in Europe**

In Europe, civic organizations increase the political participation of children of immigrants, but the effects vary by country, group, and type of organization. Klandermans (2008) measures immigrants' organization memberships (including political parties, religious organizations, sports organizations etc.) and finds that an increase in membership is associated with more political participation in the Netherlands. More broadly, a special issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* called on authors to test Fennema and Tillie (1999)'s hypothesis that differences in political participation are due to different levels of social capital drawn from ethnic civic communities. Looking at associative participation in Berlin, which includes ethnic and German organizations, Berger et al. (2004) find that participants in German organizations are more active politically. In Amsterdam, Tillie (2004) finds that membership in ethnic organizations, cross-ethnic organizations, and trade unions are all associated with greater political participation for Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans, and the Surinamese. However, Togeby (2004) finds variation in the effects of membership by type and by ethnic group in Denmark. For example,

second-generation Turks who are members of ethnic organizations or cross-ethnic sports club, but not in trade-unions, are more likely to participate in politics; ethnic organizations also have a positive effect for Pakistanis but not for Ex-Yugoslavs (Togeby 2004). Jacobs et al. (2004) find that while Turks in Brussels are part of more ethnic civic communities, Moroccans are more likely to participate in politics.

Despite substantial interest in the role of civic and community organizations in fostering political participation, very few studies have specifically investigated the role of religious attendance or affiliation in shaping immigrants' political incorporation. The few existing studies hint at a potential positive relationship between religion and politics. In the UK, McAndrew and Voas (2014) find that immigrant religiosity (and index of importance and practice) does promote civic engagement of second-generation immigrants. Compared to other immigrant religious groups, Aleksynska (2011) finds that first-generation Muslims are less affected by the participation culture in the host country and more affected by their country of origin and the migration contexts. Martinovic and Verkuyten (2014) find that for Dutch and Germans with Turkish origins, identifying as Muslim leads to more political action. These studies are limited to either the first-generation immigrants or only a couple national contexts.

Perceived discrimination has also been studied as a motivating factor in minority political participation. However, evidence on the relationship between perceived discrimination and political participation in Europe is inconclusive. Perceived religious discrimination does not significantly predict political engagement, even when combined with strong religious identity. However, discrimination based on national origins does seem to increase political participation in some countries. Martinovic and Verkuyten (2014) do not find evidence that perceived religious discrimination increases the relationship between Muslim identification and political participation in the Netherlands and Germany. On the other hand, Fischer-Neumann (2014) finds that children of immigrants' dual identification is only associated with political interest in Germany if combined with feelings of discrimination based on ethnic

origins. She finds that this effect is more pronounced for Turkish children of immigrants (Fischer-Neumann 2014). Klandermans (2008), also in Germany, finds that grievances — belief that the government does not treat one’s group well — is associated with more political participation of immigrants. However, Sanders et al. (2014) find that, in Britain, perceived ethnic discrimination is not related to political participation. To date, researchers have not considered how religious discrimination might interact with religious attendance in predicting political engagement.

Finally, previous studies have also considered the role of the state. Past studies show how multiculturalism can increase individual political engagement through ethnic identities and foster group demands and mobilization through religious identities. Wright and Bloemraad (2012) find that multiculturalism policies foster political engagement of immigrants across national context through ethnic identity but does not include the role of religious communities and religious identities. On the other hand, Kastoryano (2002) and Koopmans et al. (2005) both look at the relationship between the state and religious leaders or groups but do not include individual-level political participation. In her interviews with immigrant and political leaders in Germany, France, and the US, Kastoryano (2002) explains how the state creates group identities which are then used by groups to make claims. Koopmans et al. (2005) further explains how political institutions need to first recognize Islam for Muslims to then organize and make group demands. However, no previous research focuses on how multiculturalism might lead to more individual political engagement through religious attendance.

## **Data Source, Measures, and Methods**

### **Data source and case selection**

I investigate the relationship between religious attendance and political participation for adult children of immigrants in twenty European countries between 2010 and 2016. My primary data source is Waves 5 through 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS), a sample I



describe in Chapter 3. I focus on adult children of immigrants who are unaffiliated or identify as either Catholic, Protestant, another non-mainstream Christian tradition, or Muslim and with no observations missing on covariates of interest. I include European countries with Catholicism or Protestantism as the majority religion and with at least thirty children of immigrants interviewed. The final sample includes 8,129 individuals from twenty countries.

I augment these individual-level data with Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) data on multiculturalism and political rights for foreigners. I include policy scores for multiculturalism and political rights between 2008 and 2014 to provide a two-year lag time. As in Chapter 3, the strength of multiculturalism policies is measured using a subset of the MIPEX, only considering policies that recognize, enable, and encourage diversity in schools, employment opportunities, the legal system, and politics. Two countries — Croatia and Lithuania — are excluded because they do not have MIPEX scores between 2008 and 2014.

### **Political rights in Europe**

In addition to multiculturalism scores, I include MIPEX indicators for the strength of political rights and political liberties for legally residing foreign citizens in each country. These scores measure if legally residing foreign citizens can vote in local, regional and national elections, stand in local elections, and join organizations or political parties. The MIPEX assigns a score for each country by year: 100 representing if the political act is completely allowed, 50 if there are some requirements, and 0 if it is not allowed at all (Huddleston et al. 2015). All the indicators used to measure the strength of political rights for foreigners are in the Appendix B.3. Below, in Table 4.1, I present the average scores for political rights by country between 2008 and 2010.

Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden provide the most political rights for legally residing foreigners. In all three countries, there are no restrictions on the creation of associations or on the compositions of associations by foreigners, and there is equal access

with nationals to membership and involvement in political parties. Moreover, while no European country in this sample gives the right to legally residing foreign citizens to vote in national elections, foreigners can still stand and vote in local elections in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden, foreigners are also allowed to vote in regional elections, but that is not the case in the Netherlands.

Table 4.1: Political rights for foreigners scores from 2008 to 2014 in twenty European countries.

Country	Year							Average
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Austria					50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0
Belgium	56.3	56.3	56.3		56.3	56.3	56.3	56.3
Czech Republic		0.0		0.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	15.0
Denmark	87.5	87.5		87.5	87.5	87.5		87.5
Estonia		20.8	20.8	20.8			20.8	20.8
Finland	83.3		83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3
France	50.0	50.0		50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0
Germany	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0
Hungary	58.3		58.3	58.3		45.8		55.2
Ireland		83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3	83.3
Netherlands	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0
Norway	87.5	87.5	87.5	87.5	87.5		87.5	87.5
Poland	12.5		12.5	12.5		12.5	12.5	12.5
Portugal			75.0	75.0		75.0		75.0
Slovakia	31.3	31.3	31.3	31.3				31.3
Slovenia	33.3	33.3	33.3		33.3	33.3	33.3	33.3
Spain		62.5		62.5		62.5		62.5
Sweden	87.5	87.5	87.5	87.5	87.5		87.5	87.5
Switzerland	68.8	68.8	68.8	68.8	68.8	68.8	68.8	68.8
United Kingdom	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0

Source: MIPEX 2008-2014.

On the other hand, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia have the fewest provisions for immigrants and their children to participate and be represented in politics. None of these countries allow legally residing foreigners to vote in any national or regional elections or to be part of a political party. In Poland and the Czech Republic, foreigners are also not allowed to participate in local elections. However, in Estonia, foreigners who follow certain requirements (such as length of stay, reciprocity, or other conditions) can vote locally. In Poland and Estonia, associations cannot be composed of only foreigners. In the Czech

Republic, one of the two countries with changes in political rights over time, legally residing foreigners have been able to freely join associations since 2012.

### **Children of immigrants' political participation, religious attendance, and perceived discrimination in Europe**

To measure the *political participation* of children of immigrants, I include seven questions which ask if the respondent has done any of the following political acts in the last 12 months: contacting an official, working in a group or party, working in an organization, displaying a campaign sticker, signing a petition, attending a protest, and boycotting a product. This scale is based on traditional definitions and measurements of political participation (Alford and Friedland 1975; Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995) and is still used in many recent empirical works comparing the political participation of multiple groups (Aleksynska 2011; Klandermans 2008; Read 2007; Sanders et al. 2014). Contrary to many others, I do not include voting in my scale due to the large group of non-citizen children of immigrants and country-variation in voting requirements. I create a scale using these questions to differentiate between levels of participation (alpha 0.646). This scale covers acts that are political and those that are civic, conventional and unconventional, and high and low costs (Aleksynska 2011; de Rooij 2012; Sanders et al. 2014). de Rooij (2012) finds that for children of immigrants in Europe, all these participation measures are strongly related. As expected, this political participation scale significantly predicts voting for all individuals in the ESS even controlling for individual demographics ( $p < 0.001$ ). Political participation ranges from 0 (no acts) to 7 (participation in all possible political acts in the last year).

Table 4.2 shows the averages or proportions of key measures used in the analysis, for the full sample and by religious affiliation. On average, children of immigrants participate in a little bit more than one political act in the last year. Children of immigrants who are unaffiliated are the most likely to participate in political activities. Looking at children of immigrants who identify with a religion, mainstream Christians are the most likely to

participate in politics while other Christians have the lowest average value of political participation, less than one activity in the last year. This variation in political participation for children of immigrants from different religions may be due to their various levels of SES and incorporation. In Chapter 3 page 84, I discuss the structural and cultural incorporation of each religious group in detail.

I am interested in how *religious attendance* can increase the political participation of children of immigrants across religious affiliations, even those with low SES and cultural incorporation. In the ESS, individuals are asked how often they attend religious services nowadays, apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals. Frequency of attendance at religious events is measured on a 5-point scale: more than once a week (5), once a week (4), at least once a month (3), only on special holidays (2), less often (1) and never (0). In the original ESS questionnaire, respondents were able to differentiate between more than once a week and once a day but less than 1% of the sample attended religious services every day.

Muslim children of immigrants are the most likely to attend religious services every week or more, but a large proportion of Muslims also never attend religious services. 9.2% of Muslim children of immigrants attend religious services more than once a week compared to only 6.2% of non-mainstream Christians and 3.6% of mainstream Christians. Muslim children of immigrants are also the most likely to attend religious services once a week (15.1%) though they are closely followed by mainstream Christians (14.0% of which attend religious services once a week). However, mainstream and other Christian children of immigrants are more likely to go to church for special holidays compared to Muslims and less likely than Muslims to never attend religious services. The distribution of religious attendance for Muslims is bi-modal: many attend religious services very often while quite a few never attend. Specifically, 22.7% of Muslims never attend religious services. Many unaffiliated children of immigrants never attend religious services (66.8%). However, some unaffiliated children of immigrants still attend religious events rarely (18.8%) or only for holy days (12.0%). A few

unaffiliated children of immigrants (a total of 2.4%) attend religious services at least once a month.

Table 4.2: Children of immigrants' political participation and religious attendance in twenty European countries.

Variable	Range	Mean/Proportion				
		All <i>N</i> =8,129	Mainstream Christians <i>N</i> =2,843	Other Christians <i>N</i> =484	Muslims <i>N</i> =608	Unaffiliated <i>N</i> =4,194
Political participation scale (Std. dev)	0 - 7	1.156 (1.411)	1.167 (1.404)	0.649 (1.148)	1.115 (1.404)	1.213 (1.433)
Religious attendance	0 - 5					
Never		0.430	0.179	0.091	0.227	0.668
Rarely		0.201	0.215	0.269	0.174	0.188
Only for holy days		0.200	0.282	0.345	0.253	0.120
At least once a month		0.077	0.148	0.147	0.102	0.018
Once a week		0.068	0.140	0.087	0.151	0.005
More than once a week		0.024	0.036	0.062	0.092	0.001
Religious discrimination	0 - 1	0.029	0.009	0.027	0.289	0.005
Controls						
Subjective religiosity (Std. dev)	0 - 10	4.357 (3.139)	6.008 (2.375)	6.219 (2.177)	7.299 (2.255)	2.596 (2.718)
Placement on left-right scale (Std. dev)	0 - 10	4.774 (2.174)	5.125 (2.103)	4.814 (1.94)	4.171 (2.051)	4.619 (2.228)

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).

Controls for SES, cultural incorporation, and demographics are presented in Chapter 3, page 84.

I investigate the relationships between political participation, religious attendance, and *perceived religious discrimination*. In the ESS, respondents are asked if they would describe themselves as being part of a group that is discriminated against in that country. If the respondent says yes, the interviewer then asks on what grounds is their group discriminated, and then checks all that might apply: color or race, nationality, religion, language, ethnic group, age, gender, sexuality, disability, or other. I separate children of immigrants who say they are discriminated because of their religion from those who did not mention religion at all in their cause for discrimination. Alongside identifying with a religious group, this measure represents a sense of group consciousness. For simplicity, I do not include additional measures of in-group favoritism or attribution of blame to the political system which are part a strong feeling of group consciousness (Fischer-Neumann 2014). Muslim children of immigrants are

especially likely to consider their group discriminated because of religion. Indeed, 26.8% of Muslim children of immigrants believe their group is discriminated based on religion while only 2.7% and 0.9% of Christians believe in the same unfair treatment. Unsurprisingly, unaffiliated children of immigrants are the least likely to feel like their religious group is discriminated.

In addition to all the individual *controls* described in Chapter 3 page 84, I control for subjective importance given to religion (on a scale from 1 to 10) to differentiate the benefits of a religious community from religiosity itself. However, I do not include frequency of prayer as for Muslims, praying often happens at mosques and therefore is part of participating in religious organizations. Finally, I include a measure of political leaning to compare individuals with the same political ideas. Mainstream Christians on average are more right-leaning while Muslim children of immigrants are the most left-leaning group.

### **Methods: fixed effects and hybrid multilevel models for children of immigrants nested in countries**

*Model specification.* I pool four ESS rounds together and break down the dataset by countries to conduct both fixed effects and hybrid random intercept multilevel linear regressions on the political participation scale, with clustered errors by country. Clustering by country for both models pulls out the average effect of country entirely. The fixed effects models are used to investigate the role of individual characteristics in shaping the political participation of children of immigrants while controlling for each country individually. In the fixed effects model with individual covariates described above, 10.75% of the total variance in the political participation scale is due to country specific unobserved effects ( $F_{19,8081} = 33.08, p < 0.001$ ).

The random intercept multilevel linear regression models include country-level variables for multiculturalism and political rights for foreigners. However, due to the small sample of countries (Bryan and Jenkins 2016), I conduct a regression-based Mundlak test to

investigate if the country-level error for each covariate is correlated with the individual's political engagement, and thus leads to biased estimates (Mundlak 1978). The results from Wald tests show that country level proportions of all ESS respondents in the same country and year with high school degrees and who speak only the official language (a proxy for country level number of foreigners), as well as the average number of children in the country, all predict individual political participation. Therefore, I include country-level averages as fixed effects as well as individual differences with the country average to produce a random intercept "hybrid model" (Allison 2009).

*Analysis Plan.* I first investigate the relationship between attendance at religious events and political participation for Christian, Muslim, and the unaffiliated across European countries (H1). I test if the effect of attending religious events on political participation is greater when children of immigrants believe their religious group is discriminated (H2). Then, I compare the effect of attending religious events on political participation between Muslims, mainstream Christians, and other Christians (H3). I compute the linear predictions of political participation for each group over the different levels of frequency of religious attendance. Finally, I investigate if political rights for foreigners and multiculturalism policies directly affect children of immigrants' political participation and moderate the effect of religious organizations (H4).

## **Results**

### **Religious organizations and political participation**

I look at the consequence of religious attendance for political incorporation. I run fixed effects models for children of immigrants nested in countries and investigate if attendance at religious events influences political engagement (Table 4.3). I first predict political participation using only frequency of religious attendance and fixed effects for each year and country of survey (Model 1). I then add controls for SES and cultural incorporation (Model 2) and other demographics (Model 3). Finally, I investigate differences by religious

affiliation and perceived discrimination (Model 4). Across the models in Table 4.3, we see a slow decrease in the variance of political participation between and within countries.

There is a positive relationship between religious attendance and political participation when controlling for SES and incorporation. In the first model of Table 4.3, without accounting for SES and incorporation, an increase in the frequency of religious attendance, no matter the level, is not associated with an increase political participation of children of immigrants. However, in Model 2, when we consider children of immigrants with similar levels of education, income, and cultural incorporation, attending religious events more than once a week is associated with more political participation ( $p < 0.05$ ). Across levels of religious attendance, having a high school degree or being in a higher income percentile leads to more political participation ( $p < 0.001$ ). As expected, speaking only the official language and being a citizen are both associated with an increase in the political participation scale of a quarter of a point ( $p < 0.001$  and  $p < 0.01$  respectively).

The relationship between religious attendance and political participation is even stronger when comparing individuals of the same age, gender, family type, work status, subjective religiosity, and political leaning (Model 2). When I control for demographics, attending religious services more than once a week is associated with an increase in the political participation score of 0.427 ( $p < 0.001$ ). Moreover, children of immigrants who attend religious services just once a week have a political participation score 0.248 higher than those who never attend religious services ( $p < 0.05$ ), and children of immigrants who attend once a month have a political participation score higher by about 0.341 ( $p < 0.05$ ). While subjective religiosity, gender, family and work status do not significantly predict political participation, being older (but not too old) is associated with more political acts in the last year ( $p < 0.001$  for age and  $p < 0.001$  for the quadratic effect). Interestingly, children of immigrants who are more left-leaning are less likely to participate in politics ( $p < 0.001$ ).

Muslims and non-mainstream Christians participate in politics less often than



Table 4.3: Fixed effects linear models on political participation for children of immigrants in twenty European countries between 2010 and 2016, clustered by country (N=8,129).

	(1) Simple	(2) SES and culture	(3) Demographics	(4) Affiliation and discrimination
Religious attendance (ref=never)				
Rarely	0.022 (0.049)	0.040 (0.044)	0.078 (0.041)	0.106* (0.040)
Only for holy days	0.032 (0.083)	0.030 (0.071)	0.088 (0.064)	0.138* (0.064)
At least once a month	0.238 (0.144)	0.270 (0.132)	0.341* (0.126)	0.404** (0.126)
Once a week	0.071 (0.101)	0.128 (0.090)	0.248* (0.094)	0.289** (0.098)
More than once a week	0.216 (0.139)	0.328* (0.134)	0.427** (0.145)	0.481** (0.139)
Year (ref=2010)				
2011-2013	<i>NS</i>	<i>NS</i>	<i>NS</i>	<i>NS</i>
2014	0.247*** (0.052)	0.220*** (0.043)	0.213*** (0.046)	0.207*** (0.046)
2015 -2016	<i>NS</i>	<i>NS</i>	<i>NS</i>	<i>NS</i>
Individual SES				
Secondary education or more		0.546*** (0.050)	0.521*** (0.048)	0.517*** (0.047)
Household income <sup>a</sup>		0.030*** (0.006)	0.033*** (0.005)	0.033*** (0.005)
Cultural incorporation/differences				
Citizen of country		0.253** (0.072)	0.276*** (0.071)	0.244** (0.068)
Speaks only official language		0.228*** (0.051)	0.230*** (0.055)	0.189*** (0.044)
Western origins only		-0.062 (0.039)	-0.048 (0.040)	-0.071 (0.049)
Individual demographics				
Women			-0.037 (0.027)	-0.041 (0.027)
Children living at home			-0.013 (0.038)	-0.008 (0.037)
Women with children at home			-0.064 (0.043)	-0.067 (0.042)
Age <sup>a</sup>			0.030*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.006)
Age squared <sup>a</sup>			-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Paid work last week			-0.061 (0.037)	-0.065 (0.036)
Subjective religiosity <sup>a</sup>			-0.007 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)
Placement on left right scale <sup>a</sup>			-0.077*** (0.011)	-0.077*** (0.010)

*Continued*

Table 4.3 (Continued)

	(1) Simple	(2) SES and culture	(3) Demographics	(4) Affiliation and discrimination
Affiliation (ref=Christian: mainstream)				
Christian: other				-0.197* (0.087)
Muslim				-0.228* (0.086)
Unaffiliated				0.128*** (0.029)
Religious discrimination				
Constant	1.042*** (0.052)	0.322** (0.093)	0.413*** (0.087)	0.440*** (0.094)
Between countries ( $\sigma_{\mu_0}$ )	0.451	0.449	0.456	0.450
Within countries ( $\sigma_\epsilon$ )	1.348	1.312	1.300	1.296
ICC ( $\rho$ )	0.101	0.105	0.110	0.107

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Standard errors in parenthesis.

<sup>a</sup> Variable centered on median: income (5), age (45), religiosity (5), left-right scale (5).

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).

mainstream Christians, however, perceived religious discrimination is on average associated with more political engagement for all children of immigrants (Model 4). Muslim children of immigrants have a participation score that is 0.228 points lower than mainstream Christians ( $p < 0.05$ ) and other Christians have a score that is 0.197 lower ( $p < 0.05$ ). On the other hand, unaffiliated children of immigrants participate more in politics than all other children of immigrants. Perceived religious discrimination is associated with a higher political participation score ( $p < 0.01$ ). Nevertheless, the relationship between attending religious events and participating in politics is stronger when including religious affiliation and discrimination as predictors (Model 4), a sign of potentially significant interactions between religious identities, discrimination, and participation in religious events. There is a large unexplained variation in the full model (Model 5): a between-country variance ( $\sigma_{\mu_0}$ ) of 0.450 and a within-country variance (between individuals:  $\sigma_\epsilon$ ) of 1.290.

## Religious group consciousness and religious organizations

To investigate the role of organizations in fostering group consciousness, I compared unaffiliated children of immigrants with religiously affiliated children of immigrants who believe their religious group is discriminated and those who believe their group is not discriminated. Triple interaction effects are complicated to interpret; therefore, I present below the predicted linear estimates for the political participation scores by attendance and discrimination patterns in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.2. All the models with the full interaction effects are in Appendix A.2.

Table 4.4: Predicted political participation scores for children of immigrants in twenty European countries (Linear estimates based on Appendix A.2 Model 3, N=8,129).

	Religious attendance					
	Never		More than once a week		Difference	
Religiously affiliated						
Religious discrimination	0.733	[0.402, 1.064]	2.234	[1.225, 3.243]	1.501	[0.682, 2.320]
No religious discrimination	0.950	[0.865, 1.035]	1.321	[1.091, 1.552]	0.371	[0.108, 0.634]
Unaffiliated	1.121	[1.060, 1.183]	1.137	[-0.717, 2.990]	0.015	[-1.830, 1.860]

95% confidence intervals in brackets.

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).

Perceiving one's religious group to be discriminated against increases the positive effect of religious attendance on political participation. This reverses the gap in political engagement between unaffiliated and affiliated children of immigrants. Unaffiliated children of immigrants, who do not identify with a religion, have the same linear prediction of participating in politics if they never attend religious services or attend more than once a week (about 1.1, Table 4.4). However, affiliated children of immigrants start with a predicted score of 0.950 (less than one act in the past twelve months) when they never attend religious services which jumps to 1.321 (more than one act) once they attend religious services more than once a week ( $p < 0.05$ ). Affiliated children of immigrants who believe their group is discriminated against based on religion differences have the lowest prediction of participating in politics when they never attend religious services but the

highest predicted participation score (2.234) when they attend religious services more than once a week (an increase of 1.501  $p < 0.05$ ), this is a significantly bigger increase than affiliated children of immigrants who do not think their group is discriminated against ( $p < 0.05$ ).




Figure 4.2: Predicted political participation scores for children of immigrants in twenty European countries (Linear estimates based on Appendix A.2 Model 3, N=8,129).

### Religious organizations as pan-ethnic mobilizers

Attending religious events is especially important for the political incorporation of Muslim and Mainstream Christian children of immigrants. In Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3, I present predicted scores for political participation derived from the full interaction model of political

participation by religious affiliation (Appendix A.2 Model 4).

Table 4.5: Predicted political participation scores for children of immigrants in twenty European countries (Linear estimates based on Appendix A.2 Model 4, N=8,129).

Religious affiliation	Religious attendance				
	Never		More than once a week		Difference
Christian: mainstream	0.972	[0.869, 1.074]	1.609	[1.264, 1.954]	0.638 [0.267, 1.009]
Christian: other	1.196	[0.845, 1.547]	0.860	[0.310, 1.411]	-0.335 [-0.944, 0.274]
Muslim	0.740	[0.589, 0.891]	1.460	[0.964, 1.956]	0.720 [0.253, 1.187]
Unaffiliated	1.130	[1.063, 1.197]	1.081	[-0.753, 2.915]	-0.049 [-1.878, 1.780]

95% confidence intervals in brackets.

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).

Muslim children of immigrants, the least politically active group, gain the most from attending religious services. Muslim children of immigrants have the most dramatic increase in political participation when they attend religious events more frequently (Figure 4.3). Muslim children of immigrants who never attend religious services have predicted values of political participation of 0.740 (Table 4.5). This predicted value is significantly lower than unaffiliated children of immigrants ( $p < 0.05$ ). However, the difference between Muslims and unaffiliated children of immigrants disappears once we compare children of immigrants who attend religious services more than once a week. Religiously engaged Muslims are predicted to have a 1.460 score on the political participation scale. Between children of immigrants who never attend mosques and those who attend more than once a week, there is an increase of 0.720 in the political participation score ( $p < 0.05$ ). Unaffiliated and other Christian children of immigrants do not have a significant increase in political participation when they attend religious services more frequently. As shown in Figure 4.3, the increase in Muslim political participation for each additional category of religious attendance is almost linear.

Mainstream Christians also have an increase in their predicted political participation score when they attend religious services more than once a week compared to never attending. Mainstream Christians who never attend religious services have similar levels of political participation than all other children of immigrants (predicted score=0.972).

However, mainstream Christian children of immigrants who attend religious services more than once a week have the highest predicted political participation score (1.609). As they attend religious services more often, mainstream Christians gain 0.638 points on their predicted political participation scale ( $p < 0.05$ ).




Figure 4.3: Predicted political participation scores for children of immigrants in twenty European countries (Linear estimates based on Appendix A.2 Model 4, N=8,129).

Unaffiliated children of immigrants have a stable political participation across religious attendance while non-mainstream Christians exhibit a non-linear relationship between attendance and participation. For unaffiliated children of immigrants, attending religious events a few times seems to be associated with more political participation, but then the

predicted value goes down if children of immigrants attend religious services more than once a month (Figure 4.3). None of these changes are significant. Non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants have a decrease in their predicted values of political participation if they attend religious services rarely, for holy days, once a week, or more. However, the trend over the range of attendance frequency is not significant. The small sample size of non-mainstream Christians or unaffiliated children of immigrants who attend religious services explains the large confidence intervals, however, the results are not substantively different when I compare children of immigrants who never attend religious services to those who attend once a week.

### **Multiculturalism policies and political rights for foreigners**

The hybrid models for political participation with random intercepts by country are in Table 4.6. All individual-level variables presented previously are included in the estimations. However, in these random intercept models with both individual variables and country average controls, there is no more variation across countries in predicting political participation ( $\rho = \sigma_{mu_0} = 0$ ). This is due to having both random intercepts and clustering of errors by country. Combined, this accounts for all the average effect of countries; the between  $R^2$  is 0.664 which leaves little left to be explained.

Country-level characteristics shape the political participation of children of immigrants (Table 4.6 Model 1). Children of immigrants living in countries with a higher proportion of individuals who only speak the official language (and therefore with less immigrants) are less likely to participate in politics ( $p < 0.05$ ). Children of immigrants might feel more comfortable participating in mainstream politics in countries with a larger migrant community. Children of immigrants in countries with larger families are less likely to participate ( $p < 0.001$ ). Family size probably accounts for country level differences in economic development. However, these effects disappear once accounting for multiculturalism policies and political rights (Model 2). The proportion of foreigners and

Table 4.6: Hybrid random intercept linear models on political participation for children of immigrants in twenty European, clustered by country (N=8,129).

	(1) Simple	(2) National policies	(3) Moderation of political rights	(4) Moderation of multiculturalism
<b>Fixed estimates</b>				
Religious attendance (ref=never)				
Rarely	0.085 (0.045)	0.086* (0.041)	0.081* (0.041)	0.079* (0.039)
Only for holy days	0.051 (0.064)	0.094 (0.064)	0.097 (0.064)	0.102 (0.058)
At least once a month	0.340** (0.123)	0.346** (0.126)	0.346** (0.124)	0.346** (0.121)
Once a week	0.248** (0.079)	0.267** (0.091)	0.253** (0.083)	0.248** (0.090)
More than once a week	0.444*** (0.118)	0.423** (0.134)	0.422*** (0.125)	0.422** (0.128)
Proportion of country population:				
With at least a high school degree <sup>a</sup>	-0.310 (0.717)	-0.825* (0.369)	-0.789* (0.372)	-0.810* (0.364)
Speaking only official languages <sup>a</sup>	-3.317* (1.653)	-1.095 (0.865)	-1.120 (0.852)	-1.127 (0.852)
With children at home <sup>a</sup>	-3.924*** (1.074)	-1.373 (0.887)	-1.475 (0.901)	-1.339 (0.908)
Political rights for foreigners score <sup>b</sup>		0.145* (0.056)	0.136* (0.058)	0.143** (0.055)
Attendance and political rights			N.S. N.S.	
Multiculturalism policies score <sup>b</sup>		0.154*** (0.033)	0.152*** (0.033)	0.109** (0.034)
Attendance and multiculturalism				
Rarely				0.082** (0.030)
Only for holy days				0.125* (0.057)
At least once a month				0.094 (0.110)
Once a week				-0.009 (0.078)
More than once a week				-0.068 (0.087)
Individual-level controls				
Constant	<i>included</i> 0.485*** (0.088)	<i>included</i> 0.409*** (0.091)	<i>included</i> 0.417*** (0.093)	<i>included</i> 0.417*** (0.094)
<b>Random estimates</b>				
Within countries ( $\sigma_\epsilon$ )	1.299	1.298	1.298	1.298
ICC ( $\rho$ ) and between ( $\sigma_{\mu_0}$ )	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parenthesis., \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

<sup>a</sup> Variables centered on median.

<sup>b</sup> Standardized.

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016) and MIPLEX 2008-2014.



the economic development correlates with the strength of multiculturalism and political rights for foreigners. Once controlling for the effect of policies (Model 2), children of immigrants living in a more educated country are less likely to participate in politics ( $p < 0.05$ ).

Attendance at religious events is still positively associated with political participation even accounting for country-level characteristics and variations. For individuals in countries with similar levels of education, foreign population, and family size, attending religious services at least once a month is associated with an increase in 0.340 in the political participation scale (Model 1,  $p < 0.01$ ). Children of immigrants who attend religious services more than once a week have a score 0.444 higher than to those who never attend religious services ( $p < 0.001$ ). This holds true even accounting for political rights and multiculturalism policies (Model 3). In countries with average multiculturalism and political rights scores, attending religious services even rarely is associated with higher scores on the political participation scale.

Regardless of religious attendance, children of immigrants who live in countries with more political rights for foreigners and multiculturalism policies are more likely to participate in politics. An increase of one standardized point, centered on the average score, of political rights for foreigners leads to an increase of 0.145 in the political participation scale ( $p < 0.05$ ). Moreover, a centered increase of one standardized point in the score for multiculturalism policies is associated with an increase of 0.154 in children of immigrants' political participation ( $p < 0.001$ ). Surprisingly, the strength of multiculturalism policies seems to matter more than political rights for foreigners in predicting the political participation of children of immigrants.

The interactions between policies and religious attendance are in Model 3 and 4 of Table 4.6. Figure 4.4 presents the predicted political participation score by religious attendance and given different levels of national policies. I compared children of immigrants who live in countries with the highest possible score for political rights (87.5) and multiculturalism

(84.6) to those in countries with the lowest scores (0 and 16.2 respectively). The predicted values for children of immigrants in countries with average policy scores, not shown, are in between these two lines, though slightly closer to the high score countries.




Figure 4.4: Predicted political participation scores for children of immigrants in twenty European countries (Linear estimates based on Table 4.6 Models 3 and 4, N=8,129).

More political rights for foreigners increases the political engagement mostly among children of immigrants who never or rarely attend religious services and therefore political rights do not moderate the effect of attendance at religious events on political participation (Table 4.6). Strong political rights for foreigners increase the prediction scores for political participation for children of immigrants who never, rarely, or only attend religious services for holy days. However, the increase in political participation between children of immigrants who never attend religious organizations compared to those who attend at least

for holy days is the same in countries with more or less political rights for foreigners. On the one hand, political rights for immigrants are associated with more political engagement and are especially important for children of immigrants who do not engage often with religious organizations. On the other hand, religious organizations are associated with more political engagement and especially in countries with less expansive political rights for immigrants.

Multiculturalism policies influence political participation directly and indirectly through religious attendance, even controlling for political rights. Children of immigrants benefit more from attending religious services rarely and for holy days if they live in a country with more multiculturalism policies. As seen in Figure 4.4, the slope of change in political participation between children of immigrants who never attend religious services and those who attend only for holy days is positive in a country with strong multiculturalism while it is negative in a country with few multiculturalism provisions. Children of immigrants who attend religious services rarely have an increase in their political participation score of 0.082 (Table 4.6, Model 4,  $p < 0.01$ ) in a country with strong multiculturalism and those who attend for holy days have an increase of 0.125 ( $p < 0.05$ ). However, there are no significant differences between countries with high and low multiculturalism scores for children of immigrants who attend religious services more often.

## Summary

I test if children of immigrants who are active in their religious community also participate in politics, and how identities, discrimination, religion, and state policies shape that relationship. I find that European children of immigrants who attend religious services often have higher levels of political participation compared to children of immigrants who do not attend religious services (H1). Religious organizations have a stronger effect on political participation for children of immigrants who identify with a religion and perceive their religious group to be discriminated (H2). Religious organization also have a stronger

effect on the political participation of Muslims and mainstream Christians compared to other groups (H3). Political rights for foreigners directly influence political participation (H4a) while multiculturalism policies affect political engagement both directly (H4c) and indirectly through organizations (H4d).

In line with my first hypothesis, I find that children of immigrants who participate at least once a month in religious events are more politically active than those who never attend religious services (H1). This is true when comparing individuals of the same SES, level of cultural incorporation, and demographics. Moreover, this relationship holds when controlling for country level population statistics and policies. Religious communities link children of immigrants to the political mainstream even if these adults are from lower SES, not culturally incorporation, and living countries with few open policies.

Politicized collective identities and religious organizations interact to increase children of immigrants' political engagement. Attending religious events is more important in predicting political participation for children of immigrants who perceive their religious group to be discriminated (H2) and for children of immigrants who experience bright boundaries (H3). Children of immigrants who identify with a religion, believe their religious group is discriminated against, and attend religious services more than once a week have the highest predicted value of political participation. Muslim children of immigrants in this sample are the most likely to believe their group is discriminated against and have the largest increase in their political participation score if they attend religious services more than once a week compared to all other groups. This is especially relevant as a fifth of Muslim children of immigrants in this sample never attend religious services. However, mainstream Christians have a similar increase in their predicted scores for attending services more often. The political participation of other Christians and unaffiliated children of immigrants is unaffected by engagement with religious organizations.

While political rights for foreigners enable more political engagement among children of

immigrants across religiosity levels, multiculturalism policies both enable more engagement and increase the effect of religious organizations (H4). Children of immigrants who rarely or never attend religious events have a bigger increase in their political participation if they live in a country with more political rights for foreigners (H4a). However, I do not find any evidence that political rights for immigrants moderate the effect of religious organizations (H4b). In line with my hypothesis, children of immigrants participate more in politics in countries with more multiculturalism policies, even children of immigrants who never participate in religious events (H4c). There is mild support for the hypothesis that in countries with more multiculturalism policies, the relationship between religious organizations and political participation is stronger. Children of immigrants who attend religious events rarely or for holy days are more politically engaged in countries with more multiculturalism policies (H4d).

## **Discussion**

Attendance at religious events is associated with more political engagement across faith traditions. The relationship is even stronger for children of immigrants who experience discrimination, for those who identify as Muslims, and for those who live in countries with more multiculturalism policies. Previous research finds that children of immigrants are generally less active than native Europeans (Aleksynska 2011; de Rooij 2012), but does not investigate if membership in religious organizations, specifically, increases political participation across religions. This is the first paper to connect religious organizations, discrimination, and state policies to predict political engagement of children of immigrants in Europe.

Religion is not just a “barrier” for immigrants’ inclusion in Europe (Foner and Alba 2008) but can instead be a bridge to political incorporation. Even though Europe is more secular than the US, religious organizations might provide a larger network, a tight community, human capital, and material support to children of immigrants (Coleman 1988;

Pattillo-McCoy 1998; Portes 1998; Putnam 2001; Warner 1993). These findings call into question the presumption that children of immigrants' high religiosity is inversely related to a successful incorporation into Europe. Moreover, religious organizations may provide resources beyond those necessary for political engagement and therefore lead to even more cultural and structural incorporation.

There is evidence that a sense of group consciousness is developed in religious organizations, and this identity could be pan-ethnic for Muslims. Group consciousness develops in religious organizations for children of immigrants from all faith traditions. However, Muslim children of immigrants are both less politically incorporated and are more likely to experience religious discrimination. Mosques may be going beyond the role of typical religious organizations by closing the political incorporation gap between Muslims and other immigrant groups. In mosques, Muslim children of immigrants who are otherwise ostracized can find a group of similar others and discuss their experiences in Europe. Future research should focus on how mosques and other religious organizations might attract individuals from various backgrounds and create a sense of pan-ethnic solidarity.

The size, composition, and racial makeup of religious communities may shape the importance of religious organizations in mobilizing its members. I find that religious attendance increases the political engagement of mainstream Christians and Muslims, but not of Orthodox or other Christian children of immigrants. Mainstream Christian children of immigrants may benefit from being more like natives in their religious beliefs while other Christians may not be able to find a bridging social network or tight community because of the small size of their congregations. Future work should examine how the size and strength of co-religious communities may shape group political mobilization. However, mainstream Christian children of immigrants are also sometimes racially different from European natives. For example, many sub-Saharan African immigrants are Protestant or Catholic due to a history of colonialism. Therefore, Black Protestant or Catholic children of immigrants might experience more discrimination than white Orthodox Christians on

the basis of race; religious organizations may therefore be more important in their process of incorporation. More work should examine the intersection of racial and religious boundaries in the formation of group identities.

State policies matter for the political incorporation of children of immigrants and somewhat influence the role of organizations (Massey 1999). This paper underlines the continued importance of multiculturalism policies for the successful incorporation of children of immigrants. However, many European countries have recently been experiencing a retreat from multiculturalism policies (Joppke 2004). Multiculturalism policies shape the relationship between states and children of immigrants and create a culture of acceptance and encouragement for individuals to participate in mainstream politics (Kastoryano 2002; Modood 2013; Taylor et al. 1994). In line with these findings, European states should work alongside religious organizations to promote political incorporation and national cohesion.

The longstanding trend towards secularization has fostered a decline in scholarly interest in the relationship between religious institutions and politics in Europe. This is in stark contrast to the extensive literature on religion and politics in the US. However, recent waves of immigrants are contributing to a resurgence of religiosity, and this research demonstrates that religious institutions in Europe can be a forum for political engagement. As this new generation of Europeans continues to rely on religion as a source of identity and community, a renewed interest in the relationship between religiosity and political engagement is likely to bear fruit for scholars of immigration, politics, and religion.

## Chapter 5

### **Conclusion: Religion and The Political Incorporation of Children of Immigrants in Europe**

Since World War II, European states have implemented various policies that reflect a more multicultural society. However, many native Europeans worry that these policies exacerbate differences and do not lead to successful incorporation of immigrants. Specifically, the European political and popular discourse is centered on the perceived lack of incorporation of Muslim children of immigrants, who are more religious than their peers and sometimes even than their parents. This discourse often assumes that high religiosity reflects a lack of incorporation and a reaction against Western values. However, I argue in this dissertation that religion can also lead to new collective identities and political participation for children of immigrants. Political participation of children of immigrants reflects their cultural, social, and economic incorporation. To participate in politics, children of immigrants need to understand the political system and have the resources necessary to be engaged, both of which can be developed through networks and organizations. Through religious communities, children of immigrants develop a strong sense of collective religious identity and a motivation to change the political landscape. In this dissertation, I investigate how children of immigrants' religious identity and religiosity can be associated with more political engagement in Europe.

This dissertation aims to determine the role of religion in the political incorporation of children of immigrants across European countries. To address this issue, I investigate the development of politicized religious identities and religious behavior during adolescence and in adulthood, two key stages in individual's political lives. For adolescents, I focus on



changes in religious identity salience and frequency of religious acts over time, comparing children of immigrants to European natives. I investigate the role of social boundaries in explaining differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. In adulthood, I investigate how the social and political contexts shape the religiosity of children of immigrants. I consider if children of immigrants are more religious in countries with both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies, as a result of greater religious freedom and increased politicization of religion. Then, I further examine the role of religious communities in fostering political participation among adult children of immigrants, directly and through group consciousness. I consider whether, in a context of multiculturalism policies and political rights, children of immigrants participate more in politics and whether religious organizations play a more important role in their incorporation. Throughout the dissertation, I investigate if Muslim children of immigrants strong religious identity and religiosity are a sign of a pan-ethnicity or instead a reaction against the mainstream.

This dissertation provides a better understanding of the political engagement of religious children of immigrants within various social and political contexts in Europe. I find that instead of being a barrier to incorporation or a reaction towards the mainstream, religion is key to the political incorporation of children of immigrants. Children of immigrants give more importance to religion and practice religion more often than natives throughout adolescence, and their attendance at religious events is associated with more political engagement in adulthood. Minority groups' religiosity and political engagement flourish if the state provides them with encouragements, rights, and anti-discrimination protections. For children of immigrants experiencing bright social boundaries, such as Muslims, religious identities seem to have the potential to be a tool for pan-ethnic mobilization. This project connects theories of adolescent identity formation, religion, immigrant incorporation, pan-ethnic identities, multiculturalism, and political participation in new ways, while advancing each theoretical framework individually.

## Contributions of Empirical Research

### 1 Politicized religious identities and religious behaviors in adolescence

Religion is important for the political incorporation of children of immigrants. In the analysis of adolescents in Chapter 2, I find that children of immigrants do have a higher religious identity salience and more frequent religious practice compared to natives. Moreover, even though most adolescents secularize over time, there is no evidence of convergence between natives and children of immigrants. As children of immigrants are more attuned to discrimination and political issues concerning them, they might hold on to religion in order to make sense of their place in the political landscape. This is the first study to examine religious identities and religious behaviors over time for multiple religious groups in Europe.

There is evidence of a bright boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims infused through European cultures. In Chapter 2, I show that Muslim children of immigrants have a stronger religious identity salience than all other groups in adolescence, and that they experience an increase in religious practice over time. High levels of religious identity salience for children of immigrants is partly explained through segregated friendships and schools. However, much of the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims remains unexplained. Bright social boundaries may not only be reinforced through interactions with natives, but might also be inherent to European cultures and institutions. In line with previous studies on children of immigrants' religiosity, this dissertation does not find a strong relationship between discrimination and religious identities (Fleischmann and Phalet 2011; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Schulz and Leszczensky 2016; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). However, this is the only study which attempts to measure the consequences of various kinds of social boundaries on religious identities in Europe.

The religiosity of Muslim children of immigrants is not reactive but instead closer to the concept of a pan-ethnic identity. In Chapter 2, I find that Muslim children of immigrants

not only hold a stronger religious identity than that of all other groups but their religious practice grows more frequent over time. At the same time, Muslim children of immigrants give increased importance to their host country's identity during adolescence. This indicates that they are not disengaging with the mainstream, which is one of the signs of a reactive identity. There is some evidence that co-religious communities supersede national ties for children of immigrants at the end of adolescence. Through their attendance at religious events, Muslim children of immigrants can meet peers, discuss social and political issues affecting them, and create a new sense of collective identity. While other research finds cross-sectional evidence of a strong religiosity among Muslim children of immigrants (Jacob and Kalter 2013; Platt 2014; Verkuyten et al. 2012), this dissertation is the first to use theories of identity exploration and political socialization to examine religious identities and religious behaviors over time in adolescence for children of immigrants in Europe. My findings provide longitudinal evidence that contradicts cross-sectional analyses which associate high Muslim identity and low attachment to the host country (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Güngör et al. 2011; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012).

## **2 Minority religions within various social and political contexts**

Chapter 3 provides additional evidence of a bright boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims, as expressed through children of immigrants' response to their social context in adulthood. Muslims are more religious than all other groups, which is a result of bright cultural religious boundaries but not a reaction against the host country. In line with Chapter 2, I find that Muslim adults are more religious compared to other groups. In fact, among all immigrant groups, they are the least religiously similar to natives living in the same region. These findings point to the potential role of culture and institutions in sustaining and shaping social boundaries. Yet, this strong religiosity does not develop due to anti-immigrant attitudes from natives, in that Muslim children of immigrants do not seem to attempt to minimize their difference or react against the mainstream. The high religiosity

of Muslim children of immigrants is in line with the van Tubergen and Sindradóttir (2011) analysis of first-generation immigrants. However, contrary to Connor (2010), who finds a relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and religiosity for first-generation Muslims, this is not the case for 1.5 and second-generation immigrants. This dissertation is the first to investigate the social context of religion for children of immigrants across multiple European countries.

As shown in Chapter 3, Muslim children of immigrants are the most religious in countries with both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies, suggesting that multiculturalism policies alone do not provide enough protection for minority children of immigrants to be religious in a secular and sometimes hostile context. Non-mainstream Christians (Orthodox and others) are also more religious in countries with anti-discrimination provisions but are not affected by multiculturalism policies. Together, these findings provide evidence that multiculturalism is still important for some children of immigrants, but lip service to multiculturalism is not enough to actually enable public expression of minority identities to flourish. I also confirm that Muslim and non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants are especially sensitive to anti-discrimination policies. Beyond their impact on religious freedom, multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies might strengthen religiosity by politicizing religious identities. This research is the first to analyze the relationship between multiculturalism policies, anti-discrimination provisions, and religiosity. In doing so, it adds to the relatively few existing studies of anti-discrimination policies and their role in children of immigrants' incorporation (Aleksynska 2011; Schlueter et al. 2013).

### **3 Religion as a political mobilizing force**

In Chapter 4, I find that multiculturalism policies contribute to more political engagement and grant religious communities a greater role in incorporation. Specifically, they increase the political engagement of children of immigrants, especially among those

who sometimes attend religious services. Multiculturalism policies both remove the barriers for the political engagement of many children of immigrants and reflect a politicization of certain religious groups. This confirms some of the previous qualitative and descriptive analyses of policies and group mobilization (Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Moreover, in line with the only qualitative analysis of the relationship between states and religion (Mooney 2009), this dissertation provides cross-country quantitative evidence that national policies moderate the role of religious organizations in the successful incorporation of children of immigrants. However, more expansive political rights are also key in encouraging political engagement of children of immigrants, regardless of faith tradition and frequency of religious attendance.

Chapter 4 also confirms that religious organizations can foster political incorporation, especially for Muslim children of immigrants. Children of immigrants who attend religious services often are more politically engaged, and this relationship is particularly strong among those who identify with a religion and believe their group to be discriminated. The political engagement of religiously active children of immigrants coupled with a greater sense of religious group consciousness may be the sign of strong politicized religious identities. In addition, religious communities significantly increase the political engagement of Muslim children of immigrants, more than they do for other groups. Religious organizations may bring individuals together from different national origins and encourage political engagement through collective identities. These findings confirm that US-based theories of the role of religious organizations for political engagement (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1993) are applicable to the European context. This research extends findings on ethnic civic organizations in Europe (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Fischer-Neumann 2014; Klandermans 2008; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014) to religion specifically, and applies work on pan-ethnicity in the US (Espiritu et al. 2000; Kibria 1998; Okamoto 2006) to the framework of religious identities in Europe.

## Limitations of the Dissertation

Throughout the dissertation, religions are used as a unit of analysis and comparison. However, by defining these groups as having meaningful consequences for children of immigrants' political incorporation, I set up hypotheses and models which are more likely to confirm group differences (Brubaker 2009). In fact, by grouping children of immigrants by religious affiliation, I am more likely to find significant differences between religious groups. However, social boundary theory and my own findings provide some justification for grouping children of immigrants by religion. First, following Alba (2005) and Zolberg (1999), I argue that bright boundaries in Europe centered on religious differences make these groups relevant not only to researchers but also for native Europeans and children of immigrants themselves. Second, when I include religious groups in the analysis of religious identity salience (Chapter 3) and political participation (Chapter 4), the unexplained variation between individuals and countries reduces significantly, even when accounting for socioeconomic status and other measures of cultural incorporation. Nonetheless, my presupposition of religions as meaningful groups influences my analyses and interpretations. These issues are exacerbated by the lack of systematic measurement of religious boundaries and identities, as well as gaps in our understanding of the causal effects of national policies.

This dissertation reflects the difficulties that arise when trying to empirically test social boundary theory. I find that experiences with segregation and discrimination explain some group-level differences, but not all (Chapter 2). Moreover, I do not find evidence that religious boundaries are exacerbated by anti-immigrant attitudes (Chapter 3). To explain this lack of empirical evidence, I argue that boundaries are infused in cultures and institutions which are not measured in these analyses. However, the absence of empirical methods for identifying cultural and institutional boundaries is a limitation throughout my dissertation. Social boundaries are a theoretical construct used to understand group identities and perceptions of otherness (Alba 2005; Sanders 2002; Wimmer and Soehl 2014), and it is rare and difficult to measure and test boundaries at the empirical level

(Wimmer and Soehl 2014). This dissertation uses concepts of social boundaries to explain group level differences without proving that these bright religious boundaries exist or showing how they permeate cultures and institutions. Bright religious boundaries do lead to salient religious identities, but identity salience is also a difficult concept to measure.

Religious identity salience as measured in this dissertation does not account for relationships with other identities. In these chapters, I measure religious identity salience using importance given to religion and sense of religious group discrimination, in line with other research on religious identities in Europe and the US (Ashmore et al. 2004; Peek 2005; Platt 2014; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). However, even though these variables represent an expression of identity salience, they do not measure salience as defined by many social psychologist theorists (Stets and Burke 2000; Stryker 1968). These argue that salience of identities should instead be measured using the ranking of an identity against other types of identities, or using the likelihood of bringing up an identity in a particular context. Children of immigrants who give high importance to religion and who practice religion often, may not actually believe religion is more important than other identities and may not bring up that identity in various situations. Issues pertaining to measuring religious identity salience also impact the concepts of politicized collective identities and pan-ethnic identities.

In this dissertation, I show that religion should not be excluded as a possible source for politicized collective identities and pan-ethnic identities in Europe, and provides partial evidence for the emergence of politicized identities among some children of immigrants. To fully test my hypotheses, I would need to improve my measures of politicization, group consciousness, group mobilization, and pan-ethnicity. First, I do not measure the extent to which political debates on religion are occurring in each European country at the same time that adolescents are exploring their identities. Furthermore, there is no information on how much these children of immigrants relate political issues to their own religious identity. I also cannot test if multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies lead to more

salient religious identities through a politicization of religious identities or through other mechanisms. Second, group consciousness, as defined in the political science literature, should include a commitment to collective action, often measured as interest in politics and a sense of political efficacy (Harris 1999; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Wilcox and Gomez 1990). In this dissertation, I only use measurements of group affiliation and discrimination. Third, I am unable to show that individual political participation reflects a sense of group consciousness. Individuals may participate in politics for reasons beyond their strong religious identity. Finally, measuring pan-ethnic identities, a more precise concept than politicized collective identities, offers even more challenges. In both Chapters 2 and 4, I can only prove that Muslim children of immigrants have the potential to develop a pan-ethnic identity. In order to test the pan-ethnic hypothesis for Muslim children of immigrants, I would need information on how children of immigrants rank their religious identity compared to other ethnic-based identities, how religious organizations bring various ethnic groups together, and how religious identity leads to collective mobilization beyond individual participation (Kibria 1998; Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Nagel 1994; Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009).

As with many statistical analyses in the social sciences, causality is assumed and theorized but not always tested. In Chapter 2, I investigate identities over time; however, due to dataset limitations, I do not test if this increase in religious identity salience is associated with an increase in political interest and participation. This limits my claims that religious identities are politicized in adolescence, and that Muslim religious identities are pan-ethnic. Moreover, the ESS dataset used in Chapter 4 is cross-sectional. Therefore, I am only able to show that children of immigrants who frequently attend religious services also participate in many political acts. Children of immigrants with a greater sense of civic engagement and duty are often more likely to participate in both institutions. However, religious attendance and political participation are mutually reinforcing acts, and together represent a sense of group consciousness and have the potential for politicized religious identities. In part, I



rely on previous work on other groups, which has shown that causal mechanisms connect participation in religious organizations and political engagement (Coleman 1988; Harris 1999; Portes 1998; Putnam 2001; Secret et al. 1990; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1997).

Studying the national context using multilevel statistical analysis has strong limitations, in particular in regard to issues of measurement, model fit, and causality. In particular, this dissertation uses a new measure of the strength of multiculturalism policies, based on its definition by Wright and Bloemraad (2012) and on a popular policy index (MIPEX). Even though this measure is consistent with other work on multiculturalism, it has not been previously empirically tested. Furthermore, the models of religious identity salience and political engagement used in this dissertation may be too demanding for the actual sample of twenty European countries. Significance and relationships may arise as an artifact of the many controls and levels used in each model. This applies particularly in Chapter 4 where variance within and across countries is mostly explained by individual-level controls. Finally, in both Chapters 3 and 4, it is not possible to conclude that children of immigrants are more religious and politically engaged because of multiculturalism policies. Instead, multiculturalism policies might reflect other country-level characteristics, children of immigrants' religiosity and political engagement might lead to more multiculturalism policies, or it might even be that more religious and politically engaged immigrants might choose to move to countries with more multiculturalism policies. Though these limitations nuance my findings, they do not reduce this dissertation's theoretical relevance and instead offer many additional directions for future research.

### **Theoretical Contributions, Future Research, and Broader Implications**

Findings from the first empirical chapter provide new insights for future work on adolescents and identity exploration. In adolescence, children of immigrants go through processes of political socialization and identity exploration (Flanagan 2010; Phinney 1993). However, existing research on identity exploration in adolescence, which is mostly situated

in a US context, does not consider the potential development of political religious identities. This dissertation shows that religious identities and religious behaviors are malleable in adolescence and can have consequences for political engagement in adulthood. Studies on identity exploration can benefit from considering religion as an important component in the search for a positive sense of self in adolescence. Religion provides a way for children of immigrants to be tied to their parents' origins, to develop a sense of meaning and belonging, and to adapt to a sometimes-negative social context. Future work studying adolescents should investigate how religion, politics, and national origins intersect in adolescence as children of immigrants develop identities. In particular, questionnaires could be developed that ask adolescents how the current political context makes them think about their religious, ethnic, and racial identities.

This dissertation advances the field of sociology of religion by investigating the role religion can play for various groups outside of the US. Specifically, I investigate religion in a secularizing, but still heavily Christian, Europe. Partly due to its religious vitality, there is a long tradition of religious studies in the US, many of which focus on religion's role in creating meaning and community (Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Smith 2003; Stark and Finke 2000; Warner 1993). However, the theories are based on US experiences and cannot always attest to the variety of meanings and roles religion can take in different cultures. In this dissertation, I treat religious identity and religiosity as separate factors influencing the incorporation of children of immigrants. This dissertation shows the value in looking at religion as an identity similar to ethnic identities, as it is for many Jews or Muslims across the world, along with concomitant context of bright boundaries and potential for group mobilization. This dissertation encourages future research in sociology of religion to analyze contexts beyond the US and to use a comparative approach, such as carried out by Mooney (2009). Future work in sociology of religion should continue to explore how immigrant groups understand and use religion in their day to day lives across different national contexts. An interesting extension of this project would be to compare the meaning and role of religion

for Orthodox and Muslim children of immigrants in secular European countries, versus those living in predominantly Catholic countries.

This dissertation highlights the positive role of religious identities and communities for children of immigrants in a secular European context. In this way, it challenges the traditional theoretical framework in which religion is conceptualized as a barrier to incorporation in Europe (Foner and Alba 2008). In particular, I argue that strong religiosity and involvement in religious organizations lead to more political engagement of children of immigrants across European countries. Future research in Europe should move beyond the assumption that religion is a barrier to incorporation and instead also consider religion as a politicized collective identity, one with possible benefits for children of immigrants. For instance, studies should investigate if a strong religious identity in Europe can provide children of immigrants a sense of meaning and stronger networks, thus leading to better mental health during the difficult process of incorporation.

This study advances theories on immigrant incorporation by showing the advantages of using boundaries as a framework for understanding group-level differences. I apply the concept of bright social boundaries to children of immigrants in Europe to explain why religious identities matter and become salient in particular contexts (Alba 2005; Zolberg 1999). I extend new assimilation theory by showing that while bright boundaries might slow down the cultural and structural incorporation of some immigrant groups (Alba and Nee 2003), they also encourage stronger group communities, identities, and political mobilization. However, this project, like many others, focuses on individual-level discrimination and segregation (Wimmer and Soehl 2014) and, as detailed above, I do not find evidence of religious boundaries in many of these personal experiences. Instead, bright social boundaries may be insidious and infused in European culture and institutions. In order to advance the study of boundaries and incorporation, empirical work should focus on operationalizing and measuring boundaries beyond discrimination and segregation. For instance, future studies could analyze how popular media, cultural events, schools,

marketing, and other socio-cultural institutions create and sustain categorizations.

In this dissertation, I demonstrate the importance of the concept of pan-ethnicity, as well as the limits of segmented assimilation theory, beyond the US American experience. This paves the way for future work on the meaning and purpose of a strong Muslim identity for children of immigrants. My approach utilizes segmented assimilation theory in investigating the role of the social context in the development of identities (Rumbaut 1994) but does not find strong evidence of the formation of a reactive identity. More work is needed to investigate how children of immigrants in Europe connect across national origins and how religious organizations can use pan-ethnic identities for political mobilization. Future research should investigate if adolescent Muslim children of immigrants develop more co-religious friendships instead of friendships based on national origins. These networks could shape both the strength of adolescents' religious identities and their interest in politics. Future research should also investigate differences between Muslim communities (e.g., Turks vs. Moroccans, Sufis vs. Sunnis) to understand if this politicized collective identity is truly pan-ethnic. Finally, in line with other pan-ethnic research in the US, future research should consider the context and role of Muslim organizations in fostering a pan-ethnic mobilization. It should examine the development and strategies of mosques, Muslim political parties, and other Muslim organizations across Europe.

This dissertation considers the current and future role of multiculturalism policies in Europe, thereby advancing the debate on the relationship between state policies and incorporation. Theorists of state policies in Europe argue that multiculturalism either increases group differences, and thus slows down incorporation, or instead promotes understanding across groups (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Koopmans 2013b; Vasta 2007). However, I find that strong multiculturalism policies contribute to more religiosity and political participation among children of immigrants. These policies thus simultaneously promote both group differences and incorporation. Somewhat paradoxically, this suggests that European states dealing with a multicultural reality (Kastoryano 2002) can promote

incorporation by politicizing and encouraging minority group identities. More broadly, in the context of the rise of supra-national entities, I find that nation-states are still important in shaping the relationship between religion and incorporation for children of immigrants. Future work should keep the state as a unit of analysis and explore how other policies can shape the relationship between mainstream institutions and minority identities and organizations. However, considering the limitations of this research, there is a need for new and empirically tested methods for measuring the strength of multiculturalism, and for more detailed analysis of policies dealing with religion specifically.

Last but not least, the findings of this dissertation are relevant to the study of individual political participation and collective mobilization through organizations. In line with social psychology literature and political participation theories, this research shows that the presence of collective identities may be critical to the political participation of minority populations (Miller et al. 1981; Peterson 1992; Simon and Klandermans 2001). Future empirical research should investigate how to measure group consciousness and its effects on children of immigrants. Moreover, analyses of identity politics, popular in the US, have received less attention in Europe and have ignored politicized religious identities (Bernstein 2005), but my research illustrates that group identities can be meaningful in the European context. I find that even in countries that base their democracy on a strong nationalistic sentiment, religious identities and organizations can lead to more mainstream political engagement. Group mobilization can happen through religious communities and identities in Europe. Future work should explore the role of different identities, fostered in religious organizations, as a source of group political mobilization. Qualitative work could analyze religious organizations and ethnic organizations to compare their strategies for encouraging the formation of collective identities and group mobilization.

This study is important not only for sociologists but may also be useful for the public at large, policy makers, social workers, school officials, and organizers. This research's

primary goal is to help the public understand Islam and its place in Europe. More specifically, this research could provide school officials and social workers with tools that promote the development of a healthy identity among children of immigrants in adolescence. These findings also hope to inform the creation of programs and structures that decrease marginalization and increase political engagement of immigrant populations. Policy makers in the US and in Europe are struggling to balance public opinion on migration with the reality of an increasingly diverse population. These findings may help policy makers across the world develop national policies that improve understanding between groups and incorporation of immigrants. Finally, these findings could be useful to community leaders as they seek to mobilize their group and push forward for change. By participating in political acts, individuals can contribute to the national political discourse and increase their agency. This research shows how descendants of immigrants can play an active role in shaping their future in Western Europe.

## Appendix A

### Additional Tables

Table A.1: Demographics, country, and random effects for Christian and Muslim children of immigrants in four European countries from 2010 to 2013, with population weights (additional variables for Table 2.4, N=2,086).

	Religious identity salience			Frequency of prayer			Attendance at religious events		
<b>Fixed estimates</b>									
Baseline and Growth	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>
Parental background	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>
School context and social boundaries	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>	<i>included</i>
Demographics									
Girl	0.017 (0.345)	0.038 (0.779)	0.038 (0.779)	-0.180 (-1.721)	-0.158 (-1.541)	-0.158 (-1.541)	-0.293*** (-4.040)	-0.281*** (-4.243)	-0.281*** (-4.243)
Age in 9th grade <sup>a</sup>	0.002 (0.037)	-0.010 (-0.227)	-0.010 (-0.227)	-0.179* (-2.132)	-0.196* (-2.422)	-0.196* (-2.422)	-0.123* (-2.299)	-0.133** (-2.763)	-0.133** (-2.763)
England	0.178 (1.811)	0.143 (1.375)	0.143 (1.375)	0.261 (1.487)	0.153 (0.858)	0.153 (0.858)	0.277* (2.297)	0.154 (1.412)	0.154 (1.412)
( <i>ref=Germany</i> )	0.251** (2.976)	0.215* (2.544)	0.215* (2.544)	0.010 (0.073)	-0.107 (-0.783)	-0.107 (-0.783)	-0.114 (-1.313)	-0.172* (-1.986)	-0.172* (-1.986)
Netherlands	0.050 (0.654)	-0.000 (-0.003)	-0.000 (-0.003)	-0.528*** (-4.410)	-0.594*** (-5.183)	-0.594*** (-5.183)	-0.200* (-2.499)	-0.251*** (-3.206)	-0.251*** (-3.206)
Sweden									
<b>Random estimates</b>									
Baseline ( $\sigma_{\mu_0}^2$ )	0.508*** (12.321)	0.362*** (12.694)	0.342*** (12.276)	1.910*** (17.894)	1.653*** (17.832)	1.584*** (16.749)	0.742*** (12.381)	0.573*** (11.406)	0.547*** (11.126)
Growth ( $\sigma_{\mu_1}^2$ )	0.032** (2.951)	0.032** (2.925)	0.032** (2.925)	0.111*** (3.566)	0.111*** (3.556)	0.111*** (3.552)	0.030 (1.511)	0.031 (1.530)	0.031 (1.539)
Covariance growth and baseline ( $\sigma_{\mu_{01}}^2$ )	0.006 (0.444)	0.010 (0.683)	0.010 (0.742)	-0.128** (-3.002)	-0.118** (-2.999)	-0.114** (-2.826)	-0.027 (-1.191)	-0.014 (-0.642)	-0.015 (-0.695)
Level-1 errors ( $\sigma_{\epsilon}^2$ )	0.210*** (15.512)	0.210*** (15.448)	0.210*** (15.434)	0.654*** (16.237)	0.654*** (16.213)	0.654*** (16.198)	0.310*** (9.557)	0.310*** (9.550)	0.310*** (9.556)

t-statistics in parenthesis, \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

<sup>a</sup> Variable centered on median.

Estimates based on population design and survey weights scaled for equal weights by country.

Source: 2010 - 2013 CILS4EU.



Table A.2: Fixed effects linear models on political participation for children of immigrants in twenty European countries between 2010 and 2016, clustered by country (N=8,129).

	(1) Affiliated	(2) Religious discrimination	(3) Identity and discrimination	(4) By affiliation
Religious attendance (ref=never)				
Rarely	0.146* (0.057)	0.065 (0.039)	0.142* (0.056)	0.105 (0.061)
Only for holy days	0.145 (0.102)	0.087 (0.067)	0.145 (0.100)	0.145 (0.075)
At least once a month	0.020 (0.141)	0.334* (0.131)	0.039 (0.152)	0.509** (0.162)
Once a week	-0.087 (0.349)	0.215* (0.096)	-0.085 (0.351)	0.317** (0.091)
More than once a week	-0.009 (0.941)	0.302* (0.121)	0.015 (0.941)	0.638** (0.189)
Religiously affiliated	-0.188*** (0.028)		-0.171*** (0.032)	
Attendance if religiously affiliated				
Rarely	-0.052 (0.060)		-0.084 (0.062)	
Only for holy days	0.011 (0.109)		-0.004 (0.106)	
At least once a month	0.456* (0.186)		0.413 (0.202)	
Once a week	0.431 (0.326)		0.382 (0.322)	
More than once a week	0.523 (1.014)		0.356 (1.010)	
Religious discrimination		0.034 (0.165)	0.689 (0.338)	
Attendance if discriminated				
Rarely		0.432* (0.196)	0.647 (0.472)	
Only for holy days		0.012 (0.338)	0.321 (0.371)	
At least once a month		0.265 (0.482)	-1.706*** (0.388)	
Once a week		0.345 (0.276)	0.582 (0.300)	
More than once a week		0.879 (0.471)	1.130* (0.416)	
Religious affiliation and discriminated			-0.906* (0.374)	
Attendance if affiliated and discriminated				
Rarely			0.040 (0.556)	
Only for holy days			-0.055 (0.515)	
At least once a month			2.267* (0.848)	

Table A.2 (*Continued*)

	(1) Affiliated	(2) Religious discrimination	(3) Identity and discrimination	(4) By affiliation
Affiliation (ref=Christian: mainstream)				
Christian: other				0.224 (0.216)
Muslim				-0.232* (0.083)
Unaffiliated				0.158** (0.045)
Attendance by affiliation				
Rarely: other Christian				-0.417 (0.229)
Rarely: Muslim				0.095 (0.128)
Rarely: unaffiliated				0.032 (0.084)
Only for holy days: other Christian				-0.384 (0.225)
Only for holy days: Muslim				0.217 (0.165)
Only for holy days: unaffiliated				-0.011 (0.103)
At least once a month: other Christian				-0.467 (0.238)
At least once a month: Muslim				-0.098 (0.163)
At least once a month: unaffiliated				-0.498* (0.190)
Once a week: other Christian				-0.444 (0.334)
Once a week: Muslim				0.304 (0.153)
Once a week: unaffiliated				-0.404 (0.309)
More than once a week: other Christian				-0.973** (0.332)
More than once a week: Muslim				0.082 (0.260)
More than once a week: unaffiliated				-0.687 (0.997)
Constant	0.510*** (0.084)	0.393*** (0.091)	0.486*** (0.087)	0.406** (0.108)

All models include individual controls.

Standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).

## Appendix B

### Description of Policy Scores

Table B.1: Multiculturalism: policy strands, dimensions, indicators, and scores.

Indicators	Description	Scoring	
		100	0
<b>Multiculturalism score</b>			
Average scores for education, employment, legal system, and politics			
Average of scores for recognizing, enabling, and encouraging diversity			
<i>Average of scores below</i>			
<b>Education</b>		One or two of these	Migrants only benefit from general support.
<i>Recognizes cultural diversity in schools</i>			If there is targeted support for migrants, it is only through non-governmental initiatives.
Educational guidance at all levels	Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory education (pre-primary to higher);		
	a. Written information on educational system in migrant languages of origin;		
	b. Provision of resource persons/centers for orientation of migrant pupils;		
	c. Provision of interpretation services for families of migrant pupils for general educational advice and guidance at all levels.		

*Continued*

Table B.1 (*Continued*)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Provision of support to learn language of instruction	<p>Provision of continuous and ongoing education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. In compulsory education (both primary and secondary);</li> <li>b. In pre-primary education.</li> </ul> <p>Note: Migrant pupils may be placed in the mainstream classroom or a separate classroom for a transitional phase. This question relates to language support in either case.</p> <p>Provision includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Communicative literacy (general fluency in reading, writing, and communicating in the language);</li> <li>b. Academic literacy (fluency in studying, researching, and communicating in the language in the school academic setting).</li> </ul> <p>Provision includes quality measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Requirement for courses to use established second-language learning standards;</li> <li>b. Requirement for teachers to be specialized and certified in these standards;</li> <li>c. Curriculum standards are monitored by a state body.</li> </ul>	Both of these	One of these	No provision (only through private or community initiatives)
		Both of these	Only one of these	Level/goals not specified or defined.
		Two or more of these	At least one of these	None of these elements.

*Continued*

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Migrant monitoring	Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants	System dis-aggregates migrants into various sub-groups, e.g. gender, country of origin	System monitors migrants as a single aggregated group	None. Migrants are only included in general categories for monitoring that apply to all students.
Measures to address educational situation of migrant groups	Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups: a. Systematic provision of guidance (e.g. teaching assistance, homework support); b. Systematic provision of financial resources.	Both of these	One of these	None. Migrants only benefit from general support. If there is targeted support for migrants, it is only through voluntary initiatives.
Teacher training to reflect migrants' learning needs	Teacher training and professional development programs require courses that address migrant pupils' learning needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils, and specific teaching strategies to address this: a. Topic required in pre-service training in order to qualify as a teacher; b. Topic required in obligatory in-service professional development training.	A or B required	A or B offered extensively to teachers	A or B only on ad hoc / project basis
<i>Enables cultural diversity in schools</i>	Provision of option (in our outside school) to learn immigrant languages <sup>a</sup>	<i>Average of scores below</i> State regulations / recommendations.	Bilateral agreements or schemes financed by another country (please specify countries and languages)	No provision. Only through private or community initiatives.

Continued

Table B.1 (*Continued*)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
	Option on immigrant languages is delivered: a. In the regular school day (may involve missing other subjects); b. As an adaptation of foreign-language courses in school, which may be open to all students (equal status as other languages); c. Outside school, with some state funding.	Two or more of these	One of these	No delivery in school or funding by state
Support for teaching immigrant cultures <sup>a</sup>	Provision of option (in or outside school) to learn about migrant pupils' cultures and their / their parents' country of origin	State regulations / recommendations.	Bilateral agreements or schemes financed by another country (please specify countries)	No provision. Only through private or community initiatives
	Option on cultures of origin is delivered: a. In the regular school day (may involve missing other subjects); b. Integrated into the school curriculum, which may be open to all students; c. Outside school, with some state funding.	Two or more of these	One of these	No delivery in school or funding by state
Measures to counter segregation of migrant pupils and promote integration	Measures to promote societal integration: a. Measures to encourage schools with few migrant pupils to attract more migrant pupils and schools with many to attract more non-migrant pupils; b. Measures to link schools with few migrant pupils and many migrant pupils (curricular or extra-curricular).	Both of these	One of these	None. Only general measures

*Continued*

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Measures to support migrant parents and communities	Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children: a. Requirement for community-level support for parental involvement in their children's learning (e.g. community outreach workers); b. Requirement for school-level support to link migrant students and their schools (e.g. school liaison workers); c. Measures to encourage migrant parents to be involved in school governance.	Two or more of these	One of these	None. Migrant parents and communities are only included in general categories that apply to all
Measures to bring migrants into the teacher workforce	Measures (e.g. campaigns, incentives, support) to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce: a. To encourage more migrants to study and qualify as teachers; b. To encourage more migrants to enter the teacher workforce.	Both of these	One of these	None
<i>Encourages cultural diversity in schools</i>		<i>Average of scores below</i>		
School curriculum to reflect diversity	The official aims of intercultural education include the appreciation of cultural diversity, and is delivered: a. As a stand-alone curriculum subject; b. Integrated throughout the curriculum.	Both of these	One of these	Intercultural education not included in curriculum, or intercultural education does not include appreciation of cultural diversity
State supported information initiatives	State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout society.	Initiatives part of mandate of state-subsidized (please name)	Initiatives part of state budget line for ad hoc funding	Neither

Continued

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Adapting curriculum to reflect diversity	The school curricula and teaching materials can be modified to reflect changes in the diversity of the school population: a. State guidance on curricular change to reflect both national and local population variations; b. Inspection, evaluation and monitoring of implementation of (a).	Both of these	Only a	None
Adapting daily school life to reflect diversity	Daily life at school can be adapted based on cultural or religious needs in order to avoid exclusion of pupils. Such adaptations might include one or a few of the following: Changes to the existing school timetable and religious holidays; educational activities; dress codes and clothing; school menus.	State regulations or guidelines concerning local adaptation (please specify which adaptations)	Law allows for local or school-level discretion (please specify which adaptations)	No specific adaptation foreseen in law
Teacher training to reflect diversity	Teacher training and professional development programs require intercultural education and the appreciation of cultural diversity for all teachers: a. Topic required in pre-service training in order to qualify as a teacher; b. Topic required in obligatory in-service professional development training.	A or B required	A or B offered extensively to teachers	A or B only on ad hoc / project basis

*Continued*



Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
<b>Employment</b>		Average of scores for recognizing diversity		
<i>Recognizes cultural diversity in employment opportunities</i>		<i>Average of scores below</i>		
State facilitation of recognition of qualifications	State facilitation of recognition of qualifications obtained abroad: a) existence of one-stop-shop for TCN applicants to submit application for recognition of qualifications; b) national guidelines on fair procedures, time-lines and fees for assessments by professional, governmental, and non-governmental organizations. Do all TCNs have access to: a. Targeted training for TCNs other than generic language training (e.g. bridging courses, job specific language training, etc.); b. Programmes to encourage hiring of TCNs (e.g. employer incentives, work placements, public sector commitments, etc.).	A and b (please specify content)	A or b (please specify content)	Only ad hoc (mainly projects implemented by NGOs)
Economic integration measures of youth and women	Targeted measures to further the integration of TCNs into the labour market; a. National programs to address labor market situation of migrant youth; b. National programs to address labor market situation of migrant women.	Both (please specify content)	One of these (please specify content)	Only ad hoc (mainly projects implemented by NGOs)

Continued

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Support to access public employment services	Support to access public employment services; a) Right to resource person, mentor, coach linked to public employment service is part of integration policy for newcomers; b) Training required of public employment service staff on specific needs of migrants.	Both (please specify)	One (please specify)	None. Only ad hoc projects implemented by NGOs)
Active information policy	Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers at national level (or regional in federal states)	Policy of information by state targeted at migrant workers and/or employers on individual basis (through individualized meeting or one-stop-shop)	Policy of information on general basis (through individual campaigns in certain regions, brochures, websites updated on a regular basis)	No active policy of information in the last year
<b>Legal system</b>		Average of scores for enabling and encouraging diversity		
<i>Enables cultural diversity legally</i>		<i>Average of scores below</i>		
Family reunification requirements <sup>a</sup>	Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad	No OR Voluntary course/information (please specify which)	Requirement to take a language course	Requirement includes language test/assessment
	Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad, e.g. not language, but social/cultural	None OR voluntary information/course (please specify)	Requirement to take an integration course	Requirement to pass an integration test/assessment
	Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory (Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other for country of assessments.)	No OR Voluntary course/information (please specify which)	Requirement to take a language course	Requirement includes language test/assessment

Continued

Table B.1 (*Continued*)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Naturalization requirements <sup>a</sup>	Level of language requirement:	A1 or less set as standard	A2 set as standard	B1 or higher set as standard. OR no based on administrative discretion. (please specify which)
	Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other for country of assessments.			Requirement includes integration test/assessment
	Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory e.g. not language but social/cultural Which applicants are entitled to state-funded courses in order to pass the requirement?	No OR course/information (please specify which) All applicants	Requirement to take an integration course	None (only ad hoc projects)
Naturalization requirements <sup>a</sup>	Language requirement:	No Assessment OR A1 or less set as standard (please specify which)	A2 set as standard	B1 or higher set as standard. OR no based on administrative discretion (please specify which)
	Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other for country of assessments.			Neither of these
	Language requirement exemptions: a. Takes into account individual abilities e.g. educational qualifications; b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups e.g. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability Cost of language/integration requirement	Both of these (please specify) No costs	One of these please specify Reduced costs e.g. state intervenes to lower price for applicants (please specify amount)	Cost-covering or market costs: (please specify amount)

*Continued*

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
	Support to pass language requirement	A and b	A or b	Neither a or b
	a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions b. Assessment based on free/low-cost study guide			
	Which applicants are entitled to state-funded courses in order to pass the requirement?	All applicants.	Some applicants (please specify).	None (only ad hoc projects).
	Citizenship/integration requirement:	No Requirement OR Voluntary provision of information (please specify which).	Requirement to complete a course.	Requirement to pass an integration test/assessment
	Note: Can be test, interview, or other for country of assessments.			
	Citizenship/integration requirement exemptions:	Both of these (please specify).	One of these please specify.	Neither of these
	a. Takes into account individual abilities e.g. educational qualifications;			
	b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups e.g. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability.			
	Cost of language/integration requirement	No costs.	Reduced costs e.g. state intervenes to lower price for applicants (please specify amount).	Cost-covering or market costs: specify (please amount)
	Support to pass citizenship/integration requirement:	A and b.	A or b.	Neither a or b
	a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions;			
	b. Assessment based on free/low-cost study guide			
	Which applicants are entitled to state-funded courses in order to pass the requirement?	All applicants	Some applicants (please specify)	None (only ad hoc projects).

*Continued*

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Permanent residence language requirement <sup>a</sup>	Form of language requirement (can be test, interview, completion of course, or other for country of assessments).	No OR course/information (please specify which)	Requirement Voluntary language course.	Requirement includes language test/assessment
	Level of language requirement: Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other for country of assessments.	A1 or less set as standard	A2 set as standard	B1 or higher set as standard. OR no based on administrative discretion (please specify which)
	Form of integration requirement e.g. not language but social/cultural	No OR course/information (please specify which)	Requirement to take an integration course	Requirement includes integration test/assessment
	Language/integration requirement exemptions: a. Takes into account individual abilities e.g. educational qualifications; b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups e.g. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability	Both of these (please specify).	One of these please specify.	Neither of these
	Cost of language/integration requirement	No costs	Reduced costs e.g. state intervenes to lower price for applicants (please specify amount).	Cost-covering or market costs: (please specify amount)

*Continued*

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
	Support to pass language/integration requirement: (please specify amount)a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions; b. Assessment based on free/low-cost study guide. Which applicants are entitled to state-funded courses in order to pass the requirement?	A and b.	A or b.	Neither a or b
<i>Encourages cultural diversity legality</i>				
Dual nationality for first generation <sup>a</sup>	Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality before naturalization for first generation	All applicants	Some applicants (please specify)	None (only ad hoc projects).
		<i>Average of scores below</i>		
		None. Dual nationality is allowed	Requirement exists before naturalization, but with exceptions (when country of origin does not allow renunciation of citizenship or sets unreasonably high fees for renunciation)	Requirement exists
	Types of exemptions allowed	Both a and b	Only a or b (please specify)	Neither a or b (e.g. exemptions only for spouses, citizens of certain countries)
	a. On humanitarian grounds (e.g. for refugees, stateless); b. On accessibility grounds (e.g. cost, distance, impossibility);			
Dual nationality for second/third generation	Dual nationality for second generation	Allowed at birth or before majority	Greater facilitation than for ordinary naturalization	Same requirement as for ordinary naturalization

Continued

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
<b>Politics</b>				
<i>Enables cultural diversity in politics</i>		Average of scores for enabling and encouraging diversity		
Strength of national consultative body <sup>a</sup>	Consultation of foreign residents on national level	<i>Average of scores below</i>		
		Structural consultation (go to question 71b)	Ad hoc consultation (go to question 71b)	No consultation on national level
		Note: Consultation of immigrant population or immigrant associations exists but is not structurally organized	Note: Consultation of immigrant population or immigrant associations exists but is not structurally organized	
		Members elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents without special state intervention	Members elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents but with special state intervention, e.g. endorsement of candidates needed by the state or some members are directly selected and appointed by the state	Members of consultation body are selected and appointed by the state only
	Leadership of consultative body	Chaired by participant (foreign resident or association)	Co-chaired by participant and national authority	Chaired by national authority

Continued

Table B.1 (*Continued*)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
	<p>Institutionalization (as either right or duty of body in law or statute)</p> <p>Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the Body has:</p> <p>a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.</p> <p>b. Right to a response by the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.</p>	Both guaranteed in law/statutes	One guaranteed in law/statutes (please specify)	None guaranteed in law/statutes
	<p>Representativeness</p> <p>Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organizations must include:</p> <p>a. Both genders;</p> <p>b. Diversity of nationalities/ethnic groups</p>	Both required in law/statutes (please specify, also for any additional criteria)	One required in law/statutes (please specify)	No criteria in law/statutes
Strength of regional consultative body <sup>a</sup>	<p>Consultation of foreign residents on regional level</p> <p>Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on regional level</p>	structural consultation	ad hoc consultation or structural consultation only present in some regional entities	no consultation
	Leadership of consultative body	Structural consultation	Members elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents but with special state intervention	Members of consultation body are selected and appointed by the state only
		Chaired by participant (foreign resident or association)	Co-chaired by participant and national authority	Chaired by national authority

*Continued*



Table B.1 (*Continued*)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
	<p>Institutionalization (as either right or duty of body in law or statute)</p> <p>Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the Body has:</p> <p>a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.</p> <p>b. Right to a response by the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.</p>	Both guaranteed in law/statutes	One guaranteed in law/statutes (please specify)	None guaranteed in law/statutes
	<p>Representativeness</p> <p>Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organizations must include:</p> <p>a. Both genders;</p> <p>b. Diversity of nationalities/ethnic groups</p>	Both required in law/statutes (please specify, also for any additional criteria)	One required in law/statutes (please specify)	No criteria in law/statutes
Strength of capital consultative body <sup>a</sup>	<p>Consultation of foreign residents on local level in capital city</p> <p>Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on local level in capital city</p> <p>Leadership of consultative body</p>	<p>Structural consultation</p> <p>Members elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents without special state intervention</p> <p>Chaired by participant (foreign resident or association)</p>	<p>Ad hoc consultation</p> <p>Members elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents with special state intervention</p> <p>Co-chaired by participant and national authority</p>	<p>No consultation</p> <p>Members of consultation body must be directly selected/appointed/or approved by the state</p> <p>Chaired by national authority</p>

*Continued*

Table B.1 (*Continued*)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
	<p>Institutionalization (as either right or duty of body in law or statute)</p> <p>Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the Body has:</p> <p>a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.</p> <p>b. Right to a response by the national authority to its advice or recommendations.</p>	Both guaranteed in law/statutes	One guaranteed in law/statutes (please specify)	None guaranteed in law/statutes
	<p>Representativeness</p> <p>Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organizations must include:</p> <p>a. Both genders;</p> <p>b. Diversity of nationalities/ethnic groups</p>	Both required in law/statutes (please specify, also for any additional criteria)	One required in law/statutes (please specify)	No criteria in law/statutes
Strength of other local consultative body <sup>a</sup>	<p>Consultation of foreign residents on local level in city (other than capital) with largest proportion of foreign residents</p> <p>Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on local level in city (other than capital) with largest proportion of foreign residents</p> <p>Leadership of consultative body</p>	Structural consultation (go to question 74b)	Ad hoc consultation (go to question 74b)	No consultation (go to 75)
		Members elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents without special state intervention	Members elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents with special state intervention	Members of consultation body are selected and appointed by the state only
		Chaired by participant (foreign resident or association)	Co-chaired by participant and national authority	Chaired by national authority

*Continued*

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
	<p>Institutionalization (as either right or duty of body in law or statute)</p> <p>Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the Body has:</p> <p>a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.</p> <p>b. Right to a response by the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.</p>	Both guaranteed in law/statutes	One guaranteed in law/statutes (please specify)	None guaranteed in law/statutes
	<p>Representativeness</p> <p>Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organizations must include:</p> <p>a. Both genders;</p> <p>b. Diversity of nationalities/ethnic groups</p>	Both required in law/statutes (please specify, also for any additional criteria)	One required in law/statutes (please specify)	No criteria in law/statutes
	<p><i>Encourages cultural diversity in politics</i></p> <p>Active information policy level (or regional in federal states)</p>	<p><i>Average of scores below</i></p> <p>Policy of information by state targeted at migrant workers and/or employers on individual basis (through individualized meeting or one-stop-shop)</p>	<p>Policy of information on general basis (through individual campaigns in certain regions, brochures, websites updated on a regular basis)</p>	<p>No active policy of information in the last year</p>

Continued

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	
Public funding/support for national immigrant bodies	Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on national level	funding or support (in kind) for immigrant organizations involved in consultation and advice at national level without further conditions than being a partner in talks (or similar conditions as for non-immigrant organizations)	funding or support (in kind) dependent on criteria set by the state (beyond being a partner in consultation and different than for non-immigrant groups)	no support or funding
Public regional immigrant bodies	Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on regional level	funding or support (in kind) for immigrant organizations involved in consultation and advice at regional level without further conditions than being a partner in talks (or similar conditions as for non-immigrant organizations)	funding or support (in kind) dependent on criteria set by the state (beyond being a partner in consultation and different than for non-immigrant groups) or not in all regions	no support or funding

*Continued*

Table B.1 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Public funding/support for immigrant bodies at local level in capital city	Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on local level in capital city	funding or support (in kind) for immigrant organizations involved in consultation and advice at local level without further conditions than being a partner in talks (or similar conditions as for non-immigrant organizations)	funding or support (in kind) dependent on criteria set by the state (beyond being a partner in consultation and different than for non-immigrant groups)	no support or funding
Public funding/support for immigrant bodies in other city with largest migrant population	Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on national level in city (other than capital) with largest proportion of foreign residents	funding or support (in kind) for immigrant organizations involved in consultation and advice at local level without further conditions than being a partner in talks (or similar conditions as for non-immigrant organizations)	funding or support (in kind) dependent on criteria set by the state (beyond being a partner in consultation and different than for non-immigrant groups)	no support or funding

<sup>a</sup> Except for family reunification and naturalization requirements (which combined multiple measures within different indicators), all averages to create indicators within dimensions are the same as in the original MIPEX scale.  
Source: MIPEX 2008-2014.

Table B.2: Anti-discrimination: dimensions, indicators, and scores.

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
<b>Anti-discrimination</b> <i>Definitions and Concepts</i>	Average score of definitions, fields of application, enforcement, and equality policies	<i>Average of scores below</i>		
Law covers direct/indirect discrimination, harassment, instruction	Prohibition in the law includes direct and/or indirect discrimination, and/or harassment and/or instruction to discriminate on grounds of: a) race and ethnicity ; b) religion and belief ; c) nationality	All three grounds	Two grounds	Ground a, none, or only based on international standards or constitution, subject to judicial interpretation
Law covers discrimination by association & on the basis of assumed characteristics	Prohibition of discrimination includes by association and/or by assumption covering: a) race and ethnicity; b) religion and belief ; c) nationality	All three grounds	Two grounds	Ground a, none, or only based on international standards or constitution, subject to judicial interpretation
Law applies to natural & legal persons	Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and/or legal persons: a) In the private sector; b) Including private sector carrying out public sector activities	A and b	A or b	None
Law applies to public sector	Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector, including: a) Public bodies; b) Police force	A and b	A or b	None

*Continued*

Table B.2 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Prohibitions in law	The law prohibits: a) Public incitement to violence, hatred or discrimination on basis of race/ethnicity; religion/belief/nationality; b) Racially/religiously motivated public insults, threats or defamation; c) Instigating, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit such offences; d) Racial profiling Are there any legal provisions covering multiple discrimination?	All	A, b and c	Two of these or less
Law covers multiple discrimination	Are there any legal provisions covering multiple discrimination?	Yes, and victim has the choice of the main ground to invoke in courts - please specify	Yes but the victim has no choice on the main ground to invoke in courts - please specify	No
<i>Fields of Application</i> Employment & vocational training	Law covers employment and vocational training: a) race and ethnicity; b) religion and belief; c) nationality	<i>Average of scores below</i> All three grounds	Two grounds	Ground a, none, or only based on international standards or constitution, subject to judicial interpretation Ground a, none, or only based on international standards or constitution, subject to judicial interpretation
Education	Law covers education (primary and secondary level): a) race and ethnicity; b) religion and belief; c) nationality	All three grounds	Two grounds	Ground a, none, or only based on international standards or constitution, subject to judicial interpretation

Continued

Table B.2 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Social protection	Law covers social protection, including social security: a) race and ethnicity; b) religion and belief; c) nationality	All three grounds	Two grounds	Ground a, none or only based on international standards or constitution, subject to judicial interpretation
Access to and supply of public goods and services, including housing	Law covers access to and/or supply of goods and services available to the public, including housing: a) race and ethnicity; b) religion and belief; c) nationality	All three grounds	Two grounds	Ground a, none or only based on international standards or constitution, subject to judicial interpretation
Access to and supply of public goods and services, including health	Law covers access to supply of goods and services available to the public, including health: a) race and ethnicity; b) religion and belief; c) nationality	All three grounds	Two grounds	Ground a, none or only based on international standards or constitution, subject to judicial interpretation
<i>Enforcement mechanisms</i>		<i>Average of scores below</i>		
Procedures available for victims	Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination, to: a) judicial civil procedures; b) criminal procedures; c) administrative procedures	All three	Two of these	Only one of these
Shift in burden of proof in procedures	a) shift in burden of proof in judicial civil procedures b) shift in burden of proof in administrative procedures	A and b	Only a	None

Continued



Table B.2 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Law situation & statistical data	Would national legislation (including Procedure codes) accept a and/or b as potential evidence in court? a) situation testing b) statistical data	A and b	A or b	Neither of these
Protection against victimization	Protection against victimization in: a) employment; b) vocational training c) education; d) services; e) goods.	More than a,b	A and b	A or none
State assistance for victims	a) State (not the equality body) provides financial assistance or free court-appointed lawyer to pursue complaint before courts where victims do not have the necessary means; b) where necessary an interpreter is provided free of charge.	A and b	A or b	None
Role of legal entities in proceedings	Legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending the principle of equality: a) may engage in proceedings on behalf of victims; b) may engage in proceedings in support of victims.	A and b	A or b	Neither
Range of legal actions	Legal actions include: a) individual action b) class action c) Actio popularis	All three	Only two of these	One or none

*Continued*

Table B.2 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Range of sanctions	Sanctions include: a) financial compensation to victims for material damages; b) financial compensation to victims for moral damages/ damages for injuries to feelings; c) restitution of rights lost due to discrimination/ damages in lieu; d) imposing positive measures on discrimination; e) imposing negative measures to stop offending; f) imposing negative measures to prevent repeat offending; g) specific sanctions authorizing publication of the verdict (in a non-judicial publication, i.e. not in documents produced by the court); h) specific sanctions for legal persons.	At least 5	At least c, e and h	At least 2
<i>Equality policies</i>		<i>Average of scores below</i>		
Mandate of specialized equality body	Specialised Equality body has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination on the grounds of: a) race and ethnicity; b) religion and belief; c) nationality.	All three grounds	Two grounds	Ground a
Powers to assist victims	Specialised Body has the powers to assist victims by way of a) independent legal advice to victims on their case; b) independent investigation of the facts of the case.	All	Only one	None
Powers as quasi-judicial body	If the specialized body acts as a quasi-judicial body: a) its decisions are binding; b) an appeal of these decisions is possible.	All	Only one of these	Neither of these

Continued

Table B.2 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Legal standing in procedures	Specialised body has the legal standing to engage in: a) judicial proceedings on behalf of a complainant ; b) administrative proceedings on behalf of the complainant.	A and b	A	B or none
Powers to instigate proceedings and enforce findings	Specialised body has the power to: a) instigate proceedings in own name; b) lead own investigation.	A and b	B	None
Active information policy and dialogue	Law provides that the State itself (and not the Specialised body): a) disseminates information; b) ensures social dialogue around issues of discrimination; c) provides for structured dialogue with civil society.	All three	At least one of these	None
Ensuring compliance of mainstream legislation	On the national level there are: a) Mechanism to systematically review legislation for compliance with anti-discrimination law; b) Unit in government/ministries directly working on anti-discrimination/equality on these grounds.	Both of these	Only one of these	Neither of these
Public bodies obliged to promote equality	Law provides for: a) obligation for public bodies to promote equality in general in carrying out their functions; b) obligation for public bodies to ensure that parties to whom they award contracts, loans, grants or other benefits respect non-discrimination.	Both of these	Only one of these	Neither of these

*Continued*

Table B.2 (Continued)

Indicators	Description	Scoring		
		100	50	0
Law covers positive action measures	Law provides for: a) introduction of positive action measures on issues of ethnicity, race or religion that could also benefit people of immigrant background; b) assessment of these measures (ex. research, statistics).	Both of these	Only a	None of these

Source: MIPEX 2008-2014.

Table B.3: Political rights for foreigners: dimensions, indicators, and scores.

Indicators	Scoring		
	100	50	0
<b>Political rights for foreigners</b>			
<i>Electoral rights</i>			
Right to vote in national elections	<i>Average of scores below</i> Equal rights as nationals after certain period of residence	Reciprocity or other special conditions for certain nationalities	No right
Right to vote in regional elections	Equal rights as nationals or requirement of less than or equal to five years of residence	Requirement of more than five years of residence, reciprocity, other special conditions or special registration procedure or only in certain regions	No right
Right to vote in local elections	Equal rights as nationals or requirement of less than or equal to five years of residence	Requirement of more than five years of residence, reciprocity, other special conditions or special registration procedure, or only in certain municipalities	No right
Right to stand in local elections	Unrestricted	Restricted to certain posts, reciprocity or special requirements	No right / other restrictions apply
<i>Political liberties</i>			
Right to association	<i>Average of scores below</i> No restrictions on creation of associations by foreigners, no restrictions regarding the composition of the board of such associations	A minimal number of national citizens should be on board, other restrictions apply	No right
Membership in political parties	Equal access with nationals	Restricted access to internal elected positions	Other official/legal restrictions apply

Source: MIPEX 2008-2014.

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Tamara van der Does

*Curriculum Vitae*

IU Department of Sociology  
Ballantine Hall 744  
1020 E Kirkwood Avenue  
Bloomington, IN 47405-7103  
✉ tvanderd@indiana.edu  
www.tamaravanderdoes.com

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Professional Appointments

July 2018 - **Postdoctoral Research Fellow**, *Santa Fe Institute*, Santa Fe, NM.  
*Project:* Formation of Beliefs About Scientific Issues.  
PI: Mirta Galesic

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Education

June 2018 **Ph.D. in Sociology**, *Indiana University*, Bloomington, IN.  
*Dissertation:* Children of Immigrants' Religious Identity and Political Engagement Across Europe.  
Committee: Patricia McManus (chair), Dina Okamoto, Jennifer C. Lee, and Clem Brooks.  
*Qualifying Exams:* International Migration.  
Committee: Patricia McManus (chair), Jennifer C. Lee, and Pamela Jackson.

2016 **M.S. in Applied Statistics**, *Indiana University*, Bloomington, IN.

2013 **M.A. in Sociology**, *Indiana University*, Bloomington, IN.  
*Thesis:* The Mosque, Immigration Status, and Voting Participation Among Muslim Americans.  
Committee: Arthur S. Alderson (chair), Robert Robinson

2010 **B.A. in Mathematics**, *Wheaton College*, Wheaton, IL.  
*Institutional Honors:* *Cum Laude*  
*Urban Studies Certificate*

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Research Interests

Immigration	Sociology of Religion	Multilevel Modeling
Political Sociology	Gender, Race, and Ethnicity	Network Analysis

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Publications

Kucinskias, Jaime and **Tamara van der Does**. 2017. "Gender Ideals in Turbulent Times: An Examination of Insecurity, Islam, and Muslim Men's Gender Attitudes during the Arab Spring." *Comparative Sociology*. 16(3): 340-368.

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Manuscripts in Progress

**van der Does, Tamara** and Muna Adem. "Gendered Paths in Ethnic Identity Exploration for Young Immigrants." Revise & Resubmit at *Emerging Adulthood*.

McManus, Patricia, **Tamara van der Does** and Muna Adem. "Parental Transmission of Gender Ideology in Adolescence: Evidence from Immigrants and Natives in Europe." *Research in Progress, Working Title*.

**van der Does, Tamara**. "The Development of Religious Identities and Religious Behaviors for Children of Immigrants in Adolescence: Towards or Away from the Mainstream." *Research in Progress, Working Title*.

**van der Does, Tamara**. "European State Policies, Regional Social Contexts, and Children of Immigrants' Religiosity." *Research in Progress, Working Title*.

**van der Does, Tamara**. "Immigrant Religious Communities, Collective Identities, and Political Participation Across European Countries." *Research in Progress, Working Title*.

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### Honors and Awards

- 2017 **National Science Foundation**.  
Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Award #1738709
- 2017 **Global Religion Research Initiative, University of Notre Dame**.  
Global Religion Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship
- 2016 **Center for Research on Race and Ethnicity, Indiana University**.  
Conference Travel Award
- 2016 **Department of Sociology, Mannheim University**.  
Baden-Wuerttemberg Scholarship
- 2016 **Department of Sociology, Indiana University**.  
Advanced Departmental Fellowship
- 2013 **Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), University of Michigan**.  
Clifford C. Clogg Scholarship
- 2013 **Department of Sociology, Indiana University**.  
Schuessler Scholarship for Study at ICPSR

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### Research Experience

- 2014-2015 **Economic Research Associate, Indiana Business Research Center**, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington IN.  
*Duties: Analyze trends in demographic and economic indicators, conduct economic impact analysis and economic modeling studies, and collaborate with IBRC staff on various projects related to the business, government, and nonprofit organizations of the state of Indiana.*
- 2012 **Interviewer, Sociological Research Practicum**, Department of Sociology and Center for Survey Research, Indiana University, Bloomington IN.  
*Principal Investigator: Art Alderson*  
*Project Title: Social Status, Consumption, and Happiness.*

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## Software and Languages

R	GIS	French and English native speaker
Stata	MPlus	Spanish intermediate

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## Teaching Experience

- 2016-2017 **Graduate Teaching Assistant**, *Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)*, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.  
*Categorical Data Analysis (graduate course: Dr. Shawna Smith)*
- 2013-2017 **Associate Instructor**, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.  
*Statistics for Sociology (S371: 2 semesters)*  
*Charts, Graphs and Tables (S110: 5 semesters)*  
*Contemporary Global Social Problems (S101)*
- 2016 **Guest Lecturer**, Mannheim University, Germany.  
*Immigration to Western Europe and the US*
- 2011-2012 **Graduate Teaching Assistant**, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.  
*Introduction to Sociology (S100: Dr. Robert Robinson)*  
*Inequality, Work and Economy (S101: Dr. Youngjoo Cha)*

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## Selected Presentations

- 2017 **van der Does, Tamara**, and Jennifer C. Lee, “Ethnic Niches and High School Employment Among Hispanic Youth”.  
Population Association of America Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL
- 2016 **van der Does, Tamara**, “Belonging and Alienation: Children of Immigrants’ Religious and Ethnic Identity Development in Western Europe”.  
International CILS4EU User Conference, Mannheim, Germany
- 2014 **van der Does, Tamara**, “The Mosque, Immigration Status, and Voting Participation Among Muslim Americans”.  
Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, CA
- 2013 **van der Does, Tamara**, and Jaime Kucinkas, “The Influence of Masculinity, Islam, and Insecurity on Gender Attitudes in the Middle East and North Africa”.  
Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Boston, MA

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## Professional Associations

- 2018-Present **Council for European Studies.**  
Immigration Research Network
- 2014-Present **American Sociological Association.**  
Sections: International Migration and Sociology of Religion
- 2013-Present **Society for the Scientific Study of Religion.**